android_kernel_oneplus_msm8998/arch/arm64/Kconfig

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config ARM64
def_bool y
select ACPI_CCA_REQUIRED if ACPI
ACPI: move arm64 GSI IRQ model to generic GSI IRQ layer The code deployed to implement GSI linux IRQ numbers mapping on arm64 turns out to be generic enough so that it can be moved to ACPI core code along with its respective config option ACPI_GENERIC_GSI selectable on architectures that can reuse the same code. Current ACPI IRQ mapping code is not integrated in the kernel IRQ domain infrastructure, in particular there is no way to look-up the IRQ domain associated with a particular interrupt controller, so this first version of GSI generic code carries out the GSI<->IRQ mapping relying on the IRQ default domain which is supposed to be always set on a specific architecture in case the domain structure passed to irq_create/find_mapping() functions is missing. This patch moves the arm64 acpi functions that implement the gsi mappings: acpi_gsi_to_irq() acpi_register_gsi() acpi_unregister_gsi() to ACPI core code. Since the generic GSI<->domain mapping is based on IRQ domains, it can be extended as soon as a way to map an interrupt controller to an IRQ domain is implemented for ACPI in the IRQ domain layer. x86 and ia64 code for GSI mappings cannot rely on the generic GSI layer at present for legacy reasons, so they do not select the ACPI_GENERIC_GSI config options and keep relying on their arch specific GSI mapping layer. Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Acked-by: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2015-03-24 17:58:51 +00:00
select ACPI_GENERIC_GSI if ACPI
select ACPI_REDUCED_HARDWARE_ONLY if ACPI
select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 15:48:00 -07:00
select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
select ARCH_WANT_OPTIONAL_GPIOLIB
select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
select ARM_AMBA
select ARM_ARCH_TIMER
select ARM_GIC
select AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT_GENERIC
select ARM_GIC_V2M if PCI_MSI
select ARM_GIC_V3
select ARM_GIC_V3_ITS if PCI_MSI
select ARM_PSCI_FW
select BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT
select CLONE_BACKWARDS
select COMMON_CLK if !ARCH_QCOM
select CPU_PM if (SUSPEND || CPU_IDLE)
select DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS
select EDAC_SUPPORT
select FRAME_POINTER
select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR
select EDAC_SUPPORT
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
select GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP
select GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE
select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW
select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW_LEVEL
select GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP
select GENERIC_SCHED_CLOCK
select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER
select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER
select GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL
select HANDLE_DOMAIN_IRQ
select HARDIRQS_SW_RESEND
select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP && !(ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48)
select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
select HAVE_BPF_JIT
bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config [ upstream commit 290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb ] The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-30 03:37:41 +01:00
select HAVE_EBPF_JIT
select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT
select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
select HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG
select HAVE_DMA_ATTRS
select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
select HAVE_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD
select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER
select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
select HAVE_GENERIC_DMA_COHERENT
select HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT if PERF_EVENTS
select HAVE_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING
select HAVE_MEMBLOCK
select HAVE_PATA_PLATFORM
select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
select HAVE_PERF_REGS
select HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
select IOMMU_DMA if (IOMMU_SUPPORT && !ARCH_QCOM)
arm64: Kprobes with single stepping support commit 2dd0e8d2d2a157dbc83295a78336c2217110f2f8 upstream. Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes (jprobes) for ARM64. Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug exceptions supported on ARM v8. A software breakpoint is placed at the probe address to trap the kernel execution into the kprobe handler. ARM v8 supports enabling single stepping before the break exception return (ERET), with next PC in exception return address (ELR_EL1). The kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed, and enables single stepping. The PC is set to the out-of-line slot address before the ERET. With this scheme, the instruction is executed with the exact same register context except for the PC (and DAIF) registers. Debug mask (PSTATE.D) is enabled only when single stepping a recursive kprobe, e.g.: during kprobes reenter so that probed instruction can be single stepped within the kprobe handler -exception- context. The recursion depth of kprobe is always 2, i.e. upon probe re-entry, any further re-entry is prevented by not calling handlers and the case counted as a missed kprobe). Single stepping from the x-o-l slot has a drawback for PC-relative accesses like branching and symbolic literals access as the offset from the new PC (slot address) may not be ensured to fit in the immediate value of the opcode. Such instructions need simulation, so reject probing them. Instructions generating exceptions or cpu mode change are rejected for probing. Exclusive load/store instructions are rejected too. Additionally, the code is checked to see if it is inside an exclusive load/store sequence (code from Pratyush). System instructions are mostly enabled for stepping, except MSR/MRS accesses to "DAIF" flags in PSTATE, which are not safe for probing. [<dave.long@linaro.org>: changed to remove irq_stack references] This also changes arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h to use include/asm-generic/ptrace.h. Thanks to Steve Capper and Pratyush Anand for several suggested Changes. Signed-off-by: Sandeepa Prabhu <sandeepa.s.prabhu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-09-29 17:47:39 -04:00
select HAVE_KPROBES
select HAVE_KRETPROBES if HAVE_KPROBES
select IRQ_DOMAIN
select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select NO_BOOTMEM
select OF
select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
select OF_RESERVED_MEM
select PERF_USE_VMALLOC
select POWER_RESET
select POWER_SUPPLY
select RTC_LIB
select SPARSE_IRQ
select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE
select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
select HAVE_ARM_SMCCC
BACKPORT: arm64: split thread_info from task stack This patch moves arm64's struct thread_info from the task stack into task_struct. This protects thread_info from corruption in the case of stack overflows, and makes its address harder to determine if stack addresses are leaked, making a number of attacks more difficult. Precise detection and handling of overflow is left for subsequent patches. Largely, this involves changing code to store the task_struct in sp_el0, and acquire the thread_info from the task struct. Core code now implements current_thread_info(), and as noted in <linux/sched.h> this relies on offsetof(task_struct, thread_info) == 0, enforced by core code. This change means that the 'tsk' register used in entry.S now points to a task_struct, rather than a thread_info as it used to. To make this clear, the TI_* field offsets are renamed to TSK_TI_*, with asm-offsets appropriately updated to account for the structural change. Userspace clobbers sp_el0, and we can no longer restore this from the stack. Instead, the current task is cached in a per-cpu variable that we can safely access from early assembly as interrupts are disabled (and we are thus not preemptible). Both secondary entry and idle are updated to stash the sp and task pointer separately. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> This is a modification of Mark Rutland's original patch. Guards to check if CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK is used has been inserted. get_current() for when CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK is not used has been added to arch/arm64/include/asm/current.h. Bug: 38331309 Change-Id: Ic5eae344a7c2baea0864f6ae16be1e9c60c0a74a (cherry picked from commit c02433dd6de32f042cf3ffe476746b1115b8c096) Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@google.com>
2016-11-03 20:23:13 +00:00
select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
select HAVE_ARM_SMCCC
help
ARM 64-bit (AArch64) Linux support.
config 64BIT
def_bool y
config ARCH_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT
def_bool y
config MMU
def_bool y
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
default 14 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
default 16 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
default 18
# max bits determined by the following formula:
# VA_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT - 3
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
default 19 if ARM64_VA_BITS=36
default 24 if ARM64_VA_BITS=39
default 27 if ARM64_VA_BITS=42
default 30 if ARM64_VA_BITS=47
default 29 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48 && ARM64_64K_PAGES
default 31 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48 && ARM64_16K_PAGES
default 33 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48
default 14 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
default 16 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
default 18
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
default 7 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
default 9 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
default 11
config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
default 16
config NO_IOPORT_MAP
def_bool y if !PCI
config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
hex
default 0xdead000000000000
config STACKTRACE_SUPPORT
def_bool y
config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
hex
default 0xdead000000000000
config LOCKDEP_SUPPORT
def_bool y
config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT
def_bool y
config RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM
def_bool y
config GENERIC_BUG
def_bool y
depends on BUG
config GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS
def_bool y
depends on GENERIC_BUG
config GENERIC_HWEIGHT
def_bool y
config GENERIC_CSUM
def_bool y
config GENERIC_CALIBRATE_DELAY
def_bool y
config ZONE_DMA
def_bool y
config HAVE_GENERIC_RCU_GUP
def_bool y
config ARCH_DMA_ADDR_T_64BIT
def_bool y
config NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
def_bool y
config NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
def_bool y
config SMP
def_bool y
config HOTPLUG_SIZE_BITS
int "Memory hotplug block size(28 => 256MB 30 => 1GB)"
depends on SPARSEMEM
default 30
help
Selects granularity of hotplug memory. Block
size for memory hotplug is represent as a power
of 2.
If unsure, stick with default value.
config ARM64_DMA_USE_IOMMU
bool
select ARM_HAS_SG_CHAIN
select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
if ARM64_DMA_USE_IOMMU
config ARM64_DMA_IOMMU_ALIGNMENT
int "Maximum PAGE_SIZE order of alignment for DMA IOMMU buffers"
range 4 9
default 9
help
DMA mapping framework by default aligns all buffers to the smallest
PAGE_SIZE order which is greater than or equal to the requested buffer
size. This works well for buffers up to a few hundreds kilobytes, but
for larger buffers it just a waste of address space. Drivers which has
relatively small addressing window (like 64Mib) might run out of
virtual space with just a few allocations.
With this parameter you can specify the maximum PAGE_SIZE order for
DMA IOMMU buffers. Larger buffers will be aligned only to this
specified order. The order is expressed as a power of two multiplied
by the PAGE_SIZE.
endif
config SWIOTLB
def_bool y
config IOMMU_HELPER
def_bool SWIOTLB
config KERNEL_MODE_NEON
def_bool y
config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
def_bool y
config PGTABLE_LEVELS
int
default 2 if ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_36
default 2 if ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_42
default 3 if ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48
default 3 if ARM64_4K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_39
default 3 if ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_47
default 4 if !ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48
config MSM_GVM
bool "Enable virtualization Support for MSM kernel"
help
This enables support for MSM Kernel based virtual
machine for any platform.
This helps to enable virtual driver support.
This should work on 64bit machine.
If you don't know what to do here, say N.
config MSM_GVM_QUIN
bool "Enable virtualization Support for MSM kernel required for QUIN platform"
help
This enables support for MSM Kernel based virtual
machine for QUIN platform.
This helps to enable virtual driver support.
This should work on 64bit machine.
If you don't know what to do here, say N.
source "init/Kconfig"
source "kernel/Kconfig.freezer"
source "arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms"
menu "Bus support"
config PCI
bool "PCI support"
help
This feature enables support for PCI bus system. If you say Y
here, the kernel will include drivers and infrastructure code
to support PCI bus devices.
config PCI_DOMAINS
def_bool PCI
config PCI_DOMAINS_GENERIC
def_bool PCI
config PCI_SYSCALL
def_bool PCI
source "drivers/pci/Kconfig"
source "drivers/pci/pcie/Kconfig"
source "drivers/pci/hotplug/Kconfig"
endmenu
menu "Kernel Features"
menu "ARM errata workarounds via the alternatives framework"
config ARM64_ERRATUM_826319
bool "Cortex-A53: 826319: System might deadlock if a write cannot complete until read data is accepted"
default y
help
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
erratum 826319 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 with an AMBA 4 ACE or
AXI master interface and an L2 cache.
If a Cortex-A53 uses an AMBA AXI4 ACE interface to other processors
and is unable to accept a certain write via this interface, it will
not progress on read data presented on the read data channel and the
system can deadlock.
The workaround promotes data cache clean instructions to
data cache clean-and-invalidate.
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_827319
bool "Cortex-A53: 827319: Data cache clean instructions might cause overlapping transactions to the interconnect"
default y
help
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
erratum 827319 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 with an AMBA 5 CHI
master interface and an L2 cache.
Under certain conditions this erratum can cause a clean line eviction
to occur at the same time as another transaction to the same address
on the AMBA 5 CHI interface, which can cause data corruption if the
interconnect reorders the two transactions.
The workaround promotes data cache clean instructions to
data cache clean-and-invalidate.
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_824069
bool "Cortex-A53: 824069: Cache line might not be marked as clean after a CleanShared snoop"
default y
help
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
erratum 824069 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 when it is connected
to a coherent interconnect.
If a Cortex-A53 processor is executing a store or prefetch for
write instruction at the same time as a processor in another
cluster is executing a cache maintenance operation to the same
address, then this erratum might cause a clean cache line to be
incorrectly marked as dirty.
The workaround promotes data cache clean instructions to
data cache clean-and-invalidate.
Please note that this option does not necessarily enable the
workaround, as it depends on the alternative framework, which will
only patch the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_819472
bool "Cortex-A53: 819472: Store exclusive instructions might cause data corruption"
default y
help
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
erratum 819472 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p1 with an L2 cache
present when it is connected to a coherent interconnect.
If the processor is executing a load and store exclusive sequence at
the same time as a processor in another cluster is executing a cache
maintenance operation to the same address, then this erratum might
cause data corruption.
The workaround promotes data cache clean instructions to
data cache clean-and-invalidate.
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_832075
bool "Cortex-A57: 832075: possible deadlock on mixing exclusive memory accesses with device loads"
default y
help
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
erratum 832075 on Cortex-A57 parts up to r1p2.
Affected Cortex-A57 parts might deadlock when exclusive load/store
instructions to Write-Back memory are mixed with Device loads.
The workaround is to promote device loads to use Load-Acquire
semantics.
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_834220
bool "Cortex-A57: 834220: Stage 2 translation fault might be incorrectly reported in presence of a Stage 1 fault"
depends on KVM
default y
help
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
erratum 834220 on Cortex-A57 parts up to r1p2.
Affected Cortex-A57 parts might report a Stage 2 translation
fault as the result of a Stage 1 fault for load crossing a
page boundary when there is a permission or device memory
alignment fault at Stage 1 and a translation fault at Stage 2.
The workaround is to verify that the Stage 1 translation
doesn't generate a fault before handling the Stage 2 fault.
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
bool "Cortex-A53: 845719: a load might read incorrect data"
depends on COMPAT
default y
help
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
erratum 845719 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p4.
When running a compat (AArch32) userspace on an affected Cortex-A53
part, a load at EL0 from a virtual address that matches the bottom 32
bits of the virtual address used by a recent load at (AArch64) EL1
might return incorrect data.
The workaround is to write the contextidr_el1 register on exception
return to a 32-bit task.
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
bool "Cortex-A53: 843419: A load or store might access an incorrect address"
depends on MODULES
default y
arm64: add support for module PLTs This adds support for emitting PLTs at module load time for relative branches that are out of range. This is a prerequisite for KASLR, which may place the kernel and the modules anywhere in the vmalloc area, making it more likely that branch target offsets exceed the maximum range of +/- 128 MB. In this version, I removed the distinction between relocations against .init executable sections and ordinary executable sections. The reason is that it is hardly worth the trouble, given that .init.text usually does not contain that many far branches, and this version now only reserves PLT entry space for jump and call relocations against undefined symbols (since symbols defined in the same module can be assumed to be within +/- 128 MB) For example, the mac80211.ko module (which is fairly sizable at ~400 KB) built with -mcmodel=large gives the following relocation counts: relocs branches unique !local .text 3925 3347 518 219 .init.text 11 8 7 1 .exit.text 4 4 4 1 .text.unlikely 81 67 36 17 ('unique' means branches to unique type/symbol/addend combos, of which !local is the subset referring to undefined symbols) IOW, we are only emitting a single PLT entry for the .init sections, and we are better off just adding it to the core PLT section instead. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> (cherry picked from commit fd045f6cd98ec4953147b318418bd45e441e52a3) Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
2015-11-24 12:37:35 +01:00
select ARM64_MODULE_CMODEL_LARGE
help
This option builds kernel modules using the large memory model in
order to avoid the use of the ADRP instruction, which can cause
a subsequent memory access to use an incorrect address on Cortex-A53
parts up to r0p4.
Note that the kernel itself must be linked with a version of ld
which fixes potentially affected ADRP instructions through the
use of veneers.
If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718
bool "Cortex-A55: 1024718: Update of DBM/AP bits without break before make might result in incorrect update"
default y
help
This option adds work around for Arm Cortex-A55 Erratum 1024718.
Affected Cortex-A55 cores (r0p0, r0p1, r1p0) could cause incorrect
update of the hardware dirty bit when the DBM/AP bits are updated
without a break-before-make. The work around is to disable the usage
of hardware DBM locally on the affected cores. CPUs not affected by
erratum will continue to use the feature.
If unsure, say Y.
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375
bool "Cavium erratum 22375, 24313"
default y
help
Enable workaround for erratum 22375, 24313.
This implements two gicv3-its errata workarounds for ThunderX. Both
with small impact affecting only ITS table allocation.
erratum 22375: only alloc 8MB table size
erratum 24313: ignore memory access type
The fixes are in ITS initialization and basically ignore memory access
type and table size provided by the TYPER and BASER registers.
If unsure, say Y.
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23144
bool "Cavium erratum 23144: ITS SYNC hang on dual socket system"
depends on NUMA
default y
help
ITS SYNC command hang for cross node io and collections/cpu mapping.
If unsure, say Y.
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23154
bool "Cavium erratum 23154: Access to ICC_IAR1_EL1 is not sync'ed"
default y
help
The gicv3 of ThunderX requires a modified version for
reading the IAR status to ensure data synchronization
(access to icc_iar1_el1 is not sync'ed before and after).
If unsure, say Y.
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
bool "Cavium erratum 27456: Broadcast TLBI instructions may cause icache corruption"
default y
help
On ThunderX T88 pass 1.x through 2.1 parts, broadcast TLBI
instructions may cause the icache to become corrupted if it
contains data for a non-current ASID. The fix is to
invalidate the icache when changing the mm context.
If unsure, say Y.
endmenu
choice
prompt "Page size"
default ARM64_4K_PAGES
help
Page size (translation granule) configuration.
config ARM64_4K_PAGES
bool "4KB"
help
This feature enables 4KB pages support.
config ARM64_16K_PAGES
bool "16KB"
help
The system will use 16KB pages support. AArch32 emulation
requires applications compiled with 16K (or a multiple of 16K)
aligned segments.
config ARM64_DCACHE_DISABLE
bool "Disable CPU Data Caches"
help
Disable CPU data cache usage by setting the SCTLR[C] bit during
kernel initialization. This will result in a considerable
performance impact, but may be useful in certain situations.
If you are not sure what to do, select 'N' here.
config ARM64_ICACHE_DISABLE
bool "Disable CPU Instruction Caches"
help
Disable CPU instruction cache usage by setting the SCTLR[I]
bit during kernel initialization. This will result in a
considerable performance impact, but may be useful in certain
situations.
If you are not sure what to do, select 'N' here.
config ARM64_64K_PAGES
bool "64KB"
help
This feature enables 64KB pages support (4KB by default)
allowing only two levels of page tables and faster TLB
look-up. AArch32 emulation requires applications compiled
with 64K aligned segments.
endchoice
config MSM_APP_API
bool "API support to enable / disable app settings for MSM8996"
depends on ARCH_MSM8996 && (ENABLE_FP_SIMD_SETTINGS || MSM_APP_SETTINGS)
help
Add API support to enable / disable the app settings to be used
at runtime. These APIs are used to enable / disable app setting
when specific aarch32 or aarch64 processes are running.
If you are not sure what to do, select 'N' here.
config ENABLE_FP_SIMD_SETTINGS
bool "Enable FP(Floating Point) Settings for Qualcomm MSM8996"
depends on ARCH_MSM8996
select MSM_APP_API
help
Enable FP(Floating Point) and SIMD settings for the MSM8996 during
the execution of the aarch32 processes and disable these settings
when you switch to the aarch64 processes.
If you are not sure what to do, select 'N' here.
config MSM_APP_SETTINGS
bool "Support to enable / disable app settings for MSM8996"
depends on ARCH_MSM8996
select MSM_APP_API
help
Expose an interface used by the userspace at runtime to
enable / disable the app specific settings.
If you are not sure what to do, select 'N' here.
choice
prompt "Virtual address space size"
default ARM64_VA_BITS_39 if ARM64_4K_PAGES
default ARM64_VA_BITS_47 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
default ARM64_VA_BITS_42 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
help
Allows choosing one of multiple possible virtual address
space sizes. The level of translation table is determined by
a combination of page size and virtual address space size.
config ARM64_VA_BITS_36
bool "36-bit" if EXPERT
depends on ARM64_16K_PAGES
config ARM64_VA_BITS_39
bool "39-bit"
depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES
config ARM64_VA_BITS_42
bool "42-bit"
depends on ARM64_64K_PAGES
config ARM64_VA_BITS_47
bool "47-bit"
depends on ARM64_16K_PAGES
arm64: mm: Implement 4 levels of translation tables This patch implements 4 levels of translation tables since 3 levels of page tables with 4KB pages cannot support 40-bit physical address space described in [1] due to the following issue. It is a restriction that kernel logical memory map with 4KB + 3 levels (0xffffffc000000000-0xffffffffffffffff) cannot cover RAM region from 544GB to 1024GB in [1]. Specifically, ARM64 kernel fails to create mapping for this region in map_mem function since __phys_to_virt for this region reaches to address overflow. If SoC design follows the document, [1], over 32GB RAM would be placed from 544GB. Even 64GB system is supposed to use the region from 544GB to 576GB for only 32GB RAM. Naturally, it would reach to enable 4 levels of page tables to avoid hacking __virt_to_phys and __phys_to_virt. However, it is recommended 4 levels of page table should be only enabled if memory map is too sparse or there is about 512GB RAM. References ---------- [1]: Principles of ARM Memory Maps, White Paper, Issue C Signed-off-by: Jungseok Lee <jays.lee@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Sungjinn Chung <sungjinn.chung@samsung.com> Acked-by: Kukjin Kim <kgene.kim@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@linaro.org> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: MEMBLOCK_INITIAL_LIMIT removed, same as PUD_SIZE] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: early_ioremap_init() updated for 4 levels] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: 48-bit VA depends on BROKEN until KVM is fixed] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: Jungseok Lee <jungseoklee85@gmail.com>
2014-05-12 18:40:51 +09:00
config ARM64_VA_BITS_48
bool "48-bit"
endchoice
config ARM64_VA_BITS
int
default 36 if ARM64_VA_BITS_36
default 39 if ARM64_VA_BITS_39
default 42 if ARM64_VA_BITS_42
default 47 if ARM64_VA_BITS_47
arm64: mm: Implement 4 levels of translation tables This patch implements 4 levels of translation tables since 3 levels of page tables with 4KB pages cannot support 40-bit physical address space described in [1] due to the following issue. It is a restriction that kernel logical memory map with 4KB + 3 levels (0xffffffc000000000-0xffffffffffffffff) cannot cover RAM region from 544GB to 1024GB in [1]. Specifically, ARM64 kernel fails to create mapping for this region in map_mem function since __phys_to_virt for this region reaches to address overflow. If SoC design follows the document, [1], over 32GB RAM would be placed from 544GB. Even 64GB system is supposed to use the region from 544GB to 576GB for only 32GB RAM. Naturally, it would reach to enable 4 levels of page tables to avoid hacking __virt_to_phys and __phys_to_virt. However, it is recommended 4 levels of page table should be only enabled if memory map is too sparse or there is about 512GB RAM. References ---------- [1]: Principles of ARM Memory Maps, White Paper, Issue C Signed-off-by: Jungseok Lee <jays.lee@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Sungjinn Chung <sungjinn.chung@samsung.com> Acked-by: Kukjin Kim <kgene.kim@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@linaro.org> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: MEMBLOCK_INITIAL_LIMIT removed, same as PUD_SIZE] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: early_ioremap_init() updated for 4 levels] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: 48-bit VA depends on BROKEN until KVM is fixed] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: Jungseok Lee <jungseoklee85@gmail.com>
2014-05-12 18:40:51 +09:00
default 48 if ARM64_VA_BITS_48
config CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
bool "Build big-endian kernel"
help
Say Y if you plan on running a kernel in big-endian mode.
config SCHED_MC
bool "Multi-core scheduler support"
help
Multi-core scheduler support improves the CPU scheduler's decision
making when dealing with multi-core CPU chips at a cost of slightly
increased overhead in some places. If unsure say N here.
config SCHED_SMT
bool "SMT scheduler support"
help
Improves the CPU scheduler's decision making when dealing with
MultiThreading at a cost of slightly increased overhead in some
places. If unsure say N here.
config NR_CPUS
int "Maximum number of CPUs (2-4096)"
range 2 4096
# These have to remain sorted largest to smallest
default "64"
config HOTPLUG_CPU
bool "Support for hot-pluggable CPUs"
select GENERIC_IRQ_MIGRATION
help
Say Y here to experiment with turning CPUs off and on. CPUs
can be controlled through /sys/devices/system/cpu.
config ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
arm64: Memory hotplug support for arm64 platform This is a second and improved version of the patch previously released in [3]. It builds on the work by Scott Branden [2] and, henceforth, it needs to be applied on top of Scott's patches [2]. Comments are very welcome. Changes from the original patchset and known issues: - Compared to Scott's original patchset, this work adds the mapping of the new hotplugged pages into the kernel page tables. This is done by copying the old swapper_pg_dir over a new page, adding the new mappings, and then switching to the newly built pg_dir (see `hotplug_paging` in arch/arm64/mmu.c). There might be better ways to to this: suggestions are more than welcome. - The stub function for `arch_remove_memory` has been removed for now; we are working in parallel on memory hot remove, and we plan to contribute it as a separate patch. - Corresponding Kconfig flags have been added; - Note that this patch does not work when NUMA is enabled; in fact, the function `memory_add_physaddr_to_nid` does not have an implementation when the NUMA flag is on: this function is supposed to return the nid the hotplugged memory should be associated with. However it is not really clear to us yet what the semantics of this function in the context of a NUMA system should be. A quick and dirty fix would be to always attach to the first available NUMA node. - In arch/arm64/mm/init.c `arch_add_memory`, we are doing a hack with the nomap memory block flags to satisfy preconditions and postconditions of `__add_pages` and postconditions of `arch_add_memory`. Compared to memory hotplug implementation for other architectures, the "issue" seems to be in the implemenation of `pfn_valid`. Suggestions on how to cleanly avoid this hack are welcome. This patchset can be tested by starting the kernel with the `mem=X` flag, where X is less than the total available physical memory and has to be multiple of MIN_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE. We also tested it on a customised version of QEMU capable to emulate physical hotplug on arm64 platform. To enable the feature the CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG compilation flag needs to be set to true. Then, after memory is physically hotplugged, the standard two steps to make it available (as also documented in Documentation/memory-hotplug.txt) are: (1) Notify memory hot-add echo '0xYY000000' > /sys/devices/system/memory/probe where 0xYY000000 is the first physical address of the new memory section. (2) Online new memory block(s) echo online > /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryXXX/state -- or -- echo online_movable > /sys/devices/system/memory/memoryXXX/state where XXX corresponds to the ids of newly added blocks. Onlining can optionally be automatic at hot-add notification by enabling the global flag: echo online > /sys/devices/system/memory/auto_online_blocks or by setting the corresponding config flag in the kernel build. Again, any comment is highly appreciated. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/11/17/49 [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/12/1/811 [3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/12/14/188 Change-Id: I545807e3121c159aaa2f917ea914ee98f38fb296 Signed-off-by: Maciej Bielski <m.bielski@virtualopensystems.com> Signed-off-by: Andrea Reale <ar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Patch-mainline: linux-kernel @ 11 Apr 2017, 18:25 Signed-off-by: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@codeaurora.org> [arunks@codeaurora.org: fix to pass checker test] Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
2017-04-28 14:14:14 +05:30
depends on !NUMA
def_bool y
config ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
def_bool y
# The GPIO number here must be sorted by descending number. In case of
# a multiplatform kernel, we just want the highest value required by the
# selected platforms.
config ARCH_NR_GPIO
int
default 1024 if ARCH_TEGRA
default 1024 if ARCH_QCOM
default 256
help
Maximum number of GPIOs in the system.
If unsure, leave the default value.
config QCOM_TLB_EL2_HANDLER
bool "Raise TLB conflict exception to EL2"
help
This option enables TLB conflict to be handled
by EL2.
source kernel/Kconfig.preempt
source kernel/Kconfig.hz
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
def_bool y
config ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL
def_bool y if SPARSEMEM
config ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
def_bool y
select SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP_ENABLE
config ARCH_SPARSEMEM_DEFAULT
def_bool ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
def_bool ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
config HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
def_bool ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL || !SPARSEMEM
config HW_PERF_EVENTS
def_bool y
depends on ARM_PMU
config ARM64_REG_REBALANCE_ON_CTX_SW
bool "Rebalance registers during context switches."
def_bool ARCH_MSM8996
help
Forcefully re-balance register rename pools on context switches for
improved performance on some devices.
config PERF_EVENTS_USERMODE
bool "Enable usermode access for perf events"
depends on PERF_EVENTS
help
Enable user-mode access to performance counters for perf events.
If enabled, the access permissions allowing CPU performance
counters to be accessed from user-mode are set.
If you want user-mode programs to access perf events, say Y
config PERF_EVENTS_RESET_PMU_DEBUGFS
bool "Reset PMU via debugfs node"
depends on PERF_EVENTS
help
Enable the debugfs node that can be used to reset PMUs and all
state variables associated with PMUs. If enabled, PMU and internal
state variable are cleared.
If you want to reset PMU and PMU related internal Perf variables
via debugfs then say Y.
config SYS_SUPPORTS_HUGETLBFS
def_bool y
config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE
def_bool y if ARM64_4K_PAGES || (ARM64_16K_PAGES && !ARM64_VA_BITS_36)
config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
def_bool y
config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
def_bool y
source "mm/Kconfig"
config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE
def_bool y
depends on MEMORY_HOTPLUG
config SECCOMP
bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
---help---
This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
defined by each seccomp mode.
config XEN_DOM0
def_bool y
depends on XEN
config XEN
bool "Xen guest support on ARM64"
depends on ARM64 && OF
xen/arm,arm64: enable SWIOTLB_XEN Xen on arm and arm64 needs SWIOTLB_XEN: when running on Xen we need to program the hardware with mfns rather than pfns for dma addresses. Remove SWIOTLB_XEN dependency on X86 and PCI and make XEN select SWIOTLB_XEN on arm and arm64. At the moment always rely on swiotlb-xen, but when Xen starts supporting hardware IOMMUs we'll be able to avoid it conditionally on the presence of an IOMMU on the platform. Implement xen_create_contiguous_region on arm and arm64: for the moment we assume that dom0 has been mapped 1:1 (physical addresses == machine addresses) therefore we don't need to call XENMEM_exchange. Simply return the physical address as dma address. Initialize the xen-swiotlb from xen_early_init (before the native dma_ops are initialized), set xen_dma_ops to &xen_swiotlb_dma_ops. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Changes in v8: - assume dom0 is mapped 1:1, no need to call XENMEM_exchange. Changes in v7: - call __set_phys_to_machine_multi from xen_create_contiguous_region and xen_destroy_contiguous_region to update the P2M; - don't call XENMEM_unpin, it has been removed; - call XENMEM_exchange instead of XENMEM_exchange_and_pin; - set nr_exchanged to 0 before calling the hypercall. Changes in v6: - introduce and export xen_dma_ops; - call xen_mm_init from as arch_initcall. Changes in v4: - remove redefinition of DMA_ERROR_CODE; - update the code to use XENMEM_exchange_and_pin and XENMEM_unpin; - add a note about hardware IOMMU in the commit message. Changes in v3: - code style changes; - warn on XENMEM_put_dma_buf failures.
2013-10-10 13:40:44 +00:00
select SWIOTLB_XEN
help
Say Y if you want to run Linux in a Virtual Machine on Xen on ARM64.
config FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER
int
default "14" if (ARM64_64K_PAGES && TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE)
default "12" if (ARM64_16K_PAGES && TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE)
default "11"
help
The kernel memory allocator divides physically contiguous memory
blocks into "zones", where each zone is a power of two number of
pages. This option selects the largest power of two that the kernel
keeps in the memory allocator. If you need to allocate very large
blocks of physically contiguous memory, then you may need to
increase this value.
This config option is actually maximum order plus one. For example,
a value of 11 means that the largest free memory block is 2^10 pages.
We make sure that we can allocate upto a HugePage size for each configuration.
Hence we have :
MAX_ORDER = (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + 1 => PAGE_SHIFT - 2
However for 4K, we choose a higher default value, 11 as opposed to 10, giving us
4M allocations matching the default size used by generic code.
config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
bool "Unmap kernel when running in userspace (aka \"KAISER\")" if EXPERT
default y
help
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
be used to bypass MMU permission checks and leak kernel data to
userspace. This can be defended against by unmapping the kernel
when running in userspace, mapping it back in on exception entry
via a trampoline page in the vector table.
If unsure, say Y.
config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
default y
help
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on
being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by
executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks
can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch
predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations.
This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the
branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific
instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system
firmware.
If unsure, say Y.
menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
depends on COMPAT
help
Legacy software support may require certain instructions
that have been deprecated or obsoleted in the architecture.
Enable this config to enable selective emulation of these
features.
If unsure, say Y
if ARMV8_DEPRECATED
config SWP_EMULATION
bool "Emulate SWP/SWPB instructions"
help
ARMv8 obsoletes the use of A32 SWP/SWPB instructions such that
they are always undefined. Say Y here to enable software
emulation of these instructions for userspace using LDXR/STXR.
In some older versions of glibc [<=2.8] SWP is used during futex
trylock() operations with the assumption that the code will not
be preempted. This invalid assumption may be more likely to fail
with SWP emulation enabled, leading to deadlock of the user
application.
NOTE: when accessing uncached shared regions, LDXR/STXR rely
on an external transaction monitoring block called a global
monitor to maintain update atomicity. If your system does not
implement a global monitor, this option can cause programs that
perform SWP operations to uncached memory to deadlock.
If unsure, say Y
config CP15_BARRIER_EMULATION
bool "Emulate CP15 Barrier instructions"
help
The CP15 barrier instructions - CP15ISB, CP15DSB, and
CP15DMB - are deprecated in ARMv8 (and ARMv7). It is
strongly recommended to use the ISB, DSB, and DMB
instructions instead.
Say Y here to enable software emulation of these
instructions for AArch32 userspace code. When this option is
enabled, CP15 barrier usage is traced which can help
identify software that needs updating.
If unsure, say Y
config SETEND_EMULATION
bool "Emulate SETEND instruction"
help
The SETEND instruction alters the data-endianness of the
AArch32 EL0, and is deprecated in ARMv8.
Say Y here to enable software emulation of the instruction
for AArch32 userspace code.
Note: All the cpus on the system must have mixed endian support at EL0
for this feature to be enabled. If a new CPU - which doesn't support mixed
endian - is hotplugged in after this feature has been enabled, there could
be unexpected results in the applications.
If unsure, say Y
endif
config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
help
Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
zeroed area and reserved ASID. The user access routines
restore the valid TTBR0_EL1 temporarily.
menu "ARMv8.1 architectural features"
config ARM64_HW_AFDBM
bool "Support for hardware updates of the Access and Dirty page flags"
help
The ARMv8.1 architecture extensions introduce support for
hardware updates of the access and dirty information in page
table entries. When enabled in TCR_EL1 (HA and HD bits) on
capable processors, accesses to pages with PTE_AF cleared will
set this bit instead of raising an access flag fault.
Similarly, writes to read-only pages with the DBM bit set will
clear the read-only bit (AP[2]) instead of raising a
permission fault.
Kernels built with this configuration option enabled continue
to work on pre-ARMv8.1 hardware and the performance impact is
minimal. If unsure, say Y.
config ARM64_PAN
bool "Enable support for Privileged Access Never (PAN)"
help
Privileged Access Never (PAN; part of the ARMv8.1 Extensions)
prevents the kernel or hypervisor from accessing user-space (EL0)
memory directly.
Choosing this option will cause any unprotected (not using
copy_to_user et al) memory access to fail with a permission fault.
The feature is detected at runtime, and will remain as a 'nop'
instruction if the cpu does not implement the feature.
config ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS
bool "Atomic instructions"
help
As part of the Large System Extensions, ARMv8.1 introduces new
atomic instructions that are designed specifically to scale in
very large systems.
Say Y here to make use of these instructions for the in-kernel
atomic routines. This incurs a small overhead on CPUs that do
not support these instructions and requires the kernel to be
built with binutils >= 2.25.
endmenu
config ARM64_UAO
bool "Enable support for User Access Override (UAO)"
help
User Access Override (UAO; part of the ARMv8.2 Extensions)
causes the 'unprivileged' variant of the load/store instructions to
be overriden to be privileged.
This option changes get_user() and friends to use the 'unprivileged'
variant of the load/store instructions. This ensures that user-space
really did have access to the supplied memory. When addr_limit is
set to kernel memory the UAO bit will be set, allowing privileged
access to kernel memory.
Choosing this option will cause copy_to_user() et al to use user-space
memory permissions.
The feature is detected at runtime, the kernel will use the
regular load/store instructions if the cpu does not implement the
feature.
arm64: add support for module PLTs This adds support for emitting PLTs at module load time for relative branches that are out of range. This is a prerequisite for KASLR, which may place the kernel and the modules anywhere in the vmalloc area, making it more likely that branch target offsets exceed the maximum range of +/- 128 MB. In this version, I removed the distinction between relocations against .init executable sections and ordinary executable sections. The reason is that it is hardly worth the trouble, given that .init.text usually does not contain that many far branches, and this version now only reserves PLT entry space for jump and call relocations against undefined symbols (since symbols defined in the same module can be assumed to be within +/- 128 MB) For example, the mac80211.ko module (which is fairly sizable at ~400 KB) built with -mcmodel=large gives the following relocation counts: relocs branches unique !local .text 3925 3347 518 219 .init.text 11 8 7 1 .exit.text 4 4 4 1 .text.unlikely 81 67 36 17 ('unique' means branches to unique type/symbol/addend combos, of which !local is the subset referring to undefined symbols) IOW, we are only emitting a single PLT entry for the .init sections, and we are better off just adding it to the core PLT section instead. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> (cherry picked from commit fd045f6cd98ec4953147b318418bd45e441e52a3) Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
2015-11-24 12:37:35 +01:00
config ARM64_MODULE_CMODEL_LARGE
bool
config ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
bool
select ARM64_MODULE_CMODEL_LARGE
select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
config RELOCATABLE
bool
help
This builds the kernel as a Position Independent Executable (PIE),
which retains all relocation metadata required to relocate the
kernel binary at runtime to a different virtual address than the
address it was linked at.
Since AArch64 uses the RELA relocation format, this requires a
relocation pass at runtime even if the kernel is loaded at the
same address it was linked at.
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> (cherry picked from commit f80fb3a3d50843a401dac4b566b3b131da8077a2) Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
2016-01-26 14:12:01 +01:00
config RANDOMIZE_BASE
bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> (cherry picked from commit f80fb3a3d50843a401dac4b566b3b131da8077a2) Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
2016-01-26 14:12:01 +01:00
select RELOCATABLE
help
Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is
loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts
relying on knowledge of the location of kernel internals.
It is the bootloader's job to provide entropy, by passing a
random u64 value in /chosen/kaslr-seed at kernel entry.
When booting via the UEFI stub, it will invoke the firmware's
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL implementation (if available) to supply entropy
to the kernel proper. In addition, it will randomise the physical
location of the kernel Image as well.
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> (cherry picked from commit f80fb3a3d50843a401dac4b566b3b131da8077a2) Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
2016-01-26 14:12:01 +01:00
If unsure, say N.
config RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL
bool "Randomize the module region independently from the core kernel"
depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE && !DYNAMIC_FTRACE
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all 4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to an acceptable value. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs. If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval [_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization, but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded further away if the module region is exhausted) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> (cherry picked from commit f80fb3a3d50843a401dac4b566b3b131da8077a2) Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
2016-01-26 14:12:01 +01:00
default y
help
Randomizes the location of the module region without considering the
location of the core kernel. This way, it is impossible for modules
to leak information about the location of core kernel data structures
but it does imply that function calls between modules and the core
kernel will need to be resolved via veneers in the module PLT.
When this option is not set, the module region will be randomized over
a limited range that contains the [_stext, _etext] interval of the
core kernel, so branch relocations are always in range.
endmenu
menu "Boot options"
arm64: kernel: implement ACPI parking protocol The SBBR and ACPI specifications allow ACPI based systems that do not implement PSCI (eg systems with no EL3) to boot through the ACPI parking protocol specification[1]. This patch implements the ACPI parking protocol CPU operations, and adds code that eases parsing the parking protocol data structures to the ARM64 SMP initializion carried out at the same time as cpus enumeration. To wake-up the CPUs from the parked state, this patch implements a wakeup IPI for ARM64 (ie arch_send_wakeup_ipi_mask()) that mirrors the ARM one, so that a specific IPI is sent for wake-up purpose in order to distinguish it from other IPI sources. Given the current ACPI MADT parsing API, the patch implements a glue layer that helps passing MADT GICC data structure from SMP initialization code to the parking protocol implementation somewhat overriding the CPU operations interfaces. This to avoid creating a completely trasparent DT/ACPI CPU operations layer that would require creating opaque structure handling for CPUs data (DT represents CPU through DT nodes, ACPI through static MADT table entries), which seems overkill given that ACPI on ARM64 mandates only two booting protocols (PSCI and parking protocol), so there is no need for further protocol additions. Based on the original work by Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> [1] https://acpica.org/sites/acpica/files/MP%20Startup%20for%20ARM%20platforms.docx Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Tested-by: Loc Ho <lho@apm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Al Stone <ahs3@redhat.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: Added WARN_ONCE(!acpi_parking_protocol_valid() on the IPI] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> (cherry picked from commit 5e89c55e4ed81d7abb1ce8828db35fa389dc0e90) Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linaro.org>
2016-01-26 11:10:38 +00:00
config ARM64_ACPI_PARKING_PROTOCOL
bool "Enable support for the ARM64 ACPI parking protocol"
depends on ACPI
help
Enable support for the ARM64 ACPI parking protocol. If disabled
the kernel will not allow booting through the ARM64 ACPI parking
protocol even if the corresponding data is present in the ACPI
MADT table.
config CMDLINE
string "Default kernel command string"
default ""
help
Provide a set of default command-line options at build time by
entering them here. As a minimum, you should specify the the
root device (e.g. root=/dev/nfs).
choice
prompt "Kernel command line type" if CMDLINE != ""
default CMDLINE_FROM_BOOTLOADER
config CMDLINE_FROM_BOOTLOADER
bool "Use bootloader kernel arguments if available"
help
Uses the command-line options passed by the boot loader. If
the boot loader doesn't provide any, the default kernel command
string provided in CMDLINE will be used.
config CMDLINE_EXTEND
bool "Extend bootloader kernel arguments"
help
The command-line arguments provided by the boot loader will be
appended to the default kernel command string.
config CMDLINE_FORCE
bool "Always use the default kernel command string"
help
Always use the default kernel command string, even if the boot
loader passes other arguments to the kernel.
This is useful if you cannot or don't want to change the
command-line options your boot loader passes to the kernel.
endchoice
config EFI_STUB
bool
config EFI
bool "UEFI runtime support"
depends on OF && !CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
select LIBFDT
select UCS2_STRING
select EFI_PARAMS_FROM_FDT
select EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS
select EFI_STUB
select EFI_ARMSTUB
default y
help
This option provides support for runtime services provided
by UEFI firmware (such as non-volatile variables, realtime
clock, and platform reset). A UEFI stub is also provided to
allow the kernel to be booted as an EFI application. This
is only useful on systems that have UEFI firmware.
config DMI
bool "Enable support for SMBIOS (DMI) tables"
depends on EFI
default y
help
This enables SMBIOS/DMI feature for systems.
This option is only useful on systems that have UEFI firmware.
However, even with this option, the resultant kernel should
continue to boot on existing non-UEFI platforms.
config BUILD_ARM64_APPENDED_DTB_IMAGE
bool "Build a concatenated Image.gz/dtb by default"
depends on OF
help
Enabling this option will cause a concatenated Image.gz and list of
DTBs to be built by default (instead of a standalone Image.gz.)
The image will built in arch/arm64/boot/Image.gz-dtb
choice
prompt "Appended DTB Kernel Image name"
depends on BUILD_ARM64_APPENDED_DTB_IMAGE
help
Enabling this option will cause a specific kernel image Image or
Image.gz to be used for final image creation.
The image will built in arch/arm64/boot/IMAGE-NAME-dtb
config IMG_GZ_DTB
bool "Image.gz-dtb"
config IMG_DTB
bool "Image-dtb"
endchoice
config BUILD_ARM64_APPENDED_KERNEL_IMAGE_NAME
string
depends on BUILD_ARM64_APPENDED_DTB_IMAGE
default "Image.gz-dtb" if IMG_GZ_DTB
default "Image-dtb" if IMG_DTB
config BUILD_ARM64_APPENDED_DTB_IMAGE_NAMES
string "Default dtb names"
depends on BUILD_ARM64_APPENDED_DTB_IMAGE
help
Space separated list of names of dtbs to append when
building a concatenated Image.gz-dtb.
config BUILD_ARM64_DT_OVERLAY
bool "enable DT overlay compilation support"
depends on OF
help
This option enables support for DT overlay compilation.
endmenu
menu "Userspace binary formats"
source "fs/Kconfig.binfmt"
config COMPAT
bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0"
depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT
select COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF if BINFMT_ELF
select HAVE_UID16
select OLD_SIGSUSPEND3
select COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION
help
This option enables support for a 32-bit EL0 running under a 64-bit
kernel at EL1. AArch32-specific components such as system calls,
the user helper functions, VFP support and the ptrace interface are
handled appropriately by the kernel.
If you use a page size other than 4KB (i.e, 16KB or 64KB), please be aware
that you will only be able to execute AArch32 binaries that were compiled
with page size aligned segments.
If you want to execute 32-bit userspace applications, say Y.
config SYSVIPC_COMPAT
def_bool y
depends on COMPAT && SYSVIPC
endmenu
menu "Power management options"
source "kernel/power/Kconfig"
config ARCH_HIBERNATION_POSSIBLE
def_bool y
depends on CPU_PM
config ARCH_HIBERNATION_HEADER
def_bool y
depends on HIBERNATION
config ARCH_SUSPEND_POSSIBLE
def_bool y
endmenu
menu "CPU Power Management"
source "drivers/cpuidle/Kconfig"
source "drivers/cpufreq/Kconfig"
endmenu
source "net/Kconfig"
source "drivers/Kconfig"
source "drivers/firmware/Kconfig"
source "drivers/acpi/Kconfig"
source "fs/Kconfig"
source "arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig"
source "arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug"
source "security/Kconfig"
source "crypto/Kconfig"
if CRYPTO
source "arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig"
endif
source "lib/Kconfig"