2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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/*
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* key management facility for FS encryption support.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
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*
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* This contains encryption key functions.
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*
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* Written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar, 2015.
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*/
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#include <keys/user-type.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <crypto/sha.h>
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2018-01-05 10:45:00 -08:00
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
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#include "fscrypt_private.h"
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
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2018-04-30 15:51:49 -07:00
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/*
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* Key derivation function. This generates the derived key by encrypting the
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* master key with AES-128-ECB using the inode's nonce as the AES key.
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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*
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2018-04-30 15:51:49 -07:00
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* The master key must be at least as long as the derived key. If the master
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* key is longer, then only the first 'derived_keysize' bytes are used.
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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*/
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2018-04-30 15:51:49 -07:00
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static int derive_key_aes(const u8 *master_key,
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const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
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u8 *derived_key, unsigned int derived_keysize)
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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{
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int res = 0;
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struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
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2017-10-18 08:00:44 +01:00
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DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
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struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
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tfm = NULL;
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goto out;
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}
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crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
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req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
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if (!req) {
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res = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
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CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
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2017-10-18 08:00:44 +01:00
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crypto_req_done, &wait);
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2018-04-30 15:51:49 -07:00
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res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, ctx->nonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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if (res < 0)
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goto out;
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2018-04-30 15:51:49 -07:00
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sg_init_one(&src_sg, master_key, derived_keysize);
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sg_init_one(&dst_sg, derived_key, derived_keysize);
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skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, derived_keysize,
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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NULL);
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2017-10-18 08:00:44 +01:00
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res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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out:
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skcipher_request_free(req);
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crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
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return res;
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}
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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/*
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* Search the current task's subscribed keyrings for a "logon" key with
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* description prefix:descriptor, and if found acquire a read lock on it and
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* return a pointer to its validated payload in *payload_ret.
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*/
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static struct key *
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find_and_lock_process_key(const char *prefix,
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const u8 descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE],
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unsigned int min_keysize,
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const struct fscrypt_key **payload_ret)
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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{
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2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
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char *description;
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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struct key *key;
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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const struct fscrypt_key *payload;
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
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description = kasprintf(GFP_NOFS, "%s%*phN", prefix,
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE, descriptor);
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2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
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if (!description)
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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key = request_key(&key_type_logon, description, NULL);
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2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
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kfree(description);
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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if (IS_ERR(key))
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return key;
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down_read(&key->sem);
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ukp = user_key_payload(key);
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if (!ukp) /* was the key revoked before we acquired its semaphore? */
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goto invalid;
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payload = (const struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data;
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if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key) ||
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payload->size < 1 || payload->size > FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
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fscrypt_warn(NULL,
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"key with description '%s' has invalid payload",
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key->description);
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goto invalid;
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2017-10-09 12:46:18 -07:00
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}
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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2018-04-30 15:51:49 -07:00
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if (payload->size < min_keysize) {
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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fscrypt_warn(NULL,
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2018-04-30 15:51:49 -07:00
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"key with description '%s' is too short (got %u bytes, need %u+ bytes)",
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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key->description, payload->size, min_keysize);
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goto invalid;
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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}
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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*payload_ret = payload;
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return key;
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invalid:
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up_read(&key->sem);
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key_put(key);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
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}
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/* Find the master key, then derive the inode's actual encryption key */
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static int find_and_derive_key(const struct inode *inode,
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const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
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u8 *derived_key, unsigned int derived_keysize)
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{
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struct key *key;
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const struct fscrypt_key *payload;
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int err;
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key = find_and_lock_process_key(FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
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ctx->master_key_descriptor,
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derived_keysize, &payload);
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if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
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key = find_and_lock_process_key(inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix,
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ctx->master_key_descriptor,
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derived_keysize, &payload);
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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}
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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if (IS_ERR(key))
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return PTR_ERR(key);
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2018-04-30 15:51:49 -07:00
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err = derive_key_aes(payload->raw, ctx, derived_key, derived_keysize);
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2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
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up_read(&key->sem);
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key_put(key);
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return err;
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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}
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2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
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static struct fscrypt_mode {
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const char *friendly_name;
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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const char *cipher_str;
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int keysize;
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2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
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bool logged_impl_name;
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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} available_modes[] = {
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2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
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[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = {
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.friendly_name = "AES-256-XTS",
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.cipher_str = "xts(aes)",
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.keysize = 64,
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},
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[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS] = {
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.friendly_name = "AES-256-CTS-CBC",
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.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
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.keysize = 32,
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},
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[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
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.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
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.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
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.keysize = 16,
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},
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[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
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.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
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.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
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.keysize = 16,
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},
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[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_XTS] = {
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.friendly_name = "Speck128/256-XTS",
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.cipher_str = "xts(speck128)",
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.keysize = 64,
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},
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[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_CTS] = {
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.friendly_name = "Speck128/256-CTS-CBC",
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.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(speck128))",
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.keysize = 32,
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},
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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};
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2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
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static struct fscrypt_mode *
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select_encryption_mode(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const struct inode *inode)
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2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
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{
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(ci->ci_data_mode, ci->ci_filename_mode)) {
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2018-04-30 15:51:47 -07:00
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fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
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"inode %lu uses unsupported encryption modes (contents mode %d, filenames mode %d)",
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inode->i_ino, ci->ci_data_mode,
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ci->ci_filename_mode);
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2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
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}
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2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
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if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
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return &available_modes[ci->ci_data_mode];
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if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
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return &available_modes[ci->ci_filename_mode];
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2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
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2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
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WARN_ONCE(1, "fscrypt: filesystem tried to load encryption info for inode %lu, which is not encryptable (file type %d)\n",
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inode->i_ino, (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT));
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
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}
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
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{
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if (!ci)
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return;
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crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
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2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
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kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
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}
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
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{
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struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
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/* init hash transform on demand */
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if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
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struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
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tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
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2018-04-30 15:51:47 -07:00
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fscrypt_warn(NULL,
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"error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
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PTR_ERR(tfm));
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2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
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return PTR_ERR(tfm);
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}
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prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
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if (prev_tfm) {
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crypto_free_shash(tfm);
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tfm = prev_tfm;
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}
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}
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{
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SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
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desc->tfm = tfm;
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desc->flags = 0;
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return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
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}
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}
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static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
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int keysize)
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{
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int err;
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struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
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u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
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essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
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return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
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ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
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err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
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* used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
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* configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
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*/
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err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
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if (err)
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goto out;
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out:
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memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
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return err;
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}
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void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
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{
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crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
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}
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fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-21 15:07:11 -08:00
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|
|
int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_mode *mode;
|
2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
|
|
|
u8 *raw_key = NULL;
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-21 15:07:11 -08:00
|
|
|
if (inode->i_crypt_info)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
|
|
|
res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags);
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
|
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(inode) ||
|
2017-10-09 12:15:36 -07:00
|
|
|
IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
return res;
|
2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
|
|
|
/* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */
|
|
|
|
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
|
2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
|
|
|
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
|
|
|
|
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
|
2017-03-08 15:24:43 -08:00
|
|
|
memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
} else if (res != sizeof(ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
|
|
if (!crypt_info)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
|
2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_essiv_tfm = NULL;
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
|
2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
mode = select_encryption_mode(crypt_info, inode);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(mode)) {
|
|
|
|
res = PTR_ERR(mode);
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist
|
|
|
|
* crypto API as part of key derivation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
res = -ENOMEM;
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
raw_key = kmalloc(mode->keysize, GFP_NOFS);
|
2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
|
|
|
if (!raw_key)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
res = find_and_derive_key(inode, &ctx, raw_key, mode->keysize);
|
2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
|
|
|
if (res)
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2018-04-30 15:51:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0);
|
2018-04-30 15:51:37 -07:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ctfm)) {
|
|
|
|
res = PTR_ERR(ctfm);
|
2018-04-30 15:51:47 -07:00
|
|
|
fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
|
|
|
|
"error allocating '%s' transform for inode %lu: %d",
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
mode->cipher_str, inode->i_ino, res);
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!mode->logged_impl_name)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* fscrypt performance can vary greatly depending on which
|
|
|
|
* crypto algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug
|
|
|
|
* performance problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name the
|
|
|
|
* first time a mode is used. Note that multiple threads can
|
|
|
|
* race here, but it doesn't really matter.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mode->logged_impl_name = true;
|
|
|
|
pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
|
|
|
|
mode->friendly_name,
|
|
|
|
crypto_skcipher_alg(ctfm)->base.cra_driver_name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
|
|
|
|
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, mode->keysize);
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
|
|
|
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_data_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC) {
|
2018-05-18 10:58:14 -07:00
|
|
|
res = init_essiv_generator(crypt_info, raw_key, mode->keysize);
|
2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
|
|
|
if (res) {
|
2018-04-30 15:51:47 -07:00
|
|
|
fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
|
|
|
|
"error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
|
|
|
|
inode->i_ino, res);
|
2017-06-19 09:27:58 +02:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-21 15:07:11 -08:00
|
|
|
if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
crypt_info = NULL;
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
if (res == -ENOKEY)
|
|
|
|
res = 0;
|
|
|
|
put_crypt_info(crypt_info);
|
2016-12-01 10:44:44 -08:00
|
|
|
kzfree(raw_key);
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-21 15:07:11 -08:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info);
|
2016-10-12 17:18:56 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct fscrypt_info *ci)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_info *prev;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ci == NULL)
|
|
|
|
ci = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
|
|
|
|
if (ci == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
prev = cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, ci, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (prev != ci)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_crypt_info(ci);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_put_encryption_info);
|