RDMA/ucma: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
commit a3671a4f973ee9d9621d60166cc3b037c397d604 upstream. hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index ucm_cmd_table. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
3700bfc36c
commit
6ede39a8e1
1 changed files with 3 additions and 0 deletions
|
@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
|
|||
#include <linux/module.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/nospec.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <rdma/rdma_user_cm.h>
|
||||
#include <rdma/ib_marshall.h>
|
||||
#include <rdma/rdma_cm.h>
|
||||
|
@ -1627,6 +1629,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
|
|||
|
||||
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
hdr.cmd = array_index_nospec(hdr.cmd, ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table));
|
||||
|
||||
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue