From 1f48a715af37ceffd86ee7a5f693dd2ca2dda892 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 12:53:04 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 01/45] net: pppolac/pppopns: Add back the msg_flags Commit 26fc40a09221330 ("net: pppolac/pppopns: Replace msg.msg_iov with iov_iter_kvec()") removed the msg_flags when removing the iov fields. This lead to problems with VPN data transfers. Change-Id: Ib86ab3f927c5cf36cbad0bab501575999dc2b084 Fixes: 26fc40a09221330 ("net: pppolac/pppopns: Replace msg.msg_iov with iov_iter_kvec()") Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan --- drivers/net/ppp/pppolac.c | 4 +++- drivers/net/ppp/pppopns.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppolac.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppolac.c index 0184c96579e9..3a45cf805288 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppolac.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppolac.c @@ -206,7 +206,9 @@ static void pppolac_xmit_core(struct work_struct *delivery_work) while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&delivery_queue))) { struct sock *sk_udp = skb->sk; struct kvec iov = {.iov_base = skb->data, .iov_len = skb->len}; - struct msghdr msg = { 0 }; + struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_DONTWAIT, + }; iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, &iov, 1, skb->len); diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppopns.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppopns.c index d9e06039794e..cdb4fa1af734 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppopns.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppopns.c @@ -189,7 +189,9 @@ static void pppopns_xmit_core(struct work_struct *delivery_work) while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&delivery_queue))) { struct sock *sk_raw = skb->sk; struct kvec iov = {.iov_base = skb->data, .iov_len = skb->len}; - struct msghdr msg = { 0 }; + struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_DONTWAIT, + }; iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, &iov, 1, skb->len); From 716bcfeb12b8d55d278af47b927839b382d2837a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 09:58:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 02/45] f2fs: do more integrity verification for superblock commit 9a59b62fd88196844cee5fff851bee2cfd7afb6e upstream. Do more sanity check for superblock during ->mount. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/super.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 98 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index 3a65e0132352..16462e702f96 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -918,6 +918,79 @@ static loff_t max_file_size(unsigned bits) return result; } +static inline bool sanity_check_area_boundary(struct super_block *sb, + struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super) +{ + u32 segment0_blkaddr = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment0_blkaddr); + u32 cp_blkaddr = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->cp_blkaddr); + u32 sit_blkaddr = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->sit_blkaddr); + u32 nat_blkaddr = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->nat_blkaddr); + u32 ssa_blkaddr = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->ssa_blkaddr); + u32 main_blkaddr = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->main_blkaddr); + u32 segment_count_ckpt = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ckpt); + u32 segment_count_sit = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_sit); + u32 segment_count_nat = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_nat); + u32 segment_count_ssa = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ssa); + u32 segment_count_main = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main); + u32 segment_count = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count); + u32 log_blocks_per_seg = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg); + + if (segment0_blkaddr != cp_blkaddr) { + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, + "Mismatch start address, segment0(%u) cp_blkaddr(%u)", + segment0_blkaddr, cp_blkaddr); + return true; + } + + if (cp_blkaddr + (segment_count_ckpt << log_blocks_per_seg) != + sit_blkaddr) { + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, + "Wrong CP boundary, start(%u) end(%u) blocks(%u)", + cp_blkaddr, sit_blkaddr, + segment_count_ckpt << log_blocks_per_seg); + return true; + } + + if (sit_blkaddr + (segment_count_sit << log_blocks_per_seg) != + nat_blkaddr) { + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, + "Wrong SIT boundary, start(%u) end(%u) blocks(%u)", + sit_blkaddr, nat_blkaddr, + segment_count_sit << log_blocks_per_seg); + return true; + } + + if (nat_blkaddr + (segment_count_nat << log_blocks_per_seg) != + ssa_blkaddr) { + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, + "Wrong NAT boundary, start(%u) end(%u) blocks(%u)", + nat_blkaddr, ssa_blkaddr, + segment_count_nat << log_blocks_per_seg); + return true; + } + + if (ssa_blkaddr + (segment_count_ssa << log_blocks_per_seg) != + main_blkaddr) { + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, + "Wrong SSA boundary, start(%u) end(%u) blocks(%u)", + ssa_blkaddr, main_blkaddr, + segment_count_ssa << log_blocks_per_seg); + return true; + } + + if (main_blkaddr + (segment_count_main << log_blocks_per_seg) != + segment0_blkaddr + (segment_count << log_blocks_per_seg)) { + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, + "Wrong MAIN_AREA boundary, start(%u) end(%u) blocks(%u)", + main_blkaddr, + segment0_blkaddr + (segment_count << log_blocks_per_seg), + segment_count_main << log_blocks_per_seg); + return true; + } + + return false; +} + static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct super_block *sb, struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super) { @@ -947,6 +1020,14 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct super_block *sb, return 1; } + /* check log blocks per segment */ + if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg) != 9) { + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, + "Invalid log blocks per segment (%u)\n", + le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg)); + return 1; + } + /* Currently, support 512/1024/2048/4096 bytes sector size */ if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize) > F2FS_MAX_LOG_SECTOR_SIZE || @@ -965,6 +1046,23 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct super_block *sb, le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_sectorsize)); return 1; } + + /* check reserved ino info */ + if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino) != 1 || + le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino) != 2 || + le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino) != 3) { + f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, + "Invalid Fs Meta Ino: node(%u) meta(%u) root(%u)", + le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino), + le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino), + le32_to_cpu(raw_super->root_ino)); + return 1; + } + + /* check CP/SIT/NAT/SSA/MAIN_AREA area boundary */ + if (sanity_check_area_boundary(sb, raw_super)) + return 1; + return 0; } From bd2d6cb00d1aee5df63dc95aedaf1f2b2a7d9d4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 13:34:00 -0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/45] xc2028: unlock on error in xc2028_set_config() commit 210bd104c6acd31c3c6b8b075b3f12d4a9f6b60d upstream. We have to unlock before returning -ENOMEM. Fixes: 8dfbcc4351a0 ('[media] xc2028: avoid use after free') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c b/drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c index 082ff5608455..317ef63ee789 100644 --- a/drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c +++ b/drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c @@ -1407,8 +1407,10 @@ static int xc2028_set_config(struct dvb_frontend *fe, void *priv_cfg) memcpy(&priv->ctrl, p, sizeof(priv->ctrl)); if (p->fname) { priv->ctrl.fname = kstrdup(p->fname, GFP_KERNEL); - if (priv->ctrl.fname == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + if (priv->ctrl.fname == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto unlock; + } } /* @@ -1440,6 +1442,7 @@ static int xc2028_set_config(struct dvb_frontend *fe, void *priv_cfg) } else priv->state = XC2028_WAITING_FIRMWARE; } +unlock: mutex_unlock(&priv->lock); return rc; From 531be60fc5804318989061178fe8a34eff561e03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tero Kristo Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 15:25:18 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 04/45] ARM: OMAP2+: timer: add probe for clocksources commit 970f9091d25df14e9540ec7ff48a2f709e284cd1 upstream. A few platforms are currently missing clocksource_probe() completely in their time_init functionality. On OMAP3430 for example, this is causing cpuidle to be pretty much dead, as the counter32k is not going to be registered and instead a gptimer is used as a clocksource. This will tick in periodic mode, preventing any deeper idle states. While here, also drop one unnecessary check for populated DT before existing clocksource_probe() call. Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/mach-omap2/timer.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/timer.c b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/timer.c index f86692dbcfd5..83fc403aec3c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/timer.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/timer.c @@ -496,8 +496,7 @@ void __init omap_init_time(void) __omap_sync32k_timer_init(1, "timer_32k_ck", "ti,timer-alwon", 2, "timer_sys_ck", NULL, false); - if (of_have_populated_dt()) - clocksource_probe(); + clocksource_probe(); } #if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_OMAP3) || defined(CONFIG_SOC_AM43XX) @@ -505,6 +504,8 @@ void __init omap3_secure_sync32k_timer_init(void) { __omap_sync32k_timer_init(12, "secure_32k_fck", "ti,timer-secure", 2, "timer_sys_ck", NULL, false); + + clocksource_probe(); } #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_OMAP3 */ @@ -513,6 +514,8 @@ void __init omap3_gptimer_timer_init(void) { __omap_sync32k_timer_init(2, "timer_sys_ck", NULL, 1, "timer_sys_ck", "ti,timer-alwon", true); + + clocksource_probe(); } #endif From 40a55e4f9401499ecf0d9f9076ba06f48822d1aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Adamski Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2016 14:03:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/45] clk: sunxi: Add apb0 gates for H3 commit 6e17b4181603d183d20c73f4535529ddf2a2a020 upstream. This patch adds support for APB0 in H3. It seems to be compatible with earlier SOCs. apb0 gates controls R_ block peripherals (R_PIO, R_IR, etc). Since this gates behave just like any Allwinner clock gate, add a generic compatible that can be reused if we don't have any clock to protect. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Adamski [Maxime: Removed the H3 compatible from the simple-gates driver, reworked the commit log a bit] Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/sunxi.txt | 2 ++ drivers/clk/sunxi/clk-simple-gates.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/sunxi.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/sunxi.txt index 8a47b77abfca..e8c74a6e738b 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/sunxi.txt +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/sunxi.txt @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ Required properties: "allwinner,sun4i-a10-cpu-clk" - for the CPU multiplexer clock "allwinner,sun4i-a10-axi-clk" - for the AXI clock "allwinner,sun8i-a23-axi-clk" - for the AXI clock on A23 + "allwinner,sun4i-a10-gates-clk" - for generic gates on all compatible SoCs "allwinner,sun4i-a10-axi-gates-clk" - for the AXI gates "allwinner,sun4i-a10-ahb-clk" - for the AHB clock "allwinner,sun5i-a13-ahb-clk" - for the AHB clock on A13 @@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ Required properties: "allwinner,sun6i-a31-apb0-gates-clk" - for the APB0 gates on A31 "allwinner,sun7i-a20-apb0-gates-clk" - for the APB0 gates on A20 "allwinner,sun8i-a23-apb0-gates-clk" - for the APB0 gates on A23 + "allwinner,sun8i-h3-apb0-gates-clk" - for the APB0 gates on H3 "allwinner,sun9i-a80-apb0-gates-clk" - for the APB0 gates on A80 "allwinner,sun4i-a10-apb1-clk" - for the APB1 clock "allwinner,sun9i-a80-apb1-clk" - for the APB1 bus clock on A80 diff --git a/drivers/clk/sunxi/clk-simple-gates.c b/drivers/clk/sunxi/clk-simple-gates.c index 0214c6548afd..97cb4221de25 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/sunxi/clk-simple-gates.c +++ b/drivers/clk/sunxi/clk-simple-gates.c @@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ static void __init sunxi_simple_gates_init(struct device_node *node) sunxi_simple_gates_setup(node, NULL, 0); } +CLK_OF_DECLARE(sun4i_a10_gates, "allwinner,sun4i-a10-gates-clk", + sunxi_simple_gates_init); CLK_OF_DECLARE(sun4i_a10_apb0, "allwinner,sun4i-a10-apb0-gates-clk", sunxi_simple_gates_init); CLK_OF_DECLARE(sun4i_a10_apb1, "allwinner,sun4i-a10-apb1-gates-clk", From 10fc325c03d2b68bdaa4180a1d5efdbf58c49846 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerome Marchand Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 13:58:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 06/45] crypto: testmgr - fix out of bound read in __test_aead() commit abfa7f4357e3640fdee87dfc276fd0f379fb5ae6 upstream. __test_aead() reads MAX_IVLEN bytes from template[i].iv, but the actual length of the initialisation vector can be shorter. The length of the IV is already calculated earlier in the function. Let's just reuses that. Also the IV length is currently calculated several time for no reason. Let's fix that too. This fix an out-of-bound error detected by KASan. Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/testmgr.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index d4944318ca1f..5f15f45fcc9f 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -488,6 +488,8 @@ static int __test_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc, aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, tcrypt_complete, &result); + iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < tcount; i++) { if (template[i].np) continue; @@ -508,7 +510,6 @@ static int __test_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc, memcpy(input, template[i].input, template[i].ilen); memcpy(assoc, template[i].assoc, template[i].alen); - iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); if (template[i].iv) memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, iv_len); else @@ -617,7 +618,7 @@ static int __test_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc, j++; if (template[i].iv) - memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, MAX_IVLEN); + memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, iv_len); else memset(iv, 0, MAX_IVLEN); From 99e96ce5e3153b3543152d33b5773f34003a8892 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tom will Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 10:31:07 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 07/45] drm/amdgpu: fix array out of bounds commit 484f689fc9d4eb91c68f53e97dc355b1b06c3edb upstream. When the initial value of i is greater than zero, it may cause endless loop, resulting in array out of bounds, fix it. This is a port of the radeon fix to amdgpu. Signed-off-by: tom will Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c index 7e9154c7f1db..d1c9525d81eb 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/kv_dpm.c @@ -2258,7 +2258,7 @@ static void kv_apply_state_adjust_rules(struct amdgpu_device *adev, if (pi->caps_stable_p_state) { stable_p_state_sclk = (max_limits->sclk * 75) / 100; - for (i = table->count - 1; i >= 0; i++) { + for (i = table->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) { if (stable_p_state_sclk >= table->entries[i].clk) { stable_p_state_sclk = table->entries[i].clk; break; From 28320756e78b3e8f1520bc1c34b23a3df452569e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 16:13:15 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 08/45] ext4: check if in-inode xattr is corrupted in ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() commit 9e92f48c34eb2b9af9d12f892e2fe1fce5e8ce35 upstream. We aren't checking to see if the in-inode extended attribute is corrupted before we try to expand the inode's extra isize fields. This can lead to potential crashes caused by the BUG_ON() check in ext4_xattr_shift_entries(). Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index 263002f0389d..7c23363ecf19 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -233,6 +233,27 @@ ext4_xattr_check_block(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh) return error; } +static int +__xattr_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header *header, + void *end, const char *function, unsigned int line) +{ + struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry = IFIRST(header); + int error = -EFSCORRUPTED; + + if (((void *) header >= end) || + (header->h_magic != le32_to_cpu(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC))) + goto errout; + error = ext4_xattr_check_names(entry, end, entry); +errout: + if (error) + __ext4_error_inode(inode, function, line, 0, + "corrupted in-inode xattr"); + return error; +} + +#define xattr_check_inode(inode, header, end) \ + __xattr_check_inode((inode), (header), (end), __func__, __LINE__) + static inline int ext4_xattr_check_entry(struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry, size_t size) { @@ -344,7 +365,7 @@ ext4_xattr_ibody_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name, header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode); entry = IFIRST(header); end = (void *)raw_inode + EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size; - error = ext4_xattr_check_names(entry, end, entry); + error = xattr_check_inode(inode, header, end); if (error) goto cleanup; error = ext4_xattr_find_entry(&entry, name_index, name, @@ -475,7 +496,7 @@ ext4_xattr_ibody_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc); header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode); end = (void *)raw_inode + EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size; - error = ext4_xattr_check_names(IFIRST(header), end, IFIRST(header)); + error = xattr_check_inode(inode, header, end); if (error) goto cleanup; error = ext4_xattr_list_entries(dentry, IFIRST(header), @@ -991,8 +1012,7 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_info *i, is->s.here = is->s.first; is->s.end = (void *)raw_inode + EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size; if (ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_XATTR)) { - error = ext4_xattr_check_names(IFIRST(header), is->s.end, - IFIRST(header)); + error = xattr_check_inode(inode, header, is->s.end); if (error) return error; /* Find the named attribute. */ @@ -1293,6 +1313,10 @@ retry: last = entry; total_ino = sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header); + error = xattr_check_inode(inode, header, end); + if (error) + goto cleanup; + free = ext4_xattr_free_space(last, &min_offs, base, &total_ino); if (free >= isize_diff) { entry = IFIRST(header); From 49b2fe4b020776640268a5d75c5eca712fcc7b01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Fang Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 19:18:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 09/45] md:raid1: fix a dead loop when read from a WriteMostly disk commit 816b0acf3deb6d6be5d0519b286fdd4bafade905 upstream. If first_bad == this_sector when we get the WriteMostly disk in read_balance(), valid disk will be returned with zero max_sectors. It'll lead to a dead loop in make_request(), and OOM will happen because of endless allocation of struct bio. Since we can't get data from this disk in this case, so continue for another disk. Signed-off-by: Wei Fang Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/raid1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid1.c b/drivers/md/raid1.c index 9be39988bf06..d81be5e471d0 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid1.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid1.c @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static int read_balance(struct r1conf *conf, struct r1bio *r1_bio, int *max_sect if (best_dist_disk < 0) { if (is_badblock(rdev, this_sector, sectors, &first_bad, &bad_sectors)) { - if (first_bad < this_sector) + if (first_bad <= this_sector) /* Cannot use this */ continue; best_good_sectors = first_bad - this_sector; From 2907c91c9f9a69a3c1250dc08a146f255f26d0aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Corey Minyard Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2016 09:10:19 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 10/45] MIPS: Fix crash registers on non-crashing CPUs commit c80e1b62ffca52e2d1d865ee58bc79c4c0c55005 upstream. As part of handling a crash on an SMP system, an IPI is send to all other CPUs to save their current registers and stop. It was using task_pt_regs(current) to get the registers, but that will only be accurate if the CPU was interrupted running in userland. Instead allow the architecture to pass in the registers (all pass NULL now, but allow for the future) and then use get_irq_regs() which should be accurate as we are in an interrupt. Fall back to task_pt_regs(current) if nothing else is available. Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard Cc: David Daney Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/13050/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/kernel/crash.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/crash.c b/arch/mips/kernel/crash.c index d434d5d5ae6e..610f0f3bdb34 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/crash.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/crash.c @@ -14,12 +14,22 @@ static int crashing_cpu = -1; static cpumask_t cpus_in_crash = CPU_MASK_NONE; #ifdef CONFIG_SMP -static void crash_shutdown_secondary(void *ignore) +static void crash_shutdown_secondary(void *passed_regs) { - struct pt_regs *regs; + struct pt_regs *regs = passed_regs; int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - regs = task_pt_regs(current); + /* + * If we are passed registers, use those. Otherwise get the + * regs from the last interrupt, which should be correct, as + * we are in an interrupt. But if the regs are not there, + * pull them from the top of the stack. They are probably + * wrong, but we need something to keep from crashing again. + */ + if (!regs) + regs = get_irq_regs(); + if (!regs) + regs = task_pt_regs(current); if (!cpu_online(cpu)) return; From 1d1cb762524f05cfb37994e0d36b7b4b5e957134 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Fainelli Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 16:42:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 11/45] net: cavium: liquidio: Avoid dma_unmap_single on uninitialized ndata commit 8e6ce7ebeb34f0992f56de078c3744fb383657fa upstream. The label lio_xmit_failed is used 3 times through liquidio_xmit() but it always makes a call to dma_unmap_single() using potentially uninitialized variables from "ndata" variable. Out of the 3 gotos, 2 run after ndata has been initialized, and had a prior dma_map_single() call. Fix this by adding a new error label: lio_xmit_dma_failed which does this dma_unmap_single() and then processed with the lio_xmit_failed fallthrough. Fixes: f21fb3ed364bb ("Add support of Cavium Liquidio ethernet adapters") Reported-by: coverity (CID 1309740) Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_main.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_main.c index 7445da218bd9..cc1725616f9d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_main.c @@ -2823,7 +2823,7 @@ static int liquidio_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *netdev) if (!g) { netif_info(lio, tx_err, lio->netdev, "Transmit scatter gather: glist null!\n"); - goto lio_xmit_failed; + goto lio_xmit_dma_failed; } cmdsetup.s.gather = 1; @@ -2894,7 +2894,7 @@ static int liquidio_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *netdev) else status = octnet_send_nic_data_pkt(oct, &ndata, xmit_more); if (status == IQ_SEND_FAILED) - goto lio_xmit_failed; + goto lio_xmit_dma_failed; netif_info(lio, tx_queued, lio->netdev, "Transmit queued successfully\n"); @@ -2908,12 +2908,13 @@ static int liquidio_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *netdev) return NETDEV_TX_OK; +lio_xmit_dma_failed: + dma_unmap_single(&oct->pci_dev->dev, ndata.cmd.dptr, + ndata.datasize, DMA_TO_DEVICE); lio_xmit_failed: stats->tx_dropped++; netif_info(lio, tx_err, lio->netdev, "IQ%d Transmit dropped:%llu\n", iq_no, stats->tx_dropped); - dma_unmap_single(&oct->pci_dev->dev, ndata.cmd.dptr, - ndata.datasize, DMA_TO_DEVICE); recv_buffer_free(skb); return NETDEV_TX_OK; } From b9baa0aa66cef9e26b15372d6c56106a4f3b8439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WANG Cong Date: Mon, 16 May 2016 15:11:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 12/45] net_sched: close another race condition in tcf_mirred_release() commit dc327f8931cb9d66191f489eb9a852fc04530546 upstream. We saw the following extra refcount release on veth device: kernel: [7957821.463992] unregister_netdevice: waiting for mesos50284 to become free. Usage count = -1 Since we heavily use mirred action to redirect packets to veth, I think this is caused by the following race condition: CPU0: tcf_mirred_release(): (in RCU callback) struct net_device *dev = rcu_dereference_protected(m->tcfm_dev, 1); CPU1: mirred_device_event(): spin_lock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(m, &mirred_list, tcfm_list) { if (rcu_access_pointer(m->tcfm_dev) == dev) { dev_put(dev); /* Note : no rcu grace period necessary, as * net_device are already rcu protected. */ RCU_INIT_POINTER(m->tcfm_dev, NULL); } } spin_unlock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); CPU0: tcf_mirred_release(): spin_lock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); list_del(&m->tcfm_list); spin_unlock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); if (dev) // <======== Stil refers to the old m->tcfm_dev dev_put(dev); // <======== dev_put() is called on it again The action init code path is good because it is impossible to modify an action that is being removed. So, fix this by moving everything under the spinlock. Fixes: 2ee22a90c7af ("net_sched: act_mirred: remove spinlock in fast path") Fixes: 6bd00b850635 ("act_mirred: fix a race condition on mirred_list") Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sched/act_mirred.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/act_mirred.c b/net/sched/act_mirred.c index e384d6aefa3a..1090a52c03cd 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_mirred.c +++ b/net/sched/act_mirred.c @@ -36,14 +36,15 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mirred_list_lock); static void tcf_mirred_release(struct tc_action *a, int bind) { struct tcf_mirred *m = to_mirred(a); - struct net_device *dev = rcu_dereference_protected(m->tcfm_dev, 1); + struct net_device *dev; /* We could be called either in a RCU callback or with RTNL lock held. */ spin_lock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); list_del(&m->tcfm_list); - spin_unlock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); + dev = rcu_dereference_protected(m->tcfm_dev, 1); if (dev) dev_put(dev); + spin_unlock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); } static const struct nla_policy mirred_policy[TCA_MIRRED_MAX + 1] = { From 804605eae410ef1d1f904706eaf50400c897434b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com" Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 10:43:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 13/45] RDS: Fix the atomicity for congestion map update commit e47db94e10447fc467777a40302f2b393e9af2fa upstream. Two different threads with different rds sockets may be in rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() via receive path. If their ports both map to the same word in the congestion map, then using non-atomic ops to update it could cause the map to be incorrect. Lets use atomics to avoid such an issue. Full credit to Wengang for finding the issue, analysing it and also pointing out to offending code with spin lock based fix. Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang Signed-off-by: Santosh Shilimkar Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/rds/cong.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rds/cong.c b/net/rds/cong.c index e6144b8246fd..6641bcf7c185 100644 --- a/net/rds/cong.c +++ b/net/rds/cong.c @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ void rds_cong_set_bit(struct rds_cong_map *map, __be16 port) i = be16_to_cpu(port) / RDS_CONG_MAP_PAGE_BITS; off = be16_to_cpu(port) % RDS_CONG_MAP_PAGE_BITS; - __set_bit_le(off, (void *)map->m_page_addrs[i]); + set_bit_le(off, (void *)map->m_page_addrs[i]); } void rds_cong_clear_bit(struct rds_cong_map *map, __be16 port) @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ void rds_cong_clear_bit(struct rds_cong_map *map, __be16 port) i = be16_to_cpu(port) / RDS_CONG_MAP_PAGE_BITS; off = be16_to_cpu(port) % RDS_CONG_MAP_PAGE_BITS; - __clear_bit_le(off, (void *)map->m_page_addrs[i]); + clear_bit_le(off, (void *)map->m_page_addrs[i]); } static int rds_cong_test_bit(struct rds_cong_map *map, __be16 port) From 3e19487b9bf5076dcc2cd79da3dbd57b94d4e6b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Hunter Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 17:11:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 14/45] regulator: core: Clear the supply pointer if enabling fails commit 8e5356a73604f53da6a1e0756727cb8f9f7bba17 upstream. During the resolution of a regulator's supply, we may attempt to enable the supply if the regulator itself is already enabled. If enabling the supply fails, then we will call _regulator_put() for the supply. However, the pointer to the supply has not been cleared for the regulator and this will cause a crash if we then unregister the regulator and attempt to call regulator_put() a second time for the supply. Fix this by clearing the supply pointer if enabling the supply after fails when resolving the supply for a regulator. Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/regulator/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/regulator/core.c b/drivers/regulator/core.c index 88dbbeb8569b..f9b8c44677eb 100644 --- a/drivers/regulator/core.c +++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c @@ -1519,6 +1519,7 @@ static int regulator_resolve_supply(struct regulator_dev *rdev) ret = regulator_enable(rdev->supply); if (ret < 0) { _regulator_put(rdev->supply); + rdev->supply = NULL; return ret; } } From 5709321fd962842da490b36b8881f2c96b04608d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Felipe F. Tonello" Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2016 19:39:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 15/45] usb: gadget: f_midi: Fixed a bug when buflen was smaller than wMaxPacketSize commit 03d27ade4941076b34c823d63d91dc895731a595 upstream. buflen by default (256) is smaller than wMaxPacketSize (512) in high-speed devices. That caused the OUT endpoint to freeze if the host send any data packet of length greater than 256 bytes. This is an example dump of what happended on that enpoint: HOST: [DATA][Length=260][...] DEVICE: [NAK] HOST: [PING] DEVICE: [NAK] HOST: [PING] DEVICE: [NAK] ... HOST: [PING] DEVICE: [NAK] This patch fixes this problem by setting the minimum usb_request's buffer size for the OUT endpoint as its wMaxPacketSize. Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz Signed-off-by: Felipe F. Tonello Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c index 898a570319f1..af60cc3714c1 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c @@ -361,7 +361,9 @@ static int f_midi_set_alt(struct usb_function *f, unsigned intf, unsigned alt) /* allocate a bunch of read buffers and queue them all at once. */ for (i = 0; i < midi->qlen && err == 0; i++) { struct usb_request *req = - midi_alloc_ep_req(midi->out_ep, midi->buflen); + midi_alloc_ep_req(midi->out_ep, + max_t(unsigned, midi->buflen, + bulk_out_desc.wMaxPacketSize)); if (req == NULL) return -ENOMEM; From c583862e95d26586a1f6a2070411ea0a2023edbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefano Stabellini Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2016 18:23:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 16/45] xen/x86: don't lose event interrupts commit c06b6d70feb32d28f04ba37aa3df17973fd37b6b upstream. On slow platforms with unreliable TSC, such as QEMU emulated machines, it is possible for the kernel to request the next event in the past. In that case, in the current implementation of xen_vcpuop_clockevent, we simply return -ETIME. To be precise the Xen returns -ETIME and we pass it on. However the result of this is a missed event, which simply causes the kernel to hang. Instead it is better to always ask the hypervisor for a timer event, even if the timeout is in the past. That way there are no lost interrupts and the kernel survives. To do that, remove the VCPU_SSHOTTMR_future flag. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini Acked-by: Juergen Gross Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/xen/time.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/time.c b/arch/x86/xen/time.c index f1ba6a092854..8846257d8792 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/time.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/time.c @@ -343,11 +343,11 @@ static int xen_vcpuop_set_next_event(unsigned long delta, WARN_ON(!clockevent_state_oneshot(evt)); single.timeout_abs_ns = get_abs_timeout(delta); - single.flags = VCPU_SSHOTTMR_future; + /* Get an event anyway, even if the timeout is already expired */ + single.flags = 0; ret = HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_set_singleshot_timer, cpu, &single); - - BUG_ON(ret != 0 && ret != -ETIME); + BUG_ON(ret != 0); return ret; } From 80ec183214e8bf815ecff8f58d82d67b9842a8de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bob picco Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 14:31:19 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 17/45] sparc64: kern_addr_valid regression [ Upstream commit adfae8a5d833fa2b46577a8081f350e408851f5b ] I encountered this bug when using /proc/kcore to examine the kernel. Plus a coworker inquired about debugging tools. We computed pa but did not use it during the maximum physical address bits test. Instead we used the identity mapped virtual address which will always fail this test. I believe the defect came in here: [bpicco@zareason linus.git]$ git describe --contains bb4e6e85daa52 v3.18-rc1~87^2~4 . Signed-off-by: Bob Picco Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c b/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c index 3d3414c14792..965655afdbb6 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c +++ b/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c @@ -1493,7 +1493,7 @@ bool kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr) if ((long)addr < 0L) { unsigned long pa = __pa(addr); - if ((addr >> max_phys_bits) != 0UL) + if ((pa >> max_phys_bits) != 0UL) return false; return pfn_valid(pa >> PAGE_SHIFT); From 592d0e60a2b76b0a8ea7161d030aeb6e619ab013 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Hromatka Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 16:31:42 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 18/45] sparc64: Fix kernel panic due to erroneous #ifdef surrounding pmd_write() [ Upstream commit 9ae34dbd8afd790cb5f52467e4f816434379eafa ] This commit moves sparc64's prototype of pmd_write() outside of the CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE ifdef. In 2013, commit a7b9403f0e6d ("sparc64: Encode huge PMDs using PTE encoding.") exposed a path where pmd_write() could be called without CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE defined. This can result in the panic below. The diff is awkward to read, but the changes are straightforward. pmd_write() was moved outside of #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE. Also, __HAVE_ARCH_PMD_WRITE was defined. kernel BUG at include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:576! \|/ ____ \|/ "@'/ .. \`@" /_| \__/ |_\ \__U_/ oracle_8114_cdb(8114): Kernel bad sw trap 5 [#1] CPU: 120 PID: 8114 Comm: oracle_8114_cdb Not tainted 4.1.12-61.7.1.el6uek.rc1.sparc64 #1 task: fff8400700a24d60 ti: fff8400700bc4000 task.ti: fff8400700bc4000 TSTATE: 0000004411e01607 TPC: 00000000004609f8 TNPC: 00000000004609fc Y: 00000005 Not tainted TPC: g0: 000000000001c000 g1: 0000000000ef3954 g2: 0000000000000000 g3: 0000000000000001 g4: fff8400700a24d60 g5: fff8001fa5c10000 g6: fff8400700bc4000 g7: 0000000000000720 o0: 0000000000bc5058 o1: 0000000000000240 o2: 0000000000006000 o3: 0000000000001c00 o4: 0000000000000000 o5: 0000048000080000 sp: fff8400700bc6ab1 ret_pc: 00000000004609f0 RPC: l0: fff8400700bc74fc l1: 0000000000020000 l2: 0000000000002000 l3: 0000000000000000 l4: fff8001f93250950 l5: 000000000113f800 l6: 0000000000000004 l7: 0000000000000000 i0: fff8400700ca46a0 i1: bd0000085e800453 i2: 000000026a0c4000 i3: 000000026a0c6000 i4: 0000000000000001 i5: fff800070c958de8 i6: fff8400700bc6b61 i7: 0000000000460dd0 I7: Call Trace: [0000000000460dd0] gup_pud_range+0x170/0x1a0 [0000000000460e84] get_user_pages_fast+0x84/0x120 [00000000006f5a18] iov_iter_get_pages+0x98/0x240 [00000000005fa744] do_direct_IO+0xf64/0x1e00 [00000000005fbbc0] __blockdev_direct_IO+0x360/0x15a0 [00000000101f74fc] ext4_ind_direct_IO+0xdc/0x400 [ext4] [00000000101af690] ext4_ext_direct_IO+0x1d0/0x2c0 [ext4] [00000000101af86c] ext4_direct_IO+0xec/0x220 [ext4] [0000000000553bd4] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x140 [00000000005bdc2c] __vfs_read+0xac/0x100 [00000000005bf254] vfs_read+0x54/0x100 [00000000005bf368] SyS_pread64+0x68/0x80 Signed-off-by: Tom Hromatka Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h index 408b715c95a5..9d81579f3d54 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h +++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h @@ -668,6 +668,14 @@ static inline unsigned long pmd_pfn(pmd_t pmd) return pte_pfn(pte); } +#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMD_WRITE +static inline unsigned long pmd_write(pmd_t pmd) +{ + pte_t pte = __pte(pmd_val(pmd)); + + return pte_write(pte); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE static inline unsigned long pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { @@ -683,13 +691,6 @@ static inline unsigned long pmd_young(pmd_t pmd) return pte_young(pte); } -static inline unsigned long pmd_write(pmd_t pmd) -{ - pte_t pte = __pte(pmd_val(pmd)); - - return pte_write(pte); -} - static inline unsigned long pmd_trans_huge(pmd_t pmd) { pte_t pte = __pte(pmd_val(pmd)); From 428b3cefab22d21013c2a03b8153eefe3df1f576 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 12:39:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 19/45] net: neigh: guard against NULL solicit() method [ Upstream commit 48481c8fa16410ffa45939b13b6c53c2ca609e5f ] Dmitry posted a nice reproducer of a bug triggering in neigh_probe() when dereferencing a NULL neigh->ops->solicit method. This can happen for arp_direct_ops/ndisc_direct_ops and similar, which can be used for NUD_NOARP neighbours (created when dev->header_ops is NULL). Admin can then force changing nud_state to some other state that would fire neigh timer. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/neighbour.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index 769cece9b00b..ae92131c4f89 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -859,7 +859,8 @@ static void neigh_probe(struct neighbour *neigh) if (skb) skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); write_unlock(&neigh->lock); - neigh->ops->solicit(neigh, skb); + if (neigh->ops->solicit) + neigh->ops->solicit(neigh, skb); atomic_inc(&neigh->probes); kfree_skb(skb); } From 0e9eeb4676a770acf0d97c93db77bcbdad4eefc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Sullivan Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 15:27:01 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 20/45] net: phy: handle state correctly in phy_stop_machine [ Upstream commit 49d52e8108a21749dc2114b924c907db43358984 ] If the PHY is halted on stop, then do not set the state to PHY_UP. This ensures the phy will be restarted later in phy_start when the machine is started again. Fixes: 00db8189d984 ("This patch adds a PHY Abstraction Layer to the Linux Kernel, enabling ethernet drivers to remain as ignorant as is reasonable of the connected PHY's design and operation details.") Signed-off-by: Nathan Sullivan Signed-off-by: Brad Mouring Acked-by: Xander Huff Acked-by: Kyle Roeschley Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/phy/phy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/phy.c b/drivers/net/phy/phy.c index bba0ca786aaa..851c0e121807 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/phy.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/phy.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ void phy_stop_machine(struct phy_device *phydev) cancel_delayed_work_sync(&phydev->state_queue); mutex_lock(&phydev->lock); - if (phydev->state > PHY_UP) + if (phydev->state > PHY_UP && phydev->state != PHY_HALTED) phydev->state = PHY_UP; mutex_unlock(&phydev->lock); } From 8625dfcfd338254131a7fa650dfbcaf42e4c52ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 08:45:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 21/45] l2tp: purge socket queues in the .destruct() callback [ Upstream commit e91793bb615cf6cdd59c0b6749fe173687bb0947 ] The Rx path may grab the socket right before pppol2tp_release(), but nothing guarantees that it will enqueue packets before skb_queue_purge(). Therefore, the socket can be destroyed without its queues fully purged. Fix this by purging queues in pppol2tp_session_destruct() where we're guaranteed nothing is still referencing the socket. Fixes: 9e9cb6221aa7 ("l2tp: fix userspace reception on plain L2TP sockets") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 1ad18c55064c..cb0fa348abf9 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -467,6 +467,10 @@ static void pppol2tp_session_close(struct l2tp_session *session) static void pppol2tp_session_destruct(struct sock *sk) { struct l2tp_session *session = sk->sk_user_data; + + skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue); + skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue); + if (session) { sk->sk_user_data = NULL; BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC); @@ -505,9 +509,6 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socket *sock) l2tp_session_queue_purge(session); sock_put(sk); } - skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue); - skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue); - release_sock(sk); /* This will delete the session context via From cf71bd41f8091588c7b28ebba6eaa635a6874493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Konovalov Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 16:11:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/45] net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_frame_nr [ Upstream commit 8f8d28e4d6d815a391285e121c3a53a0b6cb9e7b ] When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result can overflow. Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX. Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would never overflow. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index d76800108ddb..b4af3f7b57ab 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -4150,6 +4150,8 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u, rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size / req->tp_frame_size; if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block == 0)) goto out; + if (unlikely(req->tp_block_size > UINT_MAX / req->tp_block_nr)) + goto out; if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) != req->tp_frame_nr)) goto out; From 25adf4e32a890244f4f53d2ab30b423efb5aab41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Konovalov Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 16:11:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 23/45] net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_reserve [ Upstream commit bcc5364bdcfe131e6379363f089e7b4108d35b70 ] When calculating po->tp_hdrlen + po->tp_reserve the result can overflow. Fix by checking that tp_reserve <= INT_MAX on assign. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index b4af3f7b57ab..f8d6a0ca9c03 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -3626,6 +3626,8 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optv return -EBUSY; if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(val))) return -EFAULT; + if (val > INT_MAX) + return -EINVAL; po->tp_reserve = val; return 0; } From f710dbd92b277232079fc662c1dd8433491b7d6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2017 12:03:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 24/45] l2tp: take reference on sessions being dumped [ Upstream commit e08293a4ccbcc993ded0fdc46f1e57926b833d63 ] Take a reference on the sessions returned by l2tp_session_find_nth() (and rename it l2tp_session_get_nth() to reflect this change), so that caller is assured that the session isn't going to disappear while processing it. For procfs and debugfs handlers, the session is held in the .start() callback and dropped in .show(). Given that pppol2tp_seq_session_show() dereferences the associated PPPoL2TP socket and that l2tp_dfs_seq_session_show() might call pppol2tp_show(), we also need to call the session's .ref() callback to prevent the socket from going away from under us. Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Fixes: 0ad6614048cf ("l2tp: Add debugfs files for dumping l2tp debug info") Fixes: 309795f4bec2 ("l2tp: Add netlink control API for L2TP") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 8 ++++++-- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 3 ++- net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c | 10 +++++++--- net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c | 7 +++++-- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 10 +++++++--- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index ec17cbe8a02b..d3dec414fd44 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -278,7 +278,8 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_find(struct net *net, struct l2tp_tunnel *tunn } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_find); -struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_find_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth) +struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth, + bool do_ref) { int hash; struct l2tp_session *session; @@ -288,6 +289,9 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_find_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth) for (hash = 0; hash < L2TP_HASH_SIZE; hash++) { hlist_for_each_entry(session, &tunnel->session_hlist[hash], hlist) { if (++count > nth) { + l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session); + if (do_ref && session->ref) + session->ref(session); read_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock); return session; } @@ -298,7 +302,7 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_find_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth) return NULL; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_find_nth); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_get_nth); /* Lookup a session by interface name. * This is very inefficient but is only used by management interfaces. diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h index 763e8e241ce3..555d962a62d2 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h @@ -243,7 +243,8 @@ out: struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_find(struct net *net, struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, u32 session_id); -struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_find_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth); +struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth, + bool do_ref); struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_find_by_ifname(struct net *net, char *ifname); struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_find(struct net *net, u32 tunnel_id); struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_find_nth(struct net *net, int nth); diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c index 2d6760a2ae34..d100aed3d06f 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_debugfs.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static void l2tp_dfs_next_tunnel(struct l2tp_dfs_seq_data *pd) static void l2tp_dfs_next_session(struct l2tp_dfs_seq_data *pd) { - pd->session = l2tp_session_find_nth(pd->tunnel, pd->session_idx); + pd->session = l2tp_session_get_nth(pd->tunnel, pd->session_idx, true); pd->session_idx++; if (pd->session == NULL) { @@ -238,10 +238,14 @@ static int l2tp_dfs_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } /* Show the tunnel or session context */ - if (pd->session == NULL) + if (!pd->session) { l2tp_dfs_seq_tunnel_show(m, pd->tunnel); - else + } else { l2tp_dfs_seq_session_show(m, pd->session); + if (pd->session->deref) + pd->session->deref(pd->session); + l2tp_session_dec_refcount(pd->session); + } out: return 0; diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c index 2caaa84ce92d..665cc74df5c5 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c @@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ static int l2tp_nl_cmd_session_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback goto out; } - session = l2tp_session_find_nth(tunnel, si); + session = l2tp_session_get_nth(tunnel, si, false); if (session == NULL) { ti++; tunnel = NULL; @@ -837,8 +837,11 @@ static int l2tp_nl_cmd_session_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback if (l2tp_nl_session_send(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI, - session, L2TP_CMD_SESSION_GET) < 0) + session, L2TP_CMD_SESSION_GET) < 0) { + l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session); break; + } + l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session); si++; } diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index cb0fa348abf9..ad80ee5400da 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -1575,7 +1575,7 @@ static void pppol2tp_next_tunnel(struct net *net, struct pppol2tp_seq_data *pd) static void pppol2tp_next_session(struct net *net, struct pppol2tp_seq_data *pd) { - pd->session = l2tp_session_find_nth(pd->tunnel, pd->session_idx); + pd->session = l2tp_session_get_nth(pd->tunnel, pd->session_idx, true); pd->session_idx++; if (pd->session == NULL) { @@ -1702,10 +1702,14 @@ static int pppol2tp_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) /* Show the tunnel or session context. */ - if (pd->session == NULL) + if (!pd->session) { pppol2tp_seq_tunnel_show(m, pd->tunnel); - else + } else { pppol2tp_seq_session_show(m, pd->session); + if (pd->session->deref) + pd->session->deref(pd->session); + l2tp_session_dec_refcount(pd->session); + } out: return 0; From 593e185eaadeefdc05a5e595428aec468646165a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2017 13:23:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 25/45] l2tp: fix PPP pseudo-wire auto-loading [ Upstream commit 249ee819e24c180909f43c1173c8ef6724d21faf ] PPP pseudo-wire type is 7 (11 is L2TP_PWTYPE_IP). Fixes: f1f39f911027 ("l2tp: auto load type modules") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index ad80ee5400da..8ab9c5d74416 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -1868,4 +1868,4 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PPP over L2TP over UDP"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_VERSION(PPPOL2TP_DRV_VERSION); MODULE_ALIAS("pppox-proto-" __stringify(PX_PROTO_OL2TP)); -MODULE_ALIAS_L2TP_PWTYPE(11); +MODULE_ALIAS_L2TP_PWTYPE(7); From cc5a5c09d32b8bd80477f45f12f47ca43536b19c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Larysch Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2017 16:46:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/45] net: ipv4: fix multipath RTM_GETROUTE behavior when iif is given [ Upstream commit a8801799c6975601fd58ae62f48964caec2eb83f ] inet_rtm_getroute synthesizes a skeletal ICMP skb, which is passed to ip_route_input when iif is given. If a multipath route is present for the designated destination, ip_multipath_icmp_hash ends up being called, which uses the source/destination addresses within the skb to calculate a hash. However, those are not set in the synthetic skb, causing it to return an arbitrary and incorrect result. Instead, use UDP, which gets no such special treatment. Signed-off-by: Florian Larysch Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index da4d68d78590..375248b900ba 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -2559,7 +2559,7 @@ static int inet_rtm_getroute(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) skb_reset_network_header(skb); /* Bugfix: need to give ip_route_input enough of an IP header to not gag. */ - ip_hdr(skb)->protocol = IPPROTO_ICMP; + ip_hdr(skb)->protocol = IPPROTO_UDP; skb_reserve(skb, MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct iphdr)); src = tb[RTA_SRC] ? nla_get_in_addr(tb[RTA_SRC]) : 0; From 52e33b4e505dedc8708581c3dd539ded37df1c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2017 13:10:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 27/45] sctp: listen on the sock only when it's state is listening or closed [ Upstream commit 34b2789f1d9bf8dcca9b5cb553d076ca2cd898ee ] Now sctp doesn't check sock's state before listening on it. It could even cause changing a sock with any state to become a listening sock when doing sctp_listen. This patch is to fix it by checking sock's state in sctp_listen, so that it will listen on the sock with right state. Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sctp/socket.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 5758818435f3..c96d666cef29 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -6394,6 +6394,9 @@ int sctp_inet_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) if (sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED) goto out; + if (!sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING) && !sctp_sstate(sk, CLOSED)) + goto out; + /* If backlog is zero, disable listening. */ if (!backlog) { if (sctp_sstate(sk, CLOSED)) From 78c4e3d4848d86c1ed36181c71c9c96834e910ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2017 08:07:33 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 28/45] tcp: clear saved_syn in tcp_disconnect() [ Upstream commit 17c3060b1701fc69daedb4c90be6325d3d9fca8e ] In the (very unlikely) case a passive socket becomes a listener, we do not want to duplicate its saved SYN headers. This would lead to double frees, use after free, and please hackers and various fuzzers Tested: 0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 +0 setsockopt(3, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_SAVE_SYN, [1], 4) = 0 +0 fcntl(3, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK) = 0 +0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 +0 listen(3, 5) = 0 +0 < S 0:0(0) win 32972 +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <...> +.1 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 +0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4 +0 connect(4, AF_UNSPEC, ...) = 0 +0 close(3) = 0 +0 bind(4, ..., ...) = 0 +0 listen(4, 5) = 0 +0 < S 0:0(0) win 32972 +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <...> +.1 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 Fixes: cd8ae85299d5 ("tcp: provide SYN headers for passive connections") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 600dcda840d1..e1d51370977b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2260,6 +2260,7 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags) tcp_init_send_head(sk); memset(&tp->rx_opt, 0, sizeof(tp->rx_opt)); __sk_dst_reset(sk); + tcp_saved_syn_free(tp); WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash); From f6b34b1709acec5c7a4d83f43b52595466a32c37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 22:14:26 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 29/45] dp83640: don't recieve time stamps twice MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 9d386cd9a755c8293e8916264d4d053878a7c9c7 ] This patch is prompted by a static checker warning about a potential use after free. The concern is that netif_rx_ni() can free "skb" and we call it twice. When I look at the commit that added this, it looks like some stray lines were added accidentally. It doesn't make sense to me that we would recieve the same data two times. I asked the author but never recieved a response. I can't test this code, but I'm pretty sure my patch is correct. Fixes: 4b063258ab93 ("dp83640: Delay scheduled work.") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Stefan Sørensen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c index e6cefd0e3262..84b9cca152eb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c @@ -1436,8 +1436,6 @@ static bool dp83640_rxtstamp(struct phy_device *phydev, skb_info->tmo = jiffies + SKB_TIMESTAMP_TIMEOUT; skb_queue_tail(&dp83640->rx_queue, skb); schedule_delayed_work(&dp83640->ts_work, SKB_TIMESTAMP_TIMEOUT); - } else { - netif_rx_ni(skb); } return true; From f6b94906b41497a1fa2c4acd055d550c501cd58b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ahern Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 14:19:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 30/45] net: ipv6: RTF_PCPU should not be settable from userspace [ Upstream commit 557c44be917c322860665be3d28376afa84aa936 ] Andrey reported a fault in the IPv6 route code: kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 4035 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.11.0-rc7+ #250 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff880069809600 task.stack: ffff880062dc8000 RIP: 0010:ip6_rt_cache_alloc+0xa6/0x560 net/ipv6/route.c:975 RSP: 0018:ffff880062dced30 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8800670561c0 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffff880062dcfb28 RDI: 0000000000000018 RBP: ffff880062dced68 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff880062dcfb28 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007feebe37e7c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000205a0fe4 CR3: 000000006b5c9000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: ip6_pol_route+0x1512/0x1f20 net/ipv6/route.c:1128 ip6_pol_route_output+0x4c/0x60 net/ipv6/route.c:1212 ... Andrey's syzkaller program passes rtmsg.rtmsg_flags with the RTF_PCPU bit set. Flags passed to the kernel are blindly copied to the allocated rt6_info by ip6_route_info_create making a newly inserted route appear as though it is a per-cpu route. ip6_rt_cache_alloc sees the flag set and expects rt->dst.from to be set - which it is not since it is not really a per-cpu copy. The subsequent call to __ip6_dst_alloc then generates the fault. Fix by checking for the flag and failing with EINVAL. Fixes: d52d3997f843f ("ipv6: Create percpu rt6_info") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: David Ahern Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/uapi/linux/ipv6_route.h | 2 +- net/ipv6/route.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ipv6_route.h b/include/uapi/linux/ipv6_route.h index f6598d1c886e..316e838b7470 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/ipv6_route.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ipv6_route.h @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ #define RTF_PREF(pref) ((pref) << 27) #define RTF_PREF_MASK 0x18000000 -#define RTF_PCPU 0x40000000 +#define RTF_PCPU 0x40000000 /* read-only: can not be set by user */ #define RTF_LOCAL 0x80000000 diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 9f0aa255e288..6c91d5c4a92c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -1758,6 +1758,10 @@ static struct rt6_info *ip6_route_info_create(struct fib6_config *cfg) int addr_type; int err = -EINVAL; + /* RTF_PCPU is an internal flag; can not be set by userspace */ + if (cfg->fc_flags & RTF_PCPU) + goto out; + if (cfg->fc_dst_len > 128 || cfg->fc_src_len > 128) goto out; #ifndef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES From 25c1040233728451a4c56083407ffd398c9f3759 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tushar Dave Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2017 15:57:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 31/45] netpoll: Check for skb->queue_mapping [ Upstream commit c70b17b775edb21280e9de7531acf6db3b365274 ] Reducing real_num_tx_queues needs to be in sync with skb queue_mapping otherwise skbs with queue_mapping greater than real_num_tx_queues can be sent to the underlying driver and can result in kernel panic. One such event is running netconsole and enabling VF on the same device. Or running netconsole and changing number of tx queues via ethtool on same device. e.g. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference tsk->{mm,active_mm}->context = 0000000000001525 tsk->{mm,active_mm}->pgd = fff800130ff9a000 \|/ ____ \|/ "@'/ .. \`@" /_| \__/ |_\ \__U_/ kworker/48:1(475): Oops [#1] CPU: 48 PID: 475 Comm: kworker/48:1 Tainted: G OE 4.11.0-rc3-davem-net+ #7 Workqueue: events queue_process task: fff80013113299c0 task.stack: fff800131132c000 TSTATE: 0000004480e01600 TPC: 00000000103f9e3c TNPC: 00000000103f9e40 Y: 00000000 Tainted: G OE TPC: g0: 0000000000000000 g1: 0000000000003fff g2: 0000000000000000 g3: 0000000000000001 g4: fff80013113299c0 g5: fff8001fa6808000 g6: fff800131132c000 g7: 00000000000000c0 o0: fff8001fa760c460 o1: fff8001311329a50 o2: fff8001fa7607504 o3: 0000000000000003 o4: fff8001f96e63a40 o5: fff8001311d77ec0 sp: fff800131132f0e1 ret_pc: 000000000049ed94 RPC: l0: 0000000000000000 l1: 0000000000000800 l2: 0000000000000000 l3: 0000000000000000 l4: 000b2aa30e34b10d l5: 0000000000000000 l6: 0000000000000000 l7: fff8001fa7605028 i0: fff80013111a8a00 i1: fff80013155a0780 i2: 0000000000000000 i3: 0000000000000000 i4: 0000000000000000 i5: 0000000000100000 i6: fff800131132f1a1 i7: 00000000103fa4b0 I7: Call Trace: [00000000103fa4b0] ixgbe_xmit_frame+0x30/0xa0 [ixgbe] [0000000000998c74] netpoll_start_xmit+0xf4/0x200 [0000000000998e10] queue_process+0x90/0x160 [0000000000485fa8] process_one_work+0x188/0x480 [0000000000486410] worker_thread+0x170/0x4c0 [000000000048c6b8] kthread+0xd8/0x120 [0000000000406064] ret_from_fork+0x1c/0x2c [0000000000000000] (null) Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Caller[00000000103fa4b0]: ixgbe_xmit_frame+0x30/0xa0 [ixgbe] Caller[0000000000998c74]: netpoll_start_xmit+0xf4/0x200 Caller[0000000000998e10]: queue_process+0x90/0x160 Caller[0000000000485fa8]: process_one_work+0x188/0x480 Caller[0000000000486410]: worker_thread+0x170/0x4c0 Caller[000000000048c6b8]: kthread+0xd8/0x120 Caller[0000000000406064]: ret_from_fork+0x1c/0x2c Caller[0000000000000000]: (null) Signed-off-by: Tushar Dave Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/netpoll.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/netpoll.c b/net/core/netpoll.c index 94acfc89ad97..440aa9f6e0a8 100644 --- a/net/core/netpoll.c +++ b/net/core/netpoll.c @@ -105,15 +105,21 @@ static void queue_process(struct work_struct *work) while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&npinfo->txq))) { struct net_device *dev = skb->dev; struct netdev_queue *txq; + unsigned int q_index; if (!netif_device_present(dev) || !netif_running(dev)) { kfree_skb(skb); continue; } - txq = skb_get_tx_queue(dev, skb); - local_irq_save(flags); + /* check if skb->queue_mapping is still valid */ + q_index = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb); + if (unlikely(q_index >= dev->real_num_tx_queues)) { + q_index = q_index % dev->real_num_tx_queues; + skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, q_index); + } + txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, q_index); HARD_TX_LOCK(dev, txq, smp_processor_id()); if (netif_xmit_frozen_or_stopped(txq) || netpoll_start_xmit(skb, dev, txq) != NETDEV_TX_OK) { From bdeb026dfd9f27ec2e4a0ea97dab0e6e3d96e632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 20:42:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 32/45] ip6mr: fix notification device destruction [ Upstream commit 723b929ca0f79c0796f160c2eeda4597ee98d2b8 ] Andrey Konovalov reported a BUG caused by the ip6mr code which is caused because we call unregister_netdevice_many for a device that is already being destroyed. In IPv4's ipmr that has been resolved by two commits long time ago by introducing the "notify" parameter to the delete function and avoiding the unregister when called from a notifier, so let's do the same for ip6mr. The trace from Andrey: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6813! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 1165 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc7+ #251 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net task: ffff880069208000 task.stack: ffff8800692d8000 RIP: 0010:rollback_registered_many+0x348/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:6813 RSP: 0018:ffff8800692de7f0 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: ffff880069208000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88006af90569 RBP: ffff8800692de9f0 R08: ffff8800692dec60 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88006af90070 R13: ffff8800692debf0 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88006af90000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006cb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe7e897d870 CR3: 00000000657e7000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: unregister_netdevice_many.part.105+0x87/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7881 unregister_netdevice_many+0xc8/0x120 net/core/dev.c:7880 ip6mr_device_event+0x362/0x3f0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1346 notifier_call_chain+0x145/0x2f0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x51/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1647 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1663 rollback_registered_many+0x919/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:6841 unregister_netdevice_many.part.105+0x87/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7881 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:7880 default_device_exit_batch+0x4fa/0x640 net/core/dev.c:8333 ops_exit_list.isra.4+0x100/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:144 cleanup_net+0x5a8/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:463 process_one_work+0xc04/0x1c10 kernel/workqueue.c:2097 worker_thread+0x223/0x19c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2231 kthread+0x35e/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:231 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:430 Code: 3c 32 00 0f 85 70 0b 00 00 48 b8 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 49 89 47 78 e9 93 fe ff ff 49 8d 57 70 49 8d 5f 78 eb 9e e8 88 7a 14 fe <0f> 0b 48 8b 9d 28 fe ff ff e8 7a 7a 14 fe 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 RIP: rollback_registered_many+0x348/0xeb0 RSP: ffff8800692de7f0 ---[ end trace e0b29c57e9b3292c ]--- Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index d9843e5a667f..8361d73ab653 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ failure: * Delete a VIF entry */ -static int mif6_delete(struct mr6_table *mrt, int vifi, struct list_head *head) +static int mif6_delete(struct mr6_table *mrt, int vifi, int notify, + struct list_head *head) { struct mif_device *v; struct net_device *dev; @@ -820,7 +821,7 @@ static int mif6_delete(struct mr6_table *mrt, int vifi, struct list_head *head) dev->ifindex, &in6_dev->cnf); } - if (v->flags & MIFF_REGISTER) + if ((v->flags & MIFF_REGISTER) && !notify) unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head); dev_put(dev); @@ -1330,7 +1331,6 @@ static int ip6mr_device_event(struct notifier_block *this, struct mr6_table *mrt; struct mif_device *v; int ct; - LIST_HEAD(list); if (event != NETDEV_UNREGISTER) return NOTIFY_DONE; @@ -1339,10 +1339,9 @@ static int ip6mr_device_event(struct notifier_block *this, v = &mrt->vif6_table[0]; for (ct = 0; ct < mrt->maxvif; ct++, v++) { if (v->dev == dev) - mif6_delete(mrt, ct, &list); + mif6_delete(mrt, ct, 1, NULL); } } - unregister_netdevice_many(&list); return NOTIFY_DONE; } @@ -1551,7 +1550,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all) for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) { if (!all && (mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC)) continue; - mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list); + mif6_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list); } unregister_netdevice_many(&list); @@ -1704,7 +1703,7 @@ int ip6_mroute_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval, uns if (copy_from_user(&mifi, optval, sizeof(mifi_t))) return -EFAULT; rtnl_lock(); - ret = mif6_delete(mrt, mifi, NULL); + ret = mif6_delete(mrt, mifi, 0, NULL); rtnl_unlock(); return ret; From 114f0c66dab46ab5d26585d6f1a63e517098a0a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2017 20:55:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 33/45] macvlan: Fix device ref leak when purging bc_queue [ Upstream commit f6478218e6edc2a587b8f132f66373baa7b2497c ] When a parent macvlan device is destroyed we end up purging its broadcast queue without dropping the device reference count on the packet source device. This causes the source device to linger. This patch drops that reference count. Fixes: 260916dfb48c ("macvlan: Fix potential use-after free for...") Reported-by: Joe Ghalam Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/macvlan.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/macvlan.c b/drivers/net/macvlan.c index 06c8bfeaccd6..40cd86614677 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macvlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/macvlan.c @@ -1110,6 +1110,7 @@ static int macvlan_port_create(struct net_device *dev) static void macvlan_port_destroy(struct net_device *dev) { struct macvlan_port *port = macvlan_port_get_rtnl(dev); + struct sk_buff *skb; dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_MACVLAN_PORT; netdev_rx_handler_unregister(dev); @@ -1118,7 +1119,15 @@ static void macvlan_port_destroy(struct net_device *dev) * but we need to cancel it and purge left skbs if any. */ cancel_work_sync(&port->bc_work); - __skb_queue_purge(&port->bc_queue); + + while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&port->bc_queue))) { + const struct macvlan_dev *src = MACVLAN_SKB_CB(skb)->src; + + if (src) + dev_put(src->dev); + + kfree_skb(skb); + } kfree_rcu(port, rcu); } From befb9254243937f676433251cf4f8beb37b02c13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WANG Cong Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 14:37:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 34/45] ipv6: check skb->protocol before lookup for nexthop [ Upstream commit 199ab00f3cdb6f154ea93fa76fd80192861a821d ] Andrey reported a out-of-bound access in ip6_tnl_xmit(), this is because we use an ipv4 dst in ip6_tnl_xmit() and cast an IPv4 neigh key as an IPv6 address: neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(skb_dst(skb), &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); if (!neigh) goto tx_err_link_failure; addr6 = (struct in6_addr *)&neigh->primary_key; // <=== HERE addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(addr6); if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) addr6 = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; memcpy(&fl6->daddr, addr6, sizeof(fl6->daddr)); Also the network header of the skb at this point should be still IPv4 for 4in6 tunnels, we shold not just use it as IPv6 header. This patch fixes it by checking if skb->protocol is ETH_P_IPV6: if it is, we are safe to do the nexthop lookup using skb_dst() and ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; if not (aka IPv4), we have no clue about which dest address we can pick here, we have to rely on callers to fill it from tunnel config, so just fall to ip6_route_output() to make the decision. Fixes: ea3dc9601bda ("ip6_tunnel: Add support for wildcard tunnel endpoints.") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index 6c6161763c2f..97cb02dc5f02 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ static int ip6_tnl_xmit2(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip6_tnl *t = netdev_priv(dev); struct net *net = t->net; struct net_device_stats *stats = &t->dev->stats; - struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb); + struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h; struct ipv6_tel_txoption opt; struct dst_entry *dst = NULL, *ndst = NULL; struct net_device *tdev; @@ -1061,26 +1061,28 @@ static int ip6_tnl_xmit2(struct sk_buff *skb, /* NBMA tunnel */ if (ipv6_addr_any(&t->parms.raddr)) { - struct in6_addr *addr6; - struct neighbour *neigh; - int addr_type; + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + struct in6_addr *addr6; + struct neighbour *neigh; + int addr_type; - if (!skb_dst(skb)) - goto tx_err_link_failure; + if (!skb_dst(skb)) + goto tx_err_link_failure; - neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(skb_dst(skb), - &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); - if (!neigh) - goto tx_err_link_failure; + neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(skb_dst(skb), + &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); + if (!neigh) + goto tx_err_link_failure; - addr6 = (struct in6_addr *)&neigh->primary_key; - addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(addr6); + addr6 = (struct in6_addr *)&neigh->primary_key; + addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(addr6); - if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) - addr6 = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; + if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY) + addr6 = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; - memcpy(&fl6->daddr, addr6, sizeof(fl6->daddr)); - neigh_release(neigh); + memcpy(&fl6->daddr, addr6, sizeof(fl6->daddr)); + neigh_release(neigh); + } } else if (!(t->parms.flags & (IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_TCLASS | IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_FWMARK))) { /* enable the cache only only if the routing decision does From 5e52fffbb11c28c37fe8e335fdd8e9705daff06d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jamie Bainbridge Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2017 10:43:27 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 35/45] ipv6: check raw payload size correctly in ioctl [ Upstream commit 105f5528b9bbaa08b526d3405a5bcd2ff0c953c8 ] In situations where an skb is paged, the transport header pointer and tail pointer can be the same because the skb contents are in frags. This results in ioctl(SIOCINQ/FIONREAD) incorrectly returning a length of 0 when the length to receive is actually greater than zero. skb->len is already correctly set in ip6_input_finish() with pskb_pull(), so use skb->len as it always returns the correct result for both linear and paged data. Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/raw.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c index 8bca90d6d915..a625f69a28dd 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/raw.c +++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c @@ -1144,8 +1144,7 @@ static int rawv6_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg) spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue); if (skb) - amount = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - - skb_transport_header(skb); + amount = skb->len; spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg); } From 8cbaf11c5026abed0f772b6478795c7170d70171 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Sakamoto Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2017 12:43:01 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 36/45] ALSA: firewire-lib: fix inappropriate assignment between signed/unsigned type commit dfb00a56935186171abb5280b3407c3f910011f1 upstream. An abstraction of asynchronous transaction for transmission of MIDI messages was introduced in Linux v4.4. Each driver can utilize this abstraction to transfer MIDI messages via fixed-length payload of transaction to a certain unit address. Filling payload of the transaction is done by callback. In this callback, each driver can return negative error code, however current implementation assigns the return value to unsigned variable. This commit changes type of the variable to fix the bug. Reported-by: Julia Lawall Fixes: 585d7cba5e1f ("ALSA: firewire-lib: add helper functions for asynchronous transactions to transfer MIDI messages") Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/firewire/lib.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/firewire/lib.h b/sound/firewire/lib.h index f3f6f84c48d6..bb5f8cdea3e2 100644 --- a/sound/firewire/lib.h +++ b/sound/firewire/lib.h @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct snd_fw_async_midi_port { struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream; snd_fw_async_midi_port_fill fill; - unsigned int consume_bytes; + int consume_bytes; }; int snd_fw_async_midi_port_init(struct snd_fw_async_midi_port *port, From 555f77106f77ceb1ad582baf4a3c936c2257fc08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2017 10:41:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 37/45] ALSA: seq: Don't break snd_use_lock_sync() loop by timeout commit 4e7655fd4f47c23e5249ea260dc802f909a64611 upstream. The snd_use_lock_sync() (thus its implementation snd_use_lock_sync_helper()) has the 5 seconds timeout to break out of the sync loop. It was introduced from the beginning, just to be "safer", in terms of avoiding the stupid bugs. However, as Ben Hutchings suggested, this timeout rather introduces a potential leak or use-after-free that was apparently fixed by the commit 2d7d54002e39 ("ALSA: seq: Fix race during FIFO resize"): for example, snd_seq_fifo_event_in() -> snd_seq_event_dup() -> copy_from_user() could block for a long time, and snd_use_lock_sync() goes timeout and still leaves the cell at releasing the pool. For fixing such a problem, we remove the break by the timeout while still keeping the warning. Suggested-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/seq/seq_lock.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_lock.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_lock.c index 3b693e924db7..12ba83367b1b 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/seq_lock.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_lock.c @@ -28,19 +28,16 @@ /* wait until all locks are released */ void snd_use_lock_sync_helper(snd_use_lock_t *lockp, const char *file, int line) { - int max_count = 5 * HZ; + int warn_count = 5 * HZ; if (atomic_read(lockp) < 0) { pr_warn("ALSA: seq_lock: lock trouble [counter = %d] in %s:%d\n", atomic_read(lockp), file, line); return; } while (atomic_read(lockp) > 0) { - if (max_count == 0) { - pr_warn("ALSA: seq_lock: timeout [%d left] in %s:%d\n", atomic_read(lockp), file, line); - break; - } + if (warn_count-- == 0) + pr_warn("ALSA: seq_lock: waiting [%d left] in %s:%d\n", atomic_read(lockp), file, line); schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1); - max_count--; } } From 1c26c382c9e7a6a919b5a005e07747c40366e7df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Hogan Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2017 16:06:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 38/45] MIPS: KGDB: Use kernel context for sleeping threads commit 162b270c664dca2e0944308e92f9fcc887151a72 upstream. KGDB is a kernel debug stub and it can't be used to debug userland as it can only safely access kernel memory. On MIPS however KGDB has always got the register state of sleeping processes from the userland register context at the beginning of the kernel stack. This is meaningless for kernel threads (which never enter userland), and for user threads it prevents the user seeing what it is doing while in the kernel: (gdb) info threads Id Target Id Frame ... 3 Thread 2 (kthreadd) 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () 2 Thread 1 (init) 0x000000007705c4b4 in ?? () 1 Thread -2 (shadowCPU0) 0xffffffff8012524c in arch_kgdb_breakpoint () at arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c:201 Get the register state instead from the (partial) kernel register context stored in the task's thread_struct for resume() to restore. All threads now correctly appear to be in context_switch(): (gdb) info threads Id Target Id Frame ... 3 Thread 2 (kthreadd) context_switch (rq=, cookie=..., next=, prev=0x0) at kernel/sched/core.c:2903 2 Thread 1 (init) context_switch (rq=, cookie=..., next=, prev=0x0) at kernel/sched/core.c:2903 1 Thread -2 (shadowCPU0) 0xffffffff8012524c in arch_kgdb_breakpoint () at arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c:201 Call clobbered registers which aren't saved and exception registers (BadVAddr & Cause) which can't be easily determined without stack unwinding are reported as 0. The PC is taken from the return address, such that the state presented matches that found immediately after returning from resume(). Fixes: 8854700115ec ("[MIPS] kgdb: add arch support for the kernel's kgdb core") Signed-off-by: James Hogan Cc: Jason Wessel Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/15829/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c b/arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c index de63d36af895..732d6171ac6a 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/kgdb.c @@ -244,9 +244,6 @@ static int compute_signal(int tt) void sleeping_thread_to_gdb_regs(unsigned long *gdb_regs, struct task_struct *p) { int reg; - struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(p); - unsigned long ksp = (unsigned long)ti + THREAD_SIZE - 32; - struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *)ksp - 1; #if (KGDB_GDB_REG_SIZE == 32) u32 *ptr = (u32 *)gdb_regs; #else @@ -254,25 +251,46 @@ void sleeping_thread_to_gdb_regs(unsigned long *gdb_regs, struct task_struct *p) #endif for (reg = 0; reg < 16; reg++) - *(ptr++) = regs->regs[reg]; + *(ptr++) = 0; /* S0 - S7 */ - for (reg = 16; reg < 24; reg++) - *(ptr++) = regs->regs[reg]; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg16; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg17; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg18; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg19; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg20; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg21; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg22; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg23; for (reg = 24; reg < 28; reg++) *(ptr++) = 0; /* GP, SP, FP, RA */ - for (reg = 28; reg < 32; reg++) - *(ptr++) = regs->regs[reg]; + *(ptr++) = (long)p; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg29; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg30; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg31; - *(ptr++) = regs->cp0_status; - *(ptr++) = regs->lo; - *(ptr++) = regs->hi; - *(ptr++) = regs->cp0_badvaddr; - *(ptr++) = regs->cp0_cause; - *(ptr++) = regs->cp0_epc; + *(ptr++) = p->thread.cp0_status; + + /* lo, hi */ + *(ptr++) = 0; + *(ptr++) = 0; + + /* + * BadVAddr, Cause + * Ideally these would come from the last exception frame up the stack + * but that requires unwinding, otherwise we can't know much for sure. + */ + *(ptr++) = 0; + *(ptr++) = 0; + + /* + * PC + * use return address (RA), i.e. the moment after return from resume() + */ + *(ptr++) = p->thread.reg31; } void kgdb_arch_set_pc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc) From 3bf0809930b8948650e04cef29143803f87073df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Cowgill Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2017 13:51:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 39/45] MIPS: Avoid BUG warning in arch_check_elf commit c46f59e90226fa5bfcc83650edebe84ae47d454b upstream. arch_check_elf contains a usage of current_cpu_data that will call smp_processor_id() with preemption enabled and therefore triggers a "BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible" warning when an fpxx executable is loaded. As a follow-up to commit b244614a60ab ("MIPS: Avoid a BUG warning during prctl(PR_SET_FP_MODE, ...)"), apply the same fix to arch_check_elf by using raw_current_cpu_data instead. The rationale quoted from the previous commit: "It is assumed throughout the kernel that if any CPU has an FPU, then all CPUs would have an FPU as well, so it is safe to perform the check with preemption enabled - change the code to use raw_ variant of the check to avoid the warning." Fixes: 46490b572544 ("MIPS: kernel: elf: Improve the overall ABI and FPU mode checks") Signed-off-by: James Cowgill Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/15951/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/kernel/elf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/elf.c b/arch/mips/kernel/elf.c index 4a4d9e067c89..3afffc30ee12 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/elf.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/elf.c @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ int arch_check_elf(void *_ehdr, bool has_interpreter, else if ((prog_req.fr1 && prog_req.frdefault) || (prog_req.single && !prog_req.frdefault)) /* Make sure 64-bit MIPS III/IV/64R1 will not pick FR1 */ - state->overall_fp_mode = ((current_cpu_data.fpu_id & MIPS_FPIR_F64) && + state->overall_fp_mode = ((raw_current_cpu_data.fpu_id & MIPS_FPIR_F64) && cpu_has_mips_r2_r6) ? FP_FR1 : FP_FR0; else if (prog_req.fr1) From 91ce8d13faeb32d0b5544674a1ac8d955c8f4891 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2017 17:22:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 40/45] p9_client_readdir() fix commit 71d6ad08379304128e4bdfaf0b4185d54375423e upstream. Don't assume that server is sane and won't return more data than asked for. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/9p/client.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/9p/client.c b/net/9p/client.c index ea79ee9a7348..f5feac4ff4ec 100644 --- a/net/9p/client.c +++ b/net/9p/client.c @@ -2101,6 +2101,10 @@ int p9_client_readdir(struct p9_fid *fid, char *data, u32 count, u64 offset) trace_9p_protocol_dump(clnt, req->rc); goto free_and_error; } + if (rsize < count) { + pr_err("bogus RREADDIR count (%d > %d)\n", count, rsize); + count = rsize; + } p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, "<<< RREADDIR count %d\n", count); From 2032eebe2384dfd5a5c572acfdaeed4371b30958 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2017 15:36:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 41/45] Input: i8042 - add Clevo P650RS to the i8042 reset list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 7c5bb4ac2b76d2a09256aec8a7d584bf3e2b0466 upstream. Clevo P650RS and other similar devices require i8042 to be reset in order to detect Synaptics touchpad. Reported-by: Paweł Bylica Tested-by: Ed Bordin Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=190301 Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h b/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h index 25eab453f2b2..e7b96f1ac2c5 100644 --- a/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h +++ b/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h @@ -685,6 +685,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id __initconst i8042_dmi_reset_table[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "20046"), }, }, + { + /* Clevo P650RS, 650RP6, Sager NP8152-S, and others */ + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "P65xRP"), + }, + }, { } }; From 82a0d8aabe043ac94efa255502754c70363dab0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 16:10:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 42/45] nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit e6838a29ecb484c97e4efef9429643b9851fba6e upstream. A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the expected data and ignore the rest. Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages, and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes. Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in svc_free_pages. So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and a large reply. As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array. We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the possibility of breaking some oddball client. Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää Reported-by: Ari Kauppi Reviewed-by: NeilBrown Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c index ad4e2377dd63..5be1fa6b676d 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c @@ -656,6 +656,37 @@ static __be32 map_new_errors(u32 vers, __be32 nfserr) return nfserr; } +/* + * A write procedure can have a large argument, and a read procedure can + * have a large reply, but no NFSv2 or NFSv3 procedure has argument and + * reply that can both be larger than a page. The xdr code has taken + * advantage of this assumption to be a sloppy about bounds checking in + * some cases. Pending a rewrite of the NFSv2/v3 xdr code to fix that + * problem, we enforce these assumptions here: + */ +static bool nfs_request_too_big(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + struct svc_procedure *proc) +{ + /* + * The ACL code has more careful bounds-checking and is not + * susceptible to this problem: + */ + if (rqstp->rq_prog != NFS_PROGRAM) + return false; + /* + * Ditto NFSv4 (which can in theory have argument and reply both + * more than a page): + */ + if (rqstp->rq_vers >= 4) + return false; + /* The reply will be small, we're OK: */ + if (proc->pc_xdrressize > 0 && + proc->pc_xdrressize < XDR_QUADLEN(PAGE_SIZE)) + return false; + + return rqstp->rq_arg.len > PAGE_SIZE; +} + int nfsd_dispatch(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *statp) { @@ -668,6 +699,11 @@ nfsd_dispatch(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *statp) rqstp->rq_vers, rqstp->rq_proc); proc = rqstp->rq_procinfo; + if (nfs_request_too_big(rqstp, proc)) { + dprintk("nfsd: NFSv%d argument too large\n", rqstp->rq_vers); + *statp = rpc_garbage_args; + return 1; + } /* * Give the xdr decoder a chance to change this if it wants * (necessary in the NFSv4.0 compound case) From 1aefe328a68dc1ffff1adf81912dacaa83a066fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vineet Gupta Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2017 19:45:48 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 43/45] ARCv2: save r30 on kernel entry as gcc uses it for code-gen commit ecd43afdbe72017aefe48080631eb625e177ef4d upstream. This is not exposed to userspace debugers yet, which can be done independently as a seperate patch ! Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arc/include/asm/entry-arcv2.h | 2 ++ arch/arc/include/asm/ptrace.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arc/include/asm/entry-arcv2.h b/arch/arc/include/asm/entry-arcv2.h index b5ff87e6f4b7..aee1a77934cf 100644 --- a/arch/arc/include/asm/entry-arcv2.h +++ b/arch/arc/include/asm/entry-arcv2.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ ; ; Now manually save: r12, sp, fp, gp, r25 + PUSH r30 PUSH r12 ; Saving pt_regs->sp correctly requires some extra work due to the way @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ POPAX AUX_USER_SP 1: POP r12 + POP r30 .endm diff --git a/arch/arc/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/arc/include/asm/ptrace.h index 69095da1fcfd..47111d565a95 100644 --- a/arch/arc/include/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/arc/include/asm/ptrace.h @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct pt_regs { unsigned long fp; unsigned long sp; /* user/kernel sp depending on where we came from */ - unsigned long r12; + unsigned long r12, r30; /*------- Below list auto saved by h/w -----------*/ unsigned long r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11; From 9c4a4755d9c552a640bef60de40b46bda3674431 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2017 17:53:55 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 44/45] ftrace/x86: Fix triple fault with graph tracing and suspend-to-ram commit 34a477e5297cbaa6ecc6e17c042a866e1cbe80d6 upstream. On x86-32, with CONFIG_FIRMWARE and multiple CPUs, if you enable function graph tracing and then suspend to RAM, it will triple fault and reboot when it resumes. The first fault happens when booting a secondary CPU: startup_32_smp() load_ucode_ap() prepare_ftrace_return() ftrace_graph_is_dead() (accesses 'kill_ftrace_graph') The early head_32.S code calls into load_ucode_ap(), which has an an ftrace hook, so it calls prepare_ftrace_return(), which calls ftrace_graph_is_dead(), which tries to access the global 'kill_ftrace_graph' variable with a virtual address, causing a fault because the CPU is still in real mode. The fix is to add a check in prepare_ftrace_return() to make sure it's running in protected mode before continuing. The check makes sure the stack pointer is a virtual kernel address. It's a bit of a hack, but it's not very intrusive and it works well enough. For reference, here are a few other (more difficult) ways this could have potentially been fixed: - Move startup_32_smp()'s call to load_ucode_ap() down to *after* paging is enabled. (No idea what that would break.) - Track down load_ucode_ap()'s entire callee tree and mark all the functions 'notrace'. (Probably not realistic.) - Pause graph tracing in ftrace_suspend_notifier_call() or bringup_cpu() or __cpu_up(), and ensure that the pause facility can be queried from real mode. Reported-by: Paul Menzel Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Tested-by: Paul Menzel Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Len Brown Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c1272269a580660703ed2eccf44308e790c7a98.1492123841.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c index 311bcf338f07..bfc587579dc3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -977,6 +977,18 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long self_addr, unsigned long *parent, unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long) &return_to_handler; + /* + * When resuming from suspend-to-ram, this function can be indirectly + * called from early CPU startup code while the CPU is in real mode, + * which would fail miserably. Make sure the stack pointer is a + * virtual address. + * + * This check isn't as accurate as virt_addr_valid(), but it should be + * good enough for this purpose, and it's fast. + */ + if (unlikely((long)__builtin_frame_address(0) >= 0)) + return; + if (unlikely(ftrace_graph_is_dead())) return; From 0c49a2c16ca93e2e4e68e21dbc95e9466a01bbdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 21:20:09 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 45/45] Linux 4.4.66 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index ddaef04f528a..1cd052823c03 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 65 +SUBLEVEL = 66 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Blurry Fish Butt