x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
(cherry picked from commit 2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681) The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: port to 4.4, no syscall_64] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
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#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include <linux/uprobes.h>
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#include <asm/desc.h>
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@ -381,6 +382,7 @@ __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs)
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}
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if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) {
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nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls);
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/*
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* It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation
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* takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that
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