metag/uaccess: Check access_ok in strncpy_from_user
commit 3a158a62da0673db918b53ac1440845a5b64fd90 upstream. The metag implementation of strncpy_from_user() doesn't validate the src pointer, which could allow reading of arbitrary kernel memory. Add a short access_ok() check to prevent that. Its still possible for it to read across the user/kernel boundary, but it will invariably reach a NUL character after only 9 bytes, leaking only a static kernel address being loaded into D0Re0 at the beginning of __start, which is acceptable for the immediate fix. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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1 changed files with 7 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -194,8 +194,13 @@ do { \
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extern long __must_check __strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
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extern long __must_check __strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
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long count);
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long count);
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#define strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count) __strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count)
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static inline long
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strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
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{
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if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, src, 1))
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return -EFAULT;
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return __strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count);
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}
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/*
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/*
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* Return the size of a string (including the ending 0)
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* Return the size of a string (including the ending 0)
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*
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*
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