BACKPORT: dm verity: add 'check_at_most_once' option to only validate hashes once

This allows platforms that are CPU/memory contrained to verify data
blocks only the first time they are read from the data device, rather
than every time.  As such, it provides a reduced level of security
because only offline tampering of the data device's content will be
detected, not online tampering.

Hash blocks are still verified each time they are read from the hash
device, since verification of hash blocks is less performance critical
than data blocks, and a hash block will not be verified any more after
all the data blocks it covers have been verified anyway.

This option introduces a bitset that is used to check if a block has
been validated before or not.  A block can be validated more than once
as there is no thread protection for the bitset.

These changes were developed and tested on entry-level Android Go
devices.

(change to use vzalloc/vfree)
(change per_bio_data_size variable)

Bug: 72664474
Change-Id: I2db2db26c7897c78407789de2cc4cff3587c84bb
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 843f38d382b1ca2f6f4ae2ef7c35933e6319ffbb)
Signed-off-by: Patrik Torstensson <totte@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Patrik Torstensson 2018-03-22 18:18:04 -07:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent a9c753efb3
commit ed3b23f4d9
3 changed files with 72 additions and 5 deletions

View file

@ -109,6 +109,17 @@ fec_start <offset>
This is the offset, in <data_block_size> blocks, from the start of the
FEC device to the beginning of the encoding data.
check_at_most_once
Verify data blocks only the first time they are read from the data device,
rather than every time. This reduces the overhead of dm-verity so that it
can be used on systems that are memory and/or CPU constrained. However, it
provides a reduced level of security because only offline tampering of the
data device's content will be detected, not online tampering.
Hash blocks are still verified each time they are read from the hash device,
since verification of hash blocks is less performance critical than data
blocks, and a hash block will not be verified any more after all the data
blocks it covers have been verified anyway.
Theory of operation
===================

View file

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#define DM_MSG_PREFIX "verity"
@ -32,6 +33,7 @@
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_LOGGING "ignore_corruption"
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_RESTART "restart_on_corruption"
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_IGN_ZEROES "ignore_zero_blocks"
#define DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE "check_at_most_once"
#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX (2 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC)
@ -398,6 +400,18 @@ static int verity_bv_zero(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
return 0;
}
/*
* Moves the bio iter one data block forward.
*/
static inline void verity_bv_skip_block(struct dm_verity *v,
struct dm_verity_io *io,
struct bvec_iter *iter)
{
struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io, v->ti->per_bio_data_size);
bio_advance_iter(bio, iter, 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits);
}
/*
* Verify one "dm_verity_io" structure.
*/
@ -410,9 +424,16 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) {
int r;
sector_t cur_block = io->block + b;
struct shash_desc *desc = verity_io_hash_desc(v, io);
r = verity_hash_for_block(v, io, io->block + b,
if (v->validated_blocks &&
likely(test_bit(cur_block, v->validated_blocks))) {
verity_bv_skip_block(v, io, &io->iter);
continue;
}
r = verity_hash_for_block(v, io, cur_block,
verity_io_want_digest(v, io),
&is_zero);
if (unlikely(r < 0))
@ -445,13 +466,16 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
return r;
if (likely(memcmp(verity_io_real_digest(v, io),
verity_io_want_digest(v, io), v->digest_size) == 0))
verity_io_want_digest(v, io), v->digest_size) == 0)) {
if (v->validated_blocks)
set_bit(cur_block, v->validated_blocks);
continue;
}
else if (verity_fec_decode(v, io, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA,
io->block + b, NULL, &start) == 0)
cur_block, NULL, &start) == 0)
continue;
else if (verity_handle_err(v, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA,
io->block + b))
cur_block))
return -EIO;
}
@ -645,6 +669,8 @@ void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
args += DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC;
if (v->zero_digest)
args++;
if (v->validated_blocks)
args++;
if (!args)
return;
DMEMIT(" %u", args);
@ -663,6 +689,8 @@ void verity_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
}
if (v->zero_digest)
DMEMIT(" " DM_VERITY_OPT_IGN_ZEROES);
if (v->validated_blocks)
DMEMIT(" " DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE);
sz = verity_fec_status_table(v, sz, result, maxlen);
break;
}
@ -716,6 +744,7 @@ void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
if (v->bufio)
dm_bufio_client_destroy(v->bufio);
vfree(v->validated_blocks);
kfree(v->salt);
kfree(v->root_digest);
kfree(v->zero_digest);
@ -737,6 +766,26 @@ void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verity_dtr);
static int verity_alloc_most_once(struct dm_verity *v)
{
struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
/* the bitset can only handle INT_MAX blocks */
if (v->data_blocks > INT_MAX) {
ti->error = "device too large to use check_at_most_once";
return -E2BIG;
}
v->validated_blocks = vzalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(v->data_blocks) *
sizeof(unsigned long));
if (!v->validated_blocks) {
ti->error = "failed to allocate bitset for check_at_most_once";
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v)
{
int r = -ENOMEM;
@ -806,6 +855,12 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v)
}
continue;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE)) {
r = verity_alloc_most_once(v);
if (r)
return r;
continue;
} else if (verity_is_fec_opt_arg(arg_name)) {
r = verity_fec_parse_opt_args(as, v, &argc, arg_name);
if (r)
@ -1074,7 +1129,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verity_ctr);
static struct target_type verity_target = {
.name = "verity",
.version = {1, 3, 0},
.version = {1, 4, 0},
.module = THIS_MODULE,
.ctr = verity_ctr,
.dtr = verity_dtr,

View file

@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct dm_verity {
sector_t hash_level_block[DM_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
struct dm_verity_fec *fec; /* forward error correction */
unsigned long *validated_blocks; /* bitset blocks validated */
};
struct dm_verity_io {