From 42c947900f8d017ebfdca25fa214f87820734db7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kefeng Wang Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2016 16:33:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 01/26] serial: 8250_dw: Check the data->pclk when get apb_pclk commit e16b46f190a22587898b331f9d58583b0b166c9a upstream. It should check the data->pclk, not data->clk when get apb_pclk. Fixes: c8ed99d4f6a8("serial: 8250_dw: Add support for deferred probing") Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c index a5d319e4aae6..8435c3f204c1 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static int dw8250_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } data->pclk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "apb_pclk"); - if (IS_ERR(data->clk) && PTR_ERR(data->clk) == -EPROBE_DEFER) { + if (IS_ERR(data->pclk) && PTR_ERR(data->pclk) == -EPROBE_DEFER) { err = -EPROBE_DEFER; goto err_clk; } From bea4698176f86cc2ad1ebe2ac9396520af7b0848 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junjie Mao Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 09:20:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 02/26] btrfs: assign error values to the correct bio structs commit 14155cafeadda946376260e2ad5d39a0528a332f upstream. Fixes: 4246a0b63bd8 ("block: add a bi_error field to struct bio") Signed-off-by: Junjie Mao Acked-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/compression.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/compression.c b/fs/btrfs/compression.c index c473c42d7d6c..bae05c5c75ba 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/compression.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/compression.c @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ int btrfs_submit_compressed_read(struct inode *inode, struct bio *bio, ret = btrfs_map_bio(root, READ, comp_bio, mirror_num, 0); if (ret) { - bio->bi_error = ret; + comp_bio->bi_error = ret; bio_endio(comp_bio); } @@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ int btrfs_submit_compressed_read(struct inode *inode, struct bio *bio, ret = btrfs_map_bio(root, READ, comp_bio, mirror_num, 0); if (ret) { - bio->bi_error = ret; + comp_bio->bi_error = ret; bio_endio(comp_bio); } From 1ccdc775631e5d636d796cc92b07852d319e9a09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peng Fan Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 16:04:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/26] drivers: base: dma-mapping: page align the size when unmap_kernel_range commit 85714108e673cdebf1b96abfd50fb02a29e37577 upstream. When dma_common_free_remap, the input parameter 'size' may not be page aligned. And, met kernel warning when doing iommu dma for usb on i.MX8 platform: " WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 869 at mm/vmalloc.c:70 vunmap_page_range+0x1cc/0x1d0() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 869 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 4.1.12-00444-gc5f9d1d-dirty #147 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8DV Sabreauto (DT) Workqueue: ci_otg ci_otg_work Call trace: [] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x124 [] show_stack+0x10/0x1c [] dump_stack+0x84/0xc8 [] warn_slowpath_common+0x98/0xd0 [] warn_slowpath_null+0x14/0x20 [] vunmap_page_range+0x1c8/0x1d0 [] unmap_kernel_range+0x20/0x88 [] dma_common_free_remap+0x74/0x84 [] __iommu_free_attrs+0x9c/0x178 [] ehci_mem_cleanup+0x140/0x194 [] ehci_stop+0x8c/0xdc [] usb_remove_hcd+0xf0/0x1cc [] host_stop+0x1c/0x58 [] ci_otg_work+0xdc/0x120 [] process_one_work+0x134/0x33c [] worker_thread+0x13c/0x47c [] kthread+0xd8/0xf0 " For dma_common_pages_remap: dma_common_pages_remap |->get_vm_area_caller |->__get_vm_area_node |->size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); Round up to page aligned So, in dma_common_free_remap, we also need a page aligned size, pass 'PAGE_ALIGN(size)' to unmap_kernel_range. Signed-off-by: Peng Fan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/base/dma-mapping.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/dma-mapping.c b/drivers/base/dma-mapping.c index d95c5971c225..a00f7b79202b 100644 --- a/drivers/base/dma-mapping.c +++ b/drivers/base/dma-mapping.c @@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ void dma_common_free_remap(void *cpu_addr, size_t size, unsigned long vm_flags) return; } - unmap_kernel_range((unsigned long)cpu_addr, size); + unmap_kernel_range((unsigned long)cpu_addr, PAGE_ALIGN(size)); vunmap(cpu_addr); } #endif From 80b742b84f85e3688e02eefd8b820642c4635329 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 07:32:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/26] fuse: listxattr: verify xattr list commit cb3ae6d25a5471be62bfe6ac1fccc0e91edeaba0 upstream. Make sure userspace filesystem is returning a well formed list of xattr names (zero or more nonzero length, null terminated strings). [Michael Theall: only verify in the nonzero size case] Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dir.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 5e2e08712d3b..67c0d1046c61 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -1797,6 +1797,23 @@ static ssize_t fuse_getxattr(struct dentry *entry, const char *name, return ret; } +static int fuse_verify_xattr_list(char *list, size_t size) +{ + size_t origsize = size; + + while (size) { + size_t thislen = strnlen(list, size); + + if (!thislen || thislen == size) + return -EIO; + + size -= thislen + 1; + list += thislen + 1; + } + + return origsize; +} + static ssize_t fuse_listxattr(struct dentry *entry, char *list, size_t size) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(entry); @@ -1832,6 +1849,8 @@ static ssize_t fuse_listxattr(struct dentry *entry, char *list, size_t size) ret = fuse_simple_request(fc, &args); if (!ret && !size) ret = outarg.size; + if (ret > 0 && size) + ret = fuse_verify_xattr_list(list, ret); if (ret == -ENOSYS) { fc->no_listxattr = 1; ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; From 97a2eba1ed753daaa53531e37385a60a88daefb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 07:32:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/26] fuse: invalidate dir dentry after chmod MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 5e2b8828ff3d79aca8c3a1730652758753205b61 upstream. Without "default_permissions" the userspace filesystem's lookup operation needs to perform the check for search permission on the directory. If directory does not allow search for everyone (this is quite rare) then userspace filesystem has to set entry timeout to zero to make sure permissions are always performed. Changing the mode bits of the directory should also invalidate the (previously cached) dentry to make sure the next lookup will have a chance of updating the timeout, if needed. Reported-by: Jean-Pierre André Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dir.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 67c0d1046c61..a810a214ee88 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -1697,14 +1697,22 @@ error: static int fuse_setattr(struct dentry *entry, struct iattr *attr) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(entry); + int ret; if (!fuse_allow_current_process(get_fuse_conn(inode))) return -EACCES; if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE) - return fuse_do_setattr(inode, attr, attr->ia_file); + ret = fuse_do_setattr(inode, attr, attr->ia_file); else - return fuse_do_setattr(inode, attr, NULL); + ret = fuse_do_setattr(inode, attr, NULL); + + if (!ret) { + /* Directory mode changed, may need to revalidate access */ + if (d_is_dir(entry) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) + fuse_invalidate_entry_cache(entry); + } + return ret; } static int fuse_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *entry, From 879d001c6d3b6bdd880b6c86acbb0d1ea8e2f548 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 07:32:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/26] fuse: fix killing s[ug]id in setattr commit a09f99eddef44035ec764075a37bace8181bec38 upstream. Fuse allowed VFS to set mode in setattr in order to clear suid/sgid on chown and truncate, and (since writeback_cache) write. The problem with this is that it'll potentially restore a stale mode. The poper fix would be to let the filesystems do the suid/sgid clearing on the relevant operations. Possibly some are already doing it but there's no way we can detect this. So fix this by refreshing and recalculating the mode. Do this only if ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID is set to not destroy performance for writes. This is still racy but the size of the window is reduced. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dir.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index a810a214ee88..4b5f2c4e69c8 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -1697,16 +1697,40 @@ error: static int fuse_setattr(struct dentry *entry, struct iattr *attr) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(entry); + struct file *file = (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE) ? attr->ia_file : NULL; int ret; if (!fuse_allow_current_process(get_fuse_conn(inode))) return -EACCES; - if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE) - ret = fuse_do_setattr(inode, attr, attr->ia_file); - else - ret = fuse_do_setattr(inode, attr, NULL); + if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID)) { + int kill; + attr->ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | + ATTR_MODE); + /* + * ia_mode calculation may have used stale i_mode. Refresh and + * recalculate. + */ + ret = fuse_do_getattr(inode, NULL, file); + if (ret) + return ret; + + attr->ia_mode = inode->i_mode; + kill = should_remove_suid(entry); + if (kill & ATTR_KILL_SUID) { + attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE; + attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISUID; + } + if (kill & ATTR_KILL_SGID) { + attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE; + attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID; + } + } + if (!attr->ia_valid) + return 0; + + ret = fuse_do_setattr(inode, attr, file); if (!ret) { /* Directory mode changed, may need to revalidate access */ if (d_is_dir(entry) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) From 6281c0883a9d56371a791304e756513a45975304 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guilherme G Piccoli Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2016 00:31:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 07/26] i40e: avoid NULL pointer dereference and recursive errors on early PCI error commit edfc23ee3e0ebbb6713d7574ab1b00abff178f6c upstream. Although rare, it's possible to hit PCI error early on device probe, meaning possibly some structs are not entirely initialized, and some might even be completely uninitialized, leading to NULL pointer dereference. The i40e driver currently presents a "bad" behavior if device hits such early PCI error: firstly, the struct i40e_pf might not be attached to pci_dev yet, leading to a NULL pointer dereference on access to pf->state. Even checking if the struct is NULL and avoiding the access in that case isn't enough, since the driver cannot recover from PCI error that early; in our experiments we saw multiple failures on kernel log, like: [549.664] i40e 0007:01:00.1: Initial pf_reset failed: -15 [549.664] i40e: probe of 0007:01:00.1 failed with error -15 [...] [871.644] i40e 0007:01:00.1: The driver for the device stopped because the device firmware failed to init. Try updating your NVM image. [871.644] i40e: probe of 0007:01:00.1 failed with error -32 [...] [872.516] i40e 0007:01:00.0: ARQ: Unknown event 0x0000 ignored Between the first probe failure (error -15) and the second (error -32) another PCI error happened due to the first bad probe. Also, driver started to flood console with those ARQ event messages. This patch will prevent these issues by allowing error recovery mechanism to remove the failed device from the system instead of trying to recover from early PCI errors during device probe. Signed-off-by: Guilherme G Piccoli Acked-by: Jacob Keller Tested-by: Andrew Bowers Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index 2215bebe208e..979cc024bca7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -10853,6 +10853,12 @@ static pci_ers_result_t i40e_pci_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, dev_info(&pdev->dev, "%s: error %d\n", __func__, error); + if (!pf) { + dev_info(&pdev->dev, + "Cannot recover - error happened during device probe\n"); + return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; + } + /* shutdown all operations */ if (!test_bit(__I40E_SUSPENDED, &pf->state)) { rtnl_lock(); From 85e27fe87acd059aa1c615184ec2c9ac9bfe29d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Rafa=C5=82=20Mi=C5=82ecki?= Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 08:23:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/26] brcmfmac: fix memory leak in brcmf_fill_bss_param MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 23e9c128adb2038c27a424a5f91136e7fa3e0dc6 upstream. This function is called from get_station callback which means that every time user space was getting/dumping station(s) we were leaking 2 KiB. Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki Fixes: 1f0dc59a6de ("brcmfmac: rework .get_station() callback") Acked-by: Arend van Spriel Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c index deb5f78dcacc..71493d2af912 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c @@ -2408,7 +2408,7 @@ static void brcmf_fill_bss_param(struct brcmf_if *ifp, struct station_info *si) WL_BSS_INFO_MAX); if (err) { brcmf_err("Failed to get bss info (%d)\n", err); - return; + goto out_kfree; } si->filled |= BIT(NL80211_STA_INFO_BSS_PARAM); si->bss_param.beacon_interval = le16_to_cpu(buf->bss_le.beacon_period); @@ -2420,6 +2420,9 @@ static void brcmf_fill_bss_param(struct brcmf_if *ifp, struct station_info *si) si->bss_param.flags |= BSS_PARAM_FLAGS_SHORT_PREAMBLE; if (capability & WLAN_CAPABILITY_SHORT_SLOT_TIME) si->bss_param.flags |= BSS_PARAM_FLAGS_SHORT_SLOT_TIME; + +out_kfree: + kfree(buf); } static s32 From a3a9b33e49ff91f6ceaeb1d5855046d50cefa3ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Iooss Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2016 21:10:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/26] ASoC: Intel: Atom: add a missing star in a memcpy call commit 61ab0d403bbd9d5f6e000e3b5734049141b91f6f upstream. In sst_prepare_and_post_msg(), when a response is received in "block", the following code gets executed: *data = kzalloc(block->size, GFP_KERNEL); memcpy(data, (void *) block->data, block->size); The memcpy() call overwrites the content of the *data pointer instead of filling the newly-allocated memory (which pointer is hold by *data). Fix this by merging kzalloc+memcpy into a single kmemdup() call. Thanks Joe Perches for suggesting using kmemdup() Fixes: 60dc8dbacb00 ("ASoC: Intel: sst: Add some helper functions") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/intel/atom/sst/sst_pvt.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/atom/sst/sst_pvt.c b/sound/soc/intel/atom/sst/sst_pvt.c index adb32fefd693..b1e6b8f34a6a 100644 --- a/sound/soc/intel/atom/sst/sst_pvt.c +++ b/sound/soc/intel/atom/sst/sst_pvt.c @@ -279,17 +279,15 @@ int sst_prepare_and_post_msg(struct intel_sst_drv *sst, if (response) { ret = sst_wait_timeout(sst, block); - if (ret < 0) { + if (ret < 0) goto out; - } else if(block->data) { - if (!data) - goto out; - *data = kzalloc(block->size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!(*data)) { + + if (data && block->data) { + *data = kmemdup(block->data, block->size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*data) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; - } else - memcpy(data, (void *) block->data, block->size); + } } } out: From 5c16520bdcd41740abcadb58133637faecf713c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mike Galbraith Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2012 15:21:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/26] reiserfs: Unlock superblock before calling reiserfs_quota_on_mount() commit 420902c9d086848a7548c83e0a49021514bd71b7 upstream. If we hold the superblock lock while calling reiserfs_quota_on_mount(), we can deadlock our own worker - mount blocks kworker/3:2, sleeps forever more. crash> ps|grep UN 715 2 3 ffff880220734d30 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/3:2] 9369 9341 2 ffff88021ffb7560 UN 1.3 493404 123184 Xorg 9665 9664 3 ffff880225b92ab0 UN 0.0 47368 812 udisks-daemon 10635 10403 3 ffff880222f22c70 UN 0.0 14904 936 mount crash> bt ffff880220734d30 PID: 715 TASK: ffff880220734d30 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "kworker/3:2" #0 [ffff8802244c3c20] schedule at ffffffff8144584b #1 [ffff8802244c3cc8] __rt_mutex_slowlock at ffffffff814472b3 #2 [ffff8802244c3d28] rt_mutex_slowlock at ffffffff814473f5 #3 [ffff8802244c3dc8] reiserfs_write_lock at ffffffffa05f28fd [reiserfs] #4 [ffff8802244c3de8] flush_async_commits at ffffffffa05ec91d [reiserfs] #5 [ffff8802244c3e08] process_one_work at ffffffff81073726 #6 [ffff8802244c3e68] worker_thread at ffffffff81073eba #7 [ffff8802244c3ec8] kthread at ffffffff810782e0 #8 [ffff8802244c3f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81450064 crash> rd ffff8802244c3cc8 10 ffff8802244c3cc8: ffffffff814472b3 ffff880222f23250 .rD.....P2.".... ffff8802244c3cd8: 0000000000000000 0000000000000286 ................ ffff8802244c3ce8: ffff8802244c3d30 ffff880220734d80 0=L$.....Ms .... ffff8802244c3cf8: ffff880222e8f628 0000000000000000 (.."............ ffff8802244c3d08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 ................ crash> struct rt_mutex ffff880222e8f628 struct rt_mutex { wait_lock = { raw_lock = { slock = 65537 } }, wait_list = { node_list = { next = 0xffff8802244c3d48, prev = 0xffff8802244c3d48 } }, owner = 0xffff880222f22c71, save_state = 0 } crash> bt 0xffff880222f22c70 PID: 10635 TASK: ffff880222f22c70 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "mount" #0 [ffff8802216a9868] schedule at ffffffff8144584b #1 [ffff8802216a9910] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81446865 #2 [ffff8802216a99a0] wait_for_common at ffffffff81445f74 #3 [ffff8802216a9a30] flush_work at ffffffff810712d3 #4 [ffff8802216a9ab0] schedule_on_each_cpu at ffffffff81074463 #5 [ffff8802216a9ae0] invalidate_bdev at ffffffff81178aba #6 [ffff8802216a9af0] vfs_load_quota_inode at ffffffff811a3632 #7 [ffff8802216a9b50] dquot_quota_on_mount at ffffffff811a375c #8 [ffff8802216a9b80] finish_unfinished at ffffffffa05dd8b0 [reiserfs] #9 [ffff8802216a9cc0] reiserfs_fill_super at ffffffffa05de825 [reiserfs] RIP: 00007f7b9303997a RSP: 00007ffff443c7a8 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000000a5 RBX: ffffffff8144ef12 RCX: 00007f7b932e9ee0 RDX: 00007f7b93d9a400 RSI: 00007f7b93d9a3e0 RDI: 00007f7b93d9a3c0 RBP: 00007f7b93d9a2c0 R8: 00007f7b93d9a550 R9: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffffc0ed040e R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000000000040e R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000c0ed040e R15: 00007ffff443ca20 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker Acked-by: Mike Galbraith Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/reiserfs/super.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/super.c b/fs/reiserfs/super.c index 4a62fe8cc3bf..f9f3be50081a 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/super.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/super.c @@ -190,7 +190,15 @@ static int remove_save_link_only(struct super_block *s, static int reiserfs_quota_on_mount(struct super_block *, int); #endif -/* look for uncompleted unlinks and truncates and complete them */ +/* + * Look for uncompleted unlinks and truncates and complete them + * + * Called with superblock write locked. If quotas are enabled, we have to + * release/retake lest we call dquot_quota_on_mount(), proceed to + * schedule_on_each_cpu() in invalidate_bdev() and deadlock waiting for the per + * cpu worklets to complete flush_async_commits() that in turn wait for the + * superblock write lock. + */ static int finish_unfinished(struct super_block *s) { INITIALIZE_PATH(path); @@ -237,7 +245,9 @@ static int finish_unfinished(struct super_block *s) quota_enabled[i] = 0; continue; } + reiserfs_write_unlock(s); ret = reiserfs_quota_on_mount(s, i); + reiserfs_write_lock(s); if (ret < 0) reiserfs_warning(s, "reiserfs-2500", "cannot turn on journaled " From be90a09bd915e417feae76d9a72c2a37dc5cf1b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2016 18:50:48 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 11/26] reiserfs: switch to generic_{get,set,remove}xattr() commit 79a628d14ec7ee9adfdc3ce04343d5ff7ec20c18 upstream. reiserfs_xattr_[sg]et() will fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for V1 inodes anyway, and all reiserfs instances of ->[sg]et() call it and so does ->set_acl(). Checks for name length in the instances had been bogus; they should've been "bugger off if it's _exactly_ the prefix" (as generic would do on its own) and not "bugger off if it's shorter than the prefix" - that can't happen. xattr_full_name() is needed to adjust for the fact that generic instances will skip the prefix in the name passed to ->[gs]et(); reiserfs homegrown analogues didn't. Signed-off-by: Al Viro [jeffm: Backported to v4.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/reiserfs/file.c | 6 ++-- fs/reiserfs/namei.c | 18 ++++++------ fs/reiserfs/xattr.c | 54 ------------------------------------ fs/reiserfs/xattr.h | 9 +----- fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c | 14 ++++------ fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c | 14 ++++------ fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c | 14 ++++------ 7 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/file.c b/fs/reiserfs/file.c index 96a1bcf33db4..8f5ccdf81c25 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/file.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/file.c @@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ const struct file_operations reiserfs_file_operations = { const struct inode_operations reiserfs_file_inode_operations = { .setattr = reiserfs_setattr, - .setxattr = reiserfs_setxattr, - .getxattr = reiserfs_getxattr, + .setxattr = generic_setxattr, + .getxattr = generic_getxattr, .listxattr = reiserfs_listxattr, - .removexattr = reiserfs_removexattr, + .removexattr = generic_removexattr, .permission = reiserfs_permission, .get_acl = reiserfs_get_acl, .set_acl = reiserfs_set_acl, diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/namei.c b/fs/reiserfs/namei.c index 47f96988fdd4..3ebc70167e41 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/namei.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/namei.c @@ -1649,10 +1649,10 @@ const struct inode_operations reiserfs_dir_inode_operations = { .mknod = reiserfs_mknod, .rename = reiserfs_rename, .setattr = reiserfs_setattr, - .setxattr = reiserfs_setxattr, - .getxattr = reiserfs_getxattr, + .setxattr = generic_setxattr, + .getxattr = generic_getxattr, .listxattr = reiserfs_listxattr, - .removexattr = reiserfs_removexattr, + .removexattr = generic_removexattr, .permission = reiserfs_permission, .get_acl = reiserfs_get_acl, .set_acl = reiserfs_set_acl, @@ -1667,10 +1667,10 @@ const struct inode_operations reiserfs_symlink_inode_operations = { .follow_link = page_follow_link_light, .put_link = page_put_link, .setattr = reiserfs_setattr, - .setxattr = reiserfs_setxattr, - .getxattr = reiserfs_getxattr, + .setxattr = generic_setxattr, + .getxattr = generic_getxattr, .listxattr = reiserfs_listxattr, - .removexattr = reiserfs_removexattr, + .removexattr = generic_removexattr, .permission = reiserfs_permission, }; @@ -1679,10 +1679,10 @@ const struct inode_operations reiserfs_symlink_inode_operations = { */ const struct inode_operations reiserfs_special_inode_operations = { .setattr = reiserfs_setattr, - .setxattr = reiserfs_setxattr, - .getxattr = reiserfs_getxattr, + .setxattr = generic_setxattr, + .getxattr = generic_getxattr, .listxattr = reiserfs_listxattr, - .removexattr = reiserfs_removexattr, + .removexattr = generic_removexattr, .permission = reiserfs_permission, .get_acl = reiserfs_get_acl, .set_acl = reiserfs_set_acl, diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c b/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c index 66b26fdfff8d..a8dbc93e45eb 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c @@ -763,60 +763,6 @@ find_xattr_handler_prefix(const struct xattr_handler **handlers, return xah; } - -/* - * Inode operation getxattr() - */ -ssize_t -reiserfs_getxattr(struct dentry * dentry, const char *name, void *buffer, - size_t size) -{ - const struct xattr_handler *handler; - - handler = find_xattr_handler_prefix(dentry->d_sb->s_xattr, name); - - if (!handler || get_inode_sd_version(d_inode(dentry)) == STAT_DATA_V1) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - return handler->get(handler, dentry, name, buffer, size); -} - -/* - * Inode operation setxattr() - * - * d_inode(dentry)->i_mutex down - */ -int -reiserfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, - size_t size, int flags) -{ - const struct xattr_handler *handler; - - handler = find_xattr_handler_prefix(dentry->d_sb->s_xattr, name); - - if (!handler || get_inode_sd_version(d_inode(dentry)) == STAT_DATA_V1) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - return handler->set(handler, dentry, name, value, size, flags); -} - -/* - * Inode operation removexattr() - * - * d_inode(dentry)->i_mutex down - */ -int reiserfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) -{ - const struct xattr_handler *handler; - - handler = find_xattr_handler_prefix(dentry->d_sb->s_xattr, name); - - if (!handler || get_inode_sd_version(d_inode(dentry)) == STAT_DATA_V1) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - return handler->set(handler, dentry, name, NULL, 0, XATTR_REPLACE); -} - struct listxattr_buf { struct dir_context ctx; size_t size; diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.h b/fs/reiserfs/xattr.h index 15dde6262c00..613ff5aef94e 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.h +++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include struct inode; struct dentry; @@ -18,12 +19,7 @@ int reiserfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); #ifdef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR #define has_xattr_dir(inode) (REISERFS_I(inode)->i_flags & i_has_xattr_dir) -ssize_t reiserfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - void *buffer, size_t size); -int reiserfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags); ssize_t reiserfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size); -int reiserfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); int reiserfs_xattr_get(struct inode *, const char *, void *, size_t); int reiserfs_xattr_set(struct inode *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); @@ -92,10 +88,7 @@ static inline void reiserfs_init_xattr_rwsem(struct inode *inode) #else -#define reiserfs_getxattr NULL -#define reiserfs_setxattr NULL #define reiserfs_listxattr NULL -#define reiserfs_removexattr NULL static inline void reiserfs_init_xattr_rwsem(struct inode *inode) { diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c index ac659af431ae..60de069225ba 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c @@ -12,26 +12,24 @@ static int security_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size) { - if (strlen(name) < sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX)) - return -EINVAL; - if (IS_PRIVATE(d_inode(dentry))) return -EPERM; - return reiserfs_xattr_get(d_inode(dentry), name, buffer, size); + return reiserfs_xattr_get(d_inode(dentry), + xattr_full_name(handler, name), + buffer, size); } static int security_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { - if (strlen(name) < sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX)) - return -EINVAL; - if (IS_PRIVATE(d_inode(dentry))) return -EPERM; - return reiserfs_xattr_set(d_inode(dentry), name, buffer, size, flags); + return reiserfs_xattr_set(d_inode(dentry), + xattr_full_name(handler, name), + buffer, size, flags); } static size_t security_list(const struct xattr_handler *handler, diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c index a338adf1b8b4..ebba1ebf28ad 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c @@ -11,26 +11,24 @@ static int trusted_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size) { - if (strlen(name) < sizeof(XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX)) - return -EINVAL; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || IS_PRIVATE(d_inode(dentry))) return -EPERM; - return reiserfs_xattr_get(d_inode(dentry), name, buffer, size); + return reiserfs_xattr_get(d_inode(dentry), + xattr_full_name(handler, name), + buffer, size); } static int trusted_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { - if (strlen(name) < sizeof(XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX)) - return -EINVAL; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || IS_PRIVATE(d_inode(dentry))) return -EPERM; - return reiserfs_xattr_set(d_inode(dentry), name, buffer, size, flags); + return reiserfs_xattr_set(d_inode(dentry), + xattr_full_name(handler, name), + buffer, size, flags); } static size_t trusted_list(const struct xattr_handler *handler, diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c index 39c9667191c5..6ac8a8c8bd9c 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c @@ -10,24 +10,22 @@ static int user_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size) { - - if (strlen(name) < sizeof(XATTR_USER_PREFIX)) - return -EINVAL; if (!reiserfs_xattrs_user(dentry->d_sb)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return reiserfs_xattr_get(d_inode(dentry), name, buffer, size); + return reiserfs_xattr_get(d_inode(dentry), + xattr_full_name(handler, name), + buffer, size); } static int user_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { - if (strlen(name) < sizeof(XATTR_USER_PREFIX)) - return -EINVAL; - if (!reiserfs_xattrs_user(dentry->d_sb)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return reiserfs_xattr_set(d_inode(dentry), name, buffer, size, flags); + return reiserfs_xattr_set(d_inode(dentry), + xattr_full_name(handler, name), + buffer, size, flags); } static size_t user_list(const struct xattr_handler *handler, From ffb3c7a99a15a7644c2fc632d6474a1e4c0c800c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Justin Maggard Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2016 13:17:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 12/26] async_pq_val: fix DMA memory leak commit c84750906b4818d4929fbf73a4ae6c113b94f52b upstream. Add missing dmaengine_unmap_put(), so we don't OOM during RAID6 sync. Fixes: 1786b943dad0 ("async_pq_val: convert to dmaengine_unmap_data") Signed-off-by: Justin Maggard Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/async_tx/async_pq.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/async_tx/async_pq.c b/crypto/async_tx/async_pq.c index c0748bbd4c08..84f8d4d8b6bc 100644 --- a/crypto/async_tx/async_pq.c +++ b/crypto/async_tx/async_pq.c @@ -368,8 +368,6 @@ async_syndrome_val(struct page **blocks, unsigned int offset, int disks, dma_set_unmap(tx, unmap); async_tx_submit(chan, tx, submit); - - return tx; } else { struct page *p_src = P(blocks, disks); struct page *q_src = Q(blocks, disks); @@ -424,9 +422,11 @@ async_syndrome_val(struct page **blocks, unsigned int offset, int disks, submit->cb_param = cb_param_orig; submit->flags = flags_orig; async_tx_sync_epilog(submit); - - return NULL; + tx = NULL; } + dmaengine_unmap_put(unmap); + + return tx; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(async_syndrome_val); From 24040922827859d1d69597c3bc0c31fad523fd21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 16:44:56 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 13/26] scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer() commit 7bc2b55a5c030685b399bb65b6baa9ccc3d1f167 upstream. We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't overflow. Reported-by: Marco Grassi Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c b/drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c index 41f9a00e4f74..7bf7dfcefefd 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c @@ -2297,7 +2297,8 @@ static int arcmsr_iop_message_xfer(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb, } case ARCMSR_MESSAGE_WRITE_WQBUFFER: { unsigned char *ver_addr; - int32_t user_len, cnt2end; + uint32_t user_len; + int32_t cnt2end; uint8_t *pQbuffer, *ptmpuserbuffer; ver_addr = kmalloc(ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!ver_addr) { @@ -2306,6 +2307,11 @@ static int arcmsr_iop_message_xfer(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb, } ptmpuserbuffer = ver_addr; user_len = pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.Length; + if (user_len > ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN) { + retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL; + kfree(ver_addr); + goto message_out; + } memcpy(ptmpuserbuffer, pcmdmessagefld->messagedatabuffer, user_len); spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->wqbuffer_lock, flags); From 161cbfec102b846247b23d4addb22ae597fa5b88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 13:22:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/26] scsi: arcmsr: Simplify user_len checking commit 4bd173c30792791a6daca8c64793ec0a4ae8324f upstream. Do the user_len check first and then the ver_addr allocation so that we can save us the kfree() on the error path when user_len is > ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Marco Grassi Cc: Dan Carpenter Cc: Tomas Henzl Cc: Martin K. Petersen Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c b/drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c index 7bf7dfcefefd..8db9f3a5844d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/arcmsr/arcmsr_hba.c @@ -2300,18 +2300,20 @@ static int arcmsr_iop_message_xfer(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb, uint32_t user_len; int32_t cnt2end; uint8_t *pQbuffer, *ptmpuserbuffer; + + user_len = pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.Length; + if (user_len > ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN) { + retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL; + goto message_out; + } + ver_addr = kmalloc(ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!ver_addr) { retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL; goto message_out; } ptmpuserbuffer = ver_addr; - user_len = pcmdmessagefld->cmdmessage.Length; - if (user_len > ARCMSR_API_DATA_BUFLEN) { - retvalue = ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FAIL; - kfree(ver_addr); - goto message_out; - } + memcpy(ptmpuserbuffer, pcmdmessagefld->messagedatabuffer, user_len); spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->wqbuffer_lock, flags); From 2ed1b50a40e6d023e91a7a7d2cdb4b1247d8cec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brian King Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 08:59:19 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 15/26] scsi: ibmvfc: Fix I/O hang when port is not mapped commit 07d0e9a847401ffd2f09bd450d41644cd090e81d upstream. If a VFC port gets unmapped in the VIOS, it may not respond with a CRQ init complete following H_REG_CRQ. If this occurs, we can end up having called scsi_block_requests and not a resulting unblock until the init complete happens, which may never occur, and we end up hanging I/O requests. This patch ensures the host action stay set to IBMVFC_HOST_ACTION_TGT_DEL so we move all rports into devloss state and unblock unless we receive an init complete. Signed-off-by: Brian King Acked-by: Tyrel Datwyler Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c index 6aa317c303e2..1f9f9e5af207 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c @@ -717,7 +717,6 @@ static int ibmvfc_reset_crq(struct ibmvfc_host *vhost) spin_lock_irqsave(vhost->host->host_lock, flags); vhost->state = IBMVFC_NO_CRQ; vhost->logged_in = 0; - ibmvfc_set_host_action(vhost, IBMVFC_HOST_ACTION_NONE); /* Clean out the queue */ memset(crq->msgs, 0, PAGE_SIZE); From 76a8f17e0b850d5bb842097b0ee9c2e96af806a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Whitney Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2016 15:45:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 16/26] ext4: enforce online defrag restriction for encrypted files commit 14fbd4aa613bd5110556c281799ce36dc6f3ba97 upstream. Online defragging of encrypted files is not currently implemented. However, the move extent ioctl can still return successfully when called. For example, this occurs when xfstest ext4/020 is run on an encrypted file system, resulting in a corrupted test file and a corresponding test failure. Until the proper functionality is implemented, fail the move extent ioctl if either the original or donor file is encrypted. Signed-off-by: Eric Whitney Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/move_extent.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/move_extent.c b/fs/ext4/move_extent.c index 796ff0eafd3c..7861d801b048 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/move_extent.c +++ b/fs/ext4/move_extent.c @@ -598,6 +598,13 @@ ext4_move_extents(struct file *o_filp, struct file *d_filp, __u64 orig_blk, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + if (ext4_encrypted_inode(orig_inode) || + ext4_encrypted_inode(donor_inode)) { + ext4_msg(orig_inode->i_sb, KERN_ERR, + "Online defrag not supported for encrypted files"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + /* Protect orig and donor inodes against a truncate */ lock_two_nondirectories(orig_inode, donor_inode); From d380cbb8637f8edba056f50c96adf64c26bdd940 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daeho Jeong Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 22:56:10 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 17/26] ext4: reinforce check of i_dtime when clearing high fields of uid and gid commit 93e3b4e6631d2a74a8cf7429138096862ff9f452 upstream. Now, ext4_do_update_inode() clears high 16-bit fields of uid/gid of deleted and evicted inode to fix up interoperability with old kernels. However, it checks only i_dtime of an inode to determine whether the inode was deleted and evicted, and this is very risky, because i_dtime can be used for the pointer maintaining orphan inode list, too. We need to further check whether the i_dtime is being used for the orphan inode list even if the i_dtime is not NULL. We found that high 16-bit fields of uid/gid of inode are unintentionally and permanently cleared when the inode truncation is just triggered, but not finished, and the inode metadata, whose high uid/gid bits are cleared, is written on disk, and the sudden power-off follows that in order. Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong Signed-off-by: Hobin Woo Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 28702932a908..9189b0a7b211 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4549,14 +4549,14 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, * Fix up interoperability with old kernels. Otherwise, old inodes get * re-used with the upper 16 bits of the uid/gid intact */ - if (!ei->i_dtime) { + if (ei->i_dtime && list_empty(&ei->i_orphan)) { + raw_inode->i_uid_high = 0; + raw_inode->i_gid_high = 0; + } else { raw_inode->i_uid_high = cpu_to_le16(high_16_bits(i_uid)); raw_inode->i_gid_high = cpu_to_le16(high_16_bits(i_gid)); - } else { - raw_inode->i_uid_high = 0; - raw_inode->i_gid_high = 0; } } else { raw_inode->i_uid_low = cpu_to_le16(fs_high2lowuid(i_uid)); From 6f6c12ce00e8bb3f36b12ebb83b004f3cf4ec695 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabian Frederick Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 11:39:52 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 18/26] ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_insert_range() commit edf15aa180d7b98fe16bd3eda42f9dd0e60dee20 upstream. Running xfstests generic/013 with kmemleak gives the following: unreferenced object 0xffff8801d3d27de0 (size 96): comm "fsstress", pid 4941, jiffies 4294860168 (age 53.485s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] kmemleak_alloc+0x23/0x40 [] __kmalloc+0xf5/0x1d0 [] ext4_find_extent+0x1ec/0x2f0 [] ext4_insert_range+0x34c/0x4a0 [] ext4_fallocate+0x4e2/0x8b0 [] vfs_fallocate+0x134/0x210 [] SyS_fallocate+0x3f/0x60 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f [] 0xffffffffffffffff Problem seems mitigated by dropping refs and freeing path when there's no path[depth].p_ext Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index 8eac7d586997..9da42ace762a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -5738,6 +5738,9 @@ int ext4_insert_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len) up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem); goto out_stop; } + } else { + ext4_ext_drop_refs(path); + kfree(path); } ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, offset_lblk, From 2db2fd9538e40e905d174c2d1067c99b58a98d7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ross Zwisler Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 11:49:38 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 19/26] ext4: allow DAX writeback for hole punch commit cca32b7eeb4ea24fa6596650e06279ad9130af98 upstream. Currently when doing a DAX hole punch with ext4 we fail to do a writeback. This is because the logic around filemap_write_and_wait_range() in ext4_punch_hole() only looks for dirty page cache pages in the radix tree, not for dirty DAX exceptional entries. Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 9189b0a7b211..c71d2941a45b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -3645,7 +3645,7 @@ int ext4_update_disksize_before_punch(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, } /* - * ext4_punch_hole: punches a hole in a file by releaseing the blocks + * ext4_punch_hole: punches a hole in a file by releasing the blocks * associated with the given offset and length * * @inode: File inode @@ -3674,7 +3674,7 @@ int ext4_punch_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length) * Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions * Then release them. */ - if (mapping->nrpages && mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) { + if (mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) { ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset, offset + length - 1); if (ret) From 847d63fcaf37730aed89c1d29373d5dd0b9b405a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: gmail Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 01:33:37 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 20/26] ext4: release bh in make_indexed_dir commit e81d44778d1d57bbaef9e24c4eac7c8a7a401d40 upstream. The commit 6050d47adcad: "ext4: bail out from make_indexed_dir() on first error" could end up leaking bh2 in the error path. [ Also avoid renaming bh2 to bh, which just confuses things --tytso ] Signed-off-by: yangsheng Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 38eb0c8e43b9..573b4cbb0cb9 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -2017,33 +2017,31 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, frame->entries = entries; frame->at = entries; frame->bh = bh; - bh = bh2; retval = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, frame->bh); if (retval) goto out_frames; - retval = ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node(handle, dir, bh); + retval = ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node(handle, dir, bh2); if (retval) goto out_frames; - de = do_split(handle,dir, &bh, frame, &fname->hinfo); + de = do_split(handle,dir, &bh2, frame, &fname->hinfo); if (IS_ERR(de)) { retval = PTR_ERR(de); goto out_frames; } - dx_release(frames); - retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, de, bh); - brelse(bh); - return retval; + retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, de, bh2); out_frames: /* * Even if the block split failed, we have to properly write * out all the changes we did so far. Otherwise we can end up * with corrupted filesystem. */ - ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); + if (retval) + ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); dx_release(frames); + brelse(bh2); return retval; } From 4f8c2ad3eeb5bc635ce23d8148cfb4b070704a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcelo Cerri Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 13:42:09 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 21/26] crypto: ghash-generic - move common definitions to a new header file commit a397ba829d7f8aff4c90af3704573a28ccd61a59 upstream. Move common values and types used by ghash-generic to a new header file so drivers can directly use ghash-generic as a fallback implementation. Fixes: cc333cd68dfa ("crypto: vmx - Adding GHASH routines for VMX module") Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/ghash-generic.c | 13 +------------ include/crypto/ghash.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/crypto/ghash.h diff --git a/crypto/ghash-generic.c b/crypto/ghash-generic.c index bac70995e064..12ad3e3a84e3 100644 --- a/crypto/ghash-generic.c +++ b/crypto/ghash-generic.c @@ -14,24 +14,13 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include -#define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE 16 -#define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE 16 - -struct ghash_ctx { - struct gf128mul_4k *gf128; -}; - -struct ghash_desc_ctx { - u8 buffer[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; - u32 bytes; -}; - static int ghash_init(struct shash_desc *desc) { struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); diff --git a/include/crypto/ghash.h b/include/crypto/ghash.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2a61c9bbab8f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/ghash.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* + * Common values for GHASH algorithms + */ + +#ifndef __CRYPTO_GHASH_H__ +#define __CRYPTO_GHASH_H__ + +#include +#include + +#define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE 16 +#define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE 16 + +struct ghash_ctx { + struct gf128mul_4k *gf128; +}; + +struct ghash_desc_ctx { + u8 buffer[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u32 bytes; +}; + +#endif From 78e1355d421d266f8309f81ce0770a0f9372a0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcelo Cerri Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 13:42:10 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 22/26] crypto: vmx - Fix memory corruption caused by p8_ghash commit 80da44c29d997e28c4442825f35f4ac339813877 upstream. This patch changes the p8_ghash driver to use ghash-generic as a fixed fallback implementation. This allows the correct value of descsize to be defined directly in its shash_alg structure and avoids problems with incorrect buffer sizes when its state is exported or imported. Reported-by: Jan Stancek Fixes: cc333cd68dfa ("crypto: vmx - Adding GHASH routines for VMX module") Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/vmx/ghash.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/vmx/ghash.c b/drivers/crypto/vmx/ghash.c index 2183a2e77641..9cb3a0b715e2 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/vmx/ghash.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/ghash.c @@ -26,16 +26,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #define IN_INTERRUPT in_interrupt() -#define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE (16) -#define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE (16) -#define GHASH_KEY_LEN (16) - void gcm_init_p8(u128 htable[16], const u64 Xi[2]); void gcm_gmult_p8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 htable[16]); void gcm_ghash_p8(u64 Xi[2], const u128 htable[16], @@ -55,16 +52,11 @@ struct p8_ghash_desc_ctx { static int p8_ghash_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) { - const char *alg; + const char *alg = "ghash-generic"; struct crypto_shash *fallback; struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm = __crypto_shash_cast(tfm); struct p8_ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); - if (!(alg = crypto_tfm_alg_name(tfm))) { - printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to get algorithm name.\n"); - return -ENOENT; - } - fallback = crypto_alloc_shash(alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK); if (IS_ERR(fallback)) { printk(KERN_ERR @@ -78,10 +70,18 @@ static int p8_ghash_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) crypto_shash_set_flags(fallback, crypto_shash_get_flags((struct crypto_shash *) tfm)); - ctx->fallback = fallback; - shash_tfm->descsize = sizeof(struct p8_ghash_desc_ctx) - + crypto_shash_descsize(fallback); + /* Check if the descsize defined in the algorithm is still enough. */ + if (shash_tfm->descsize < sizeof(struct p8_ghash_desc_ctx) + + crypto_shash_descsize(fallback)) { + printk(KERN_ERR + "Desc size of the fallback implementation (%s) does not match the expected value: %lu vs %u\n", + alg, + shash_tfm->descsize - sizeof(struct p8_ghash_desc_ctx), + crypto_shash_descsize(fallback)); + return -EINVAL; + } + ctx->fallback = fallback; return 0; } @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int p8_ghash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key, { struct p8_ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_shash_tfm(tfm)); - if (keylen != GHASH_KEY_LEN) + if (keylen != GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) return -EINVAL; preempt_disable(); @@ -215,7 +215,8 @@ struct shash_alg p8_ghash_alg = { .update = p8_ghash_update, .final = p8_ghash_final, .setkey = p8_ghash_setkey, - .descsize = sizeof(struct p8_ghash_desc_ctx), + .descsize = sizeof(struct p8_ghash_desc_ctx) + + sizeof(struct ghash_desc_ctx), .base = { .cra_name = "ghash", .cra_driver_name = "p8_ghash", From 1832397d8ce4de6827fb102a70649c63e7a2f9a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2016 10:14:37 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 23/26] dlm: free workqueues after the connections commit 3a8db79889ce16930aff19b818f5b09651bb7644 upstream. After backporting commit ee44b4bc054a ("dlm: use sctp 1-to-1 API") series to a kernel with an older workqueue which didn't use RCU yet, it was noticed that we are freeing the workqueues in dlm_lowcomms_stop() too early as free_conn() will try to access that memory for canceling the queued works if any. This issue was introduced by commit 0d737a8cfd83 as before it such attempt to cancel the queued works wasn't performed, so the issue was not present. This patch fixes it by simply inverting the free order. Fixes: 0d737a8cfd83 ("dlm: fix race while closing connections") Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: David Teigland Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/dlm/lowcomms.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/dlm/lowcomms.c b/fs/dlm/lowcomms.c index 3a37bd3f9637..9d7a4a714907 100644 --- a/fs/dlm/lowcomms.c +++ b/fs/dlm/lowcomms.c @@ -1607,16 +1607,12 @@ void dlm_lowcomms_stop(void) mutex_lock(&connections_lock); dlm_allow_conn = 0; foreach_conn(stop_conn); + clean_writequeues(); + foreach_conn(free_conn); mutex_unlock(&connections_lock); work_stop(); - mutex_lock(&connections_lock); - clean_writequeues(); - - foreach_conn(free_conn); - - mutex_unlock(&connections_lock); kmem_cache_destroy(con_cache); } From b3b4283f7e46f563b438e587a0a567118a45a3fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2016 12:44:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 24/26] vfs: move permission checking into notify_change() for utimes(NULL) commit f2b20f6ee842313a0d681dbbf7f87b70291a6a3b upstream. This fixes a bug where the permission was not properly checked in overlayfs. The testcase is ltp/utimensat01. It is also cleaner and safer to do the permission checking in the vfs helper instead of the caller. This patch introduces an additional ia_valid flag ATTR_TOUCH (since touch(1) is the most obvious user of utimes(NULL)) that is passed into notify_change whenever the conditions for this special permission checking mode are met. Reported-by: Aihua Zhang Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Tested-by: Aihua Zhang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/attr.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ fs/utimes.c | 16 +--------------- include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 6530ced19697..d62f674a605f 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -202,6 +202,21 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr, struct inode **de return -EPERM; } + /* + * If utimes(2) and friends are called with times == NULL (or both + * times are UTIME_NOW), then we need to check for write permission + */ + if (ia_valid & ATTR_TOUCH) { + if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) + return -EPERM; + + if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) { + error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE); + if (error) + return error; + } + } + if ((ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) { umode_t amode = attr->ia_mode; /* Flag setting protected by i_mutex */ diff --git a/fs/utimes.c b/fs/utimes.c index aa138d64560a..cb771c30d102 100644 --- a/fs/utimes.c +++ b/fs/utimes.c @@ -87,20 +87,7 @@ static int utimes_common(struct path *path, struct timespec *times) */ newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_TIMES_SET; } else { - /* - * If times is NULL (or both times are UTIME_NOW), - * then we need to check permissions, because - * inode_change_ok() won't do it. - */ - error = -EACCES; - if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) - goto mnt_drop_write_and_out; - - if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) { - error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE); - if (error) - goto mnt_drop_write_and_out; - } + newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_TOUCH; } retry_deleg: mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); @@ -112,7 +99,6 @@ retry_deleg: goto retry_deleg; } -mnt_drop_write_and_out: mnt_drop_write(path->mnt); out: return error; diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 0166582c4d78..e1a123760dbf 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ typedef void (dax_iodone_t)(struct buffer_head *bh_map, int uptodate); #define ATTR_KILL_PRIV (1 << 14) #define ATTR_OPEN (1 << 15) /* Truncating from open(O_TRUNC) */ #define ATTR_TIMES_SET (1 << 16) +#define ATTR_TOUCH (1 << 17) /* * Whiteout is represented by a char device. The following constants define the From c7077fba80b443ab771f7df4d892dcc687a27b92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Glauber Costa Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 20:59:59 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 25/26] cfq: fix starvation of asynchronous writes commit 3932a86b4b9d1f0b049d64d4591ce58ad18b44ec upstream. While debugging timeouts happening in my application workload (ScyllaDB), I have observed calls to open() taking a long time, ranging everywhere from 2 seconds - the first ones that are enough to time out my application - to more than 30 seconds. The problem seems to happen because XFS may block on pending metadata updates under certain circumnstances, and that's confirmed with the following backtrace taken by the offcputime tool (iovisor/bcc): ffffffffb90c57b1 finish_task_switch ffffffffb97dffb5 schedule ffffffffb97e310c schedule_timeout ffffffffb97e1f12 __down ffffffffb90ea821 down ffffffffc046a9dc xfs_buf_lock ffffffffc046abfb _xfs_buf_find ffffffffc046ae4a xfs_buf_get_map ffffffffc046babd xfs_buf_read_map ffffffffc0499931 xfs_trans_read_buf_map ffffffffc044a561 xfs_da_read_buf ffffffffc0451390 xfs_dir3_leaf_read.constprop.16 ffffffffc0452b90 xfs_dir2_leaf_lookup_int ffffffffc0452e0f xfs_dir2_leaf_lookup ffffffffc044d9d3 xfs_dir_lookup ffffffffc047d1d9 xfs_lookup ffffffffc0479e53 xfs_vn_lookup ffffffffb925347a path_openat ffffffffb9254a71 do_filp_open ffffffffb9242a94 do_sys_open ffffffffb9242b9e sys_open ffffffffb97e42b2 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath 00007fb0698162ed [unknown] Inspecting my run with blktrace, I can see that the xfsaild kthread exhibit very high "Dispatch wait" times, on the dozens of seconds range and consistent with the open() times I have saw in that run. Still from the blktrace output, we can after searching a bit, identify the request that wasn't dispatched: 8,0 11 152 81.092472813 804 A WM 141698288 + 8 <- (8,1) 141696240 8,0 11 153 81.092472889 804 Q WM 141698288 + 8 [xfsaild/sda1] 8,0 11 154 81.092473207 804 G WM 141698288 + 8 [xfsaild/sda1] 8,0 11 206 81.092496118 804 I WM 141698288 + 8 ( 22911) [xfsaild/sda1] <==== 'I' means Inserted (into the IO scheduler) ===================================> 8,0 0 289372 96.718761435 0 D WM 141698288 + 8 (15626265317) [swapper/0] <==== Only 15s later the CFQ scheduler dispatches the request ======================> As we can see above, in this particular example CFQ took 15 seconds to dispatch this request. Going back to the full trace, we can see that the xfsaild queue had plenty of opportunity to run, and it was selected as the active queue many times. It would just always be preempted by something else (example): 8,0 1 0 81.117912979 0 m N cfq1618SN / insert_request 8,0 1 0 81.117913419 0 m N cfq1618SN / add_to_rr 8,0 1 0 81.117914044 0 m N cfq1618SN / preempt 8,0 1 0 81.117914398 0 m N cfq767A / slice expired t=1 8,0 1 0 81.117914755 0 m N cfq767A / resid=40 8,0 1 0 81.117915340 0 m N / served: vt=1948520448 min_vt=1948520448 8,0 1 0 81.117915858 0 m N cfq767A / sl_used=1 disp=0 charge=0 iops=1 sect=0 where cfq767 is the xfsaild queue and cfq1618 corresponds to one of the ScyllaDB IO dispatchers. The requests preempting the xfsaild queue are synchronous requests. That's a characteristic of ScyllaDB workloads, as we only ever issue O_DIRECT requests. While it can be argued that preempting ASYNC requests in favor of SYNC is part of the CFQ logic, I don't believe that doing so for 15+ seconds is anyone's goal. Moreover, unless I am misunderstanding something, that breaks the expectation set by the "fifo_expire_async" tunable, which in my system is set to the default. Looking at the code, it seems to me that the issue is that after we make an async queue active, there is no guarantee that it will execute any request. When the queue itself tests if it cfq_may_dispatch() it can bail if it sees SYNC requests in flight. An incoming request from another queue can also preempt it in such situation before we have the chance to execute anything (as seen in the trace above). This patch sets the must_dispatch flag if we notice that we have requests that are already fifo_expired. This flag is always cleared after cfq_dispatch_request() returns from cfq_dispatch_requests(), so it won't pin the queue for subsequent requests (unless they are themselves expired) Care is taken during preempt to still allow rt requests to preempt us regardless. Testing my workload with this patch applied produces much better results. From the application side I see no timeouts, and the open() latency histogram generated by systemtap looks much better, with the worst outlier at 131ms: Latency histogram of xfs_buf_lock acquisition (microseconds): value |-------------------------------------------------- count 0 | 11 1 |@@@@ 161 2 |@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ 1966 4 |@ 54 8 | 36 16 | 7 32 | 0 64 | 0 ~ 1024 | 0 2048 | 0 4096 | 1 8192 | 1 16384 | 2 32768 | 0 65536 | 0 131072 | 1 262144 | 0 524288 | 0 Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa CC: Jens Axboe CC: linux-block@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Glauber Costa Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/cfq-iosched.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/cfq-iosched.c b/block/cfq-iosched.c index 1f9093e901da..3ad307ee6029 100644 --- a/block/cfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/cfq-iosched.c @@ -3003,7 +3003,6 @@ static struct request *cfq_check_fifo(struct cfq_queue *cfqq) if (time_before(jiffies, rq->fifo_time)) rq = NULL; - cfq_log_cfqq(cfqq->cfqd, cfqq, "fifo=%p", rq); return rq; } @@ -3377,6 +3376,9 @@ static bool cfq_may_dispatch(struct cfq_data *cfqd, struct cfq_queue *cfqq) { unsigned int max_dispatch; + if (cfq_cfqq_must_dispatch(cfqq)) + return true; + /* * Drain async requests before we start sync IO */ @@ -3468,15 +3470,20 @@ static bool cfq_dispatch_request(struct cfq_data *cfqd, struct cfq_queue *cfqq) BUG_ON(RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&cfqq->sort_list)); + rq = cfq_check_fifo(cfqq); + if (rq) + cfq_mark_cfqq_must_dispatch(cfqq); + if (!cfq_may_dispatch(cfqd, cfqq)) return false; /* * follow expired path, else get first next available */ - rq = cfq_check_fifo(cfqq); if (!rq) rq = cfqq->next_rq; + else + cfq_log_cfqq(cfqq->cfqd, cfqq, "fifo=%p", rq); /* * insert request into driver dispatch list @@ -3944,7 +3951,7 @@ cfq_should_preempt(struct cfq_data *cfqd, struct cfq_queue *new_cfqq, * if the new request is sync, but the currently running queue is * not, let the sync request have priority. */ - if (rq_is_sync(rq) && !cfq_cfqq_sync(cfqq)) + if (rq_is_sync(rq) && !cfq_cfqq_sync(cfqq) && !cfq_cfqq_must_dispatch(cfqq)) return true; if (new_cfqq->cfqg != cfqq->cfqg) From 3afd8362fabd167bb04f79501f21dd67aa9cb99f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 22 Oct 2016 12:27:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/26] Linux 4.4.27 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index a127b9ef9ebc..b6ee4ce561f8 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 26 +SUBLEVEL = 27 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Blurry Fish Butt