[ Upstream commit c5a94f434c82529afda290df3235e4d85873c5b4 ]
It was observed that a process blocked indefintely in
__fscache_read_or_alloc_page(), waiting for FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP
to be cleared via fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup().
At this time, ->backing_objects was empty, which would normaly prevent
__fscache_read_or_alloc_page() from getting to the point of waiting.
This implies that ->backing_objects was cleared *after*
__fscache_read_or_alloc_page was was entered.
When an object is "killed" and then "dropped",
FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP is cleared in fscache_lookup_failure(), then
KILL_OBJECT and DROP_OBJECT are "called" and only in DROP_OBJECT is
->backing_objects cleared. This leaves a window where
something else can set FSCACHE_COOKIE_LOOKING_UP and
__fscache_read_or_alloc_page() can start waiting, before
->backing_objects is cleared
There is some uncertainty in this analysis, but it seems to be fit the
observations. Adding the wake in this patch will be handled correctly
by __fscache_read_or_alloc_page(), as it checks if ->backing_objects
is empty again, after waiting.
Customer which reported the hang, also report that the hang cannot be
reproduced with this fix.
The backtrace for the blocked process looked like:
PID: 29360 TASK: ffff881ff2ac0f80 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "zsh"
#0 [ffff881ff43efbf8] schedule at ffffffff815e56f1
#1 [ffff881ff43efc58] bit_wait at ffffffff815e64ed
#2 [ffff881ff43efc68] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815e61b8
#3 [ffff881ff43efca0] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff815e625e
#4 [ffff881ff43efd08] fscache_wait_for_deferred_lookup at ffffffffa04f2e8f [fscache]
#5 [ffff881ff43efd18] __fscache_read_or_alloc_page at ffffffffa04f2ffe [fscache]
#6 [ffff881ff43efd58] __nfs_readpage_from_fscache at ffffffffa0679668 [nfs]
#7 [ffff881ff43efd78] nfs_readpage at ffffffffa067092b [nfs]
#8 [ffff881ff43efda0] generic_file_read_iter at ffffffff81187a73
#9 [ffff881ff43efe50] nfs_file_read at ffffffffa066544b [nfs]
#10 [ffff881ff43efe70] __vfs_read at ffffffff811fc756
#11 [ffff881ff43efee8] vfs_read at ffffffff811fccfa
#12 [ffff881ff43eff18] sys_read at ffffffff811fda62
#13 [ffff881ff43eff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath at ffffffff815e986e
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2084ac6c505a58f7efdec13eba633c6aaa085ca5 ]
The function dentry_connected calls dput(dentry) to drop the previously
acquired reference to dentry. In this case, dentry can be released.
After that, IS_ROOT(dentry) checks the condition
(dentry == dentry->d_parent), which may result in a use-after-free bug.
This patch directly compares dentry with its parent obtained before
dropping the reference.
Fixes: a056cc8934c("exportfs: stop retrying once we race with
rename/remove")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a4390aee72713d9e73f1132bcdeb17d72fbbf974 ]
When doing an incremental send, due to the need of delaying directory move
(rename) operations we can end up in infinite loop at
apply_children_dir_moves().
An example scenario that triggers this problem is described below, where
directory names correspond to the numbers of their respective inodes.
Parent snapshot:
.
|--- 261/
|--- 271/
|--- 266/
|--- 259/
|--- 260/
| |--- 267
|
|--- 264/
| |--- 258/
| |--- 257/
|
|--- 265/
|--- 268/
|--- 269/
| |--- 262/
|
|--- 270/
|--- 272/
| |--- 263/
| |--- 275/
|
|--- 274/
|--- 273/
Send snapshot:
.
|-- 275/
|-- 274/
|-- 273/
|-- 262/
|-- 269/
|-- 258/
|-- 271/
|-- 268/
|-- 267/
|-- 270/
|-- 259/
| |-- 265/
|
|-- 272/
|-- 257/
|-- 260/
|-- 264/
|-- 263/
|-- 261/
|-- 266/
When processing inode 257 we delay its move (rename) operation because its
new parent in the send snapshot, inode 272, was not yet processed. Then
when processing inode 272, we delay the move operation for that inode
because inode 274 is its ancestor in the send snapshot. Finally we delay
the move operation for inode 274 when processing it because inode 275 is
its new parent in the send snapshot and was not yet moved.
When finishing processing inode 275, we start to do the move operations
that were previously delayed (at apply_children_dir_moves()), resulting in
the following iterations:
1) We issue the move operation for inode 274;
2) Because inode 262 depended on the move operation of inode 274 (it was
delayed because 274 is its ancestor in the send snapshot), we issue the
move operation for inode 262;
3) We issue the move operation for inode 272, because it was delayed by
inode 274 too (ancestor of 272 in the send snapshot);
4) We issue the move operation for inode 269 (it was delayed by 262);
5) We issue the move operation for inode 257 (it was delayed by 272);
6) We issue the move operation for inode 260 (it was delayed by 272);
7) We issue the move operation for inode 258 (it was delayed by 269);
8) We issue the move operation for inode 264 (it was delayed by 257);
9) We issue the move operation for inode 271 (it was delayed by 258);
10) We issue the move operation for inode 263 (it was delayed by 264);
11) We issue the move operation for inode 268 (it was delayed by 271);
12) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 270 (it was
delayed by 271). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
inode 267 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
operation for inode 270. So we delay again the move operation for
inode 270, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 267 is
moved;
13) We issue the move operation for inode 261 (it was delayed by 263);
14) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 266 (it was
delayed by 263). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
inode 270 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
operation for inode 266. So we delay again the move operation for
inode 266, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 270 is
moved (its move operation was delayed in step 12);
15) We issue the move operation for inode 267 (it was delayed by 268);
16) We verify if we can issue the move operation for inode 266 (it was
delayed by 270). We detect a path loop in the current state, because
inode 270 needs to be moved first before we can issue the move
operation for inode 266. So we delay again the move operation for
inode 266, this time we will attempt to do it after inode 270 is
moved (its move operation was delayed in step 12). So here we added
again the same delayed move operation that we added in step 14;
17) We attempt again to see if we can issue the move operation for inode
266, and as in step 16, we realize we can not due to a path loop in
the current state due to a dependency on inode 270. Again we delay
inode's 266 rename to happen after inode's 270 move operation, adding
the same dependency to the empty stack that we did in steps 14 and 16.
The next iteration will pick the same move dependency on the stack
(the only entry) and realize again there is still a path loop and then
again the same dependency to the stack, over and over, resulting in
an infinite loop.
So fix this by preventing adding the same move dependency entries to the
stack by removing each pending move record from the red black tree of
pending moves. This way the next call to get_pending_dir_moves() will
not return anything for the current parent inode.
A test case for fstests, with this reproducer, follows soon.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko <robbieko@synology.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
[Wrote changelog with example and more clear explanation]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c4b7d1ba7d263b74bb72e9325262a67139605cde ]
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
fs/sysv/inode.c: In function '__sysv_write_inode':
fs/sysv/inode.c:239:6: warning:
variable 'err' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
__sysv_write_inode should return 'err' instead of 0
Fixes: 05459ca81a ("repair sysv_write_inode(), switch sysv to simple_fsync()")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit c988de29ca161823db6a7125e803d597ef75b49c upstream.
Make sure to use the CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb) as path separator for
prefixpath too. Fixes a bug with smb1 UNIX extensions.
Fixes: a6b5058fafdf ("fs/cifs: make share unaccessible at root level mountable")
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f8397d69daef06d358430d3054662fb597e37c00 upstream.
When a metadata read is served the endio routine btree_readpage_end_io_hook
is called which eventually runs the tree-checker. If tree-checker fails
to validate the read eb then it sets EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This
leads to btree_read_extent_buffer_pages wrongly assuming that all
available copies of this extent buffer are wrong and failing prematurely.
Fix this modify btree_read_extent_buffer_pages to read all copies of
the data.
This failure was exhibitted in xfstests btrfs/124 which would
spuriously fail its balance operations. The reason was that when balance
was run following re-introduction of the missing raid1 disk
__btrfs_map_block would map the read request to stripe 0, which
corresponded to devid 2 (the disk which is being removed in the test):
item 2 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 3553624064) itemoff 15975 itemsize 112
length 1073741824 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID1
io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096
num_stripes 2 sub_stripes 1
stripe 0 devid 2 offset 2156920832
dev_uuid 8466c350-ed0c-4c3b-b17d-6379b445d5c8
stripe 1 devid 1 offset 3553624064
dev_uuid 1265d8db-5596-477e-af03-df08eb38d2ca
This caused read requests for a checksum item that to be routed to the
stale disk which triggered the aforementioned logic involving
EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This then triggered cascading failures of
the balance operation.
Fixes: a826d6dcb3 ("Btrfs: check items for correctness as we search")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Suggested-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 166126c1e54d927c2e8efa2702d420e0ce301fd9 upstream.
gcc 8.1.0 complains:
fs/kernfs/symlink.c:91:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying
as many bytes from a string as its length
fs/kernfs/symlink.c: In function 'kernfs_iop_get_link':
fs/kernfs/symlink.c:88:14: note: length computed here
Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to
be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy()
with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3756f6401c302617c5e091081ca4d26ab604bec5 upstream.
gcc-8 warns about using strncpy() with the source size as the limit:
fs/exec.c:1223:32: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncpy' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
This is indeed slightly suspicious, as it protects us from source
arguments without NUL-termination, but does not guarantee that the
destination is terminated.
This keeps the strncpy() to ensure we have properly padded target
buffer, but ensures that we use the correct length, by passing the
actual length of the destination buffer as well as adding a build-time
check to ensure it is exactly TASK_COMM_LEN.
There are only 23 callsites which I all reviewed to ensure this is
currently the case. We could get away with doing only the check or
passing the right length, but it doesn't hurt to do both.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205151724.1764896-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We want to release the unused reservation we have since it refills the
delayed refs reserve, which will make everything go smoother when
running the delayed refs if we're short on our reservation.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ecebf55d27a11538ea84aee0be643dd953f830d5 upstream.
The function ext2_xattr_set calls brelse(bh) to drop the reference count
of bh. After that, bh may be freed. However, following brelse(bh),
it reads bh->b_data via macro HDR(bh). This may result in a
use-after-free bug. This patch moves brelse(bh) after reading field.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f505754fd6599230371cb01b9332754ddc104be1 upstream.
We were using the path name received from user space without checking that
it is null terminated. While btrfs-progs is well behaved and does proper
validation and null termination, someone could call the ioctl and pass
a non-null terminated patch, leading to buffer overrun problems in the
kernel. The ioctl is protected by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
So just set the last byte of the path to a null character, similar to what
we do in other ioctls (add/remove/resize device, snapshot creation, etc).
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5 upstream.
Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the
directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag. The purpose
is to make data spoofing attacks harder. This protection can be turned
on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like
the symlinks/hardlinks protection. This patch is based on Openwall's
"HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer.
This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented
by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation:
CVE-2000-1134
CVE-2007-3852
CVE-2008-0525
CVE-2009-0416
CVE-2011-4834
CVE-2015-1838
CVE-2015-7442
CVE-2016-7489
This list is not meant to be complete. It's difficult to track down all
vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any
mention of this particular attack vector. In fact, before
hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite
vehicle to exploit them.
[s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com
[keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future]
[keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Loic <hackurx@opensec.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6ba9fc8e628becf0e3ec94083450d089b0dec5f5 upstream.
[BUG]
fstrim on some btrfs only trims the unallocated space, not trimming any
space in existing block groups.
[CAUSE]
Before fstrim_range passed to btrfs_trim_fs(), it gets truncated to
range [0, super->total_bytes). So later btrfs_trim_fs() will only be
able to trim block groups in range [0, super->total_bytes).
While for btrfs, any bytenr aligned to sectorsize is valid, since btrfs
uses its logical address space, there is nothing limiting the location
where we put block groups.
For filesystem with frequent balance, it's quite easy to relocate all
block groups and bytenr of block groups will start beyond
super->total_bytes.
In that case, btrfs will not trim existing block groups.
[FIX]
Just remove the truncation in btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(), so btrfs_trim_fs()
can get the unmodified range, which is normally set to [0, U64_MAX].
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Fixes: f4c697e640 ("btrfs: return EINVAL if start > total_bytes in fitrim ioctl")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4c62bd9cea7bcf10292f7e4c57a2bca332942697 upstream.
When alloc_percpu() fails, sdp gets freed but sb->s_fs_info still points
to the same address. Move the assignment after that error check so that
s_fs_info can only point to a valid sdp or NULL, which is checked for
later in the error path, in gfs2_kill_super().
Reported-by: syzbot+dcb8b3587445007f5808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9f2df09a33aa2c76ce6385d382693f98d7f2f07e upstream.
syzbot is reporting too large memory allocation at bfs_fill_super() [1].
Since file system image is corrupted such that bfs_sb->s_start == 0,
bfs_fill_super() is trying to allocate 8MB of continuous memory. Fix
this by adding a sanity check on bfs_sb->s_start, __GFP_NOWARN and
printf().
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=16a87c236b951351374a84c8a32f40edbc034e96
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1525862104-3407-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+71c6b5d68e91149fc8a4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tigran Aivazian <aivazian.tigran@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 81c99089bce693b94b775b6eb888115d2d540086 upstream.
p9stat_read will call p9stat_free on error, we should only free the
struct content on success.
There also is no need to "p9stat_init" st as the read function will
zero the whole struct for us anyway, so clean up the code a bit while
we are here.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535410108-20650-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Reported-by: syzbot+d4252148d198410b864f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 10283ea525d30f2e99828978fd04d8427876a7ad upstream.
gfs2_put_super calls gfs2_clear_rgrpd to destroy the gfs2_rgrpd objects
attached to the resource group glocks. That function should release the
buffers attached to the gfs2_bitmap objects (bi_bh), but the call to
gfs2_rgrp_brelse for doing that is missing.
When gfs2_releasepage later runs across these buffers which are still
referenced, it refuses to free them. This causes the pages the buffers
are attached to to remain referenced as well. With enough mount/unmount
cycles, the system will eventually run out of memory.
Fix this by adding the missing call to gfs2_rgrp_brelse in
gfs2_clear_rgrpd.
(Also fix a gfs2_rgrp_relse -> gfs2_rgrp_brelse typo in a comment.)
Fixes: 39b0f1e929 ("GFS2: Don't brelse rgrp buffer_heads every allocation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 515f1867addaba49c1c6ac73abfaffbc192c1db4 ]
There are some cases can cause memory leak when parsing
option 'osdname'.
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0a3021d4f5295aa073c7bf5c5e4de60a2e292578 ]
Creating, renaming or deleting a file may cause catalog corruption and
data loss. This bug is randomly triggered by xfstests generic/027, but
here is a faster reproducer:
truncate -s 50M fs.iso
mkfs.hfsplus fs.iso
mount fs.iso /mnt
i=100
while [ $i -le 150 ]; do
touch /mnt/$i &>/dev/null
((++i))
done
i=100
while [ $i -le 150 ]; do
mv /mnt/$i /mnt/$(perl -e "print $i x82") &>/dev/null
((++i))
done
umount /mnt
fsck.hfsplus -n fs.iso
The bug is triggered whenever hfs_brec_update_parent() needs to split the
root node. The height of the btree is not increased, which leaves the new
node orphaned and its records lost.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/26d882184fc43043a810114258f45277752186c7.1535682461.git.ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ernesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d057c036672f33d43a5f7344acbb08cf3a8a0c09 ]
This bug is triggered whenever hfs_brec_update_parent() needs to split
the root node. The height of the btree is not increased, which leaves
the new node orphaned and its records lost. It is not possible for this
to happen on a valid hfs filesystem because the index nodes have fixed
length keys.
For reasons I ignore, the hfs module does have support for a number of
hfsplus features. A corrupt btree header may report variable length
keys and trigger this bug, so it's better to fix it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9750b1415685c4adca10766895f6d5ef12babdb0.1535682463.git.ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ernesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b10298d56c9623f9b173f19959732d3184b35f4f ]
fill_with_dentries() failed to propagate errors up to
reiserfs_for_each_xattr() properly. Plumb them through.
Note that reiserfs_for_each_xattr() is only used by
reiserfs_delete_xattrs() and reiserfs_chown_xattrs(). The result of
reiserfs_delete_xattrs() is discarded anyway, the only difference there is
whether a warning is printed to dmesg. The result of
reiserfs_chown_xattrs() does matter because it can block chowning of the
file to which the xattrs belong; but either way, the resulting state can
have misaligned ownership, so my patch doesn't improve things greatly.
Credit for making me look at this code goes to Al Viro, who pointed out
that the ->actor calling convention is suboptimal and should be changed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802163335.83312-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 1823342a1f2b47a4e6f5667f67cd28ab6bc4d6cd upstream.
gcc 8.1.0 complains:
fs/configfs/symlink.c:67:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many
bytes from a string as its length
fs/configfs/symlink.c: In function 'configfs_get_link':
fs/configfs/symlink.c:63:13: note: length computed here
Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to
be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy()
with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu@cybertrust.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7fabaf303458fcabb694999d6fa772cc13d4e217 upstream.
fuse_request_send_notify_reply() may fail if the connection was reset for
some reason (e.g. fs was unmounted). Don't leak request reference in this
case. Besides leaking memory, this resulted in fc->num_waiting not being
decremented and hence fuse_wait_aborted() left in a hanging and unkillable
state.
Fixes: 2d45ba381a ("fuse: add retrieve request")
Fixes: b8f95e5d13f5 ("fuse: umount should wait for all requests")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6339eda9cb4ebbc4c37b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v2.6.36
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c8e0a1b683525464a2abe9fb4b54404a50ed2b4 upstream.
Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk> wrote:
> As per mount_namespaces(7) unprivileged users should not be able to look under mount points:
>
> Mounts that come as a single unit from more privileged mount are locked
> together and may not be separated in a less privileged mount namespace.
>
> However they can:
>
> 1. Create a mount namespace.
> 2. In the mount namespace open a file descriptor to the parent of a mount point.
> 3. Destroy the mount namespace.
> 4. Use the file descriptor to look under the mount point.
>
> I have reproduced this with Linux 4.16.18 and Linux 4.18-rc8.
>
> The setup:
>
> $ sudo sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1
> kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone = 1
> $ mkdir -p A/B/Secret
> $ sudo mount -t tmpfs hide A/B
>
>
> "Secret" is indeed hidden as expected:
>
> $ ls -lR A
> A:
> total 0
> drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 40 Feb 12 21:08 B
>
> A/B:
> total 0
>
>
> The attack revealing "Secret":
>
> $ unshare -Umr sh -c "exec unshare -m ls -lR /proc/self/fd/4/ 4<A"
> /proc/self/fd/4/:
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 60 Feb 12 21:08 B
>
> /proc/self/fd/4/B:
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 40 Feb 12 21:08 Secret
>
> /proc/self/fd/4/B/Secret:
> total 0
I tracked this down to put_mnt_ns running passing UMOUNT_SYNC and
disconnecting all of the mounts in a mount namespace. Fix this by
factoring drop_mounts out of drop_collected_mounts and passing
0 instead of UMOUNT_SYNC.
There are two possible behavior differences that result from this.
- No longer setting UMOUNT_SYNC will no longer set MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT on
the vfsmounts being unmounted. This effects the lazy rcu walk by
kicking the walk out of rcu mode and forcing it to be a non-lazy
walk.
- No longer disconnecting locked mounts will keep some mounts around
longer as they stay because the are locked to other mounts.
There are only two users of drop_collected mounts: audit_tree.c and
put_mnt_ns.
In audit_tree.c the mounts are private and there are no rcu lazy walks
only calls to iterate_mounts. So the changes should have no effect
except for a small timing effect as the connected mounts are disconnected.
In put_mnt_ns there may be references from process outside the mount
namespace to the mounts. So the mounts remaining connected will
be the bug fix that is needed. That rcu walks are allowed to continue
appears not to be a problem especially as the rcu walk change was about
an implementation detail not about semantics.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5ff9d8a65c ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users")
Reported-by: Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk>
Tested-by: Timothy Baldwin <timbaldwin@fastmail.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit df7342b240185d58d3d9665c0bbf0a0f5570ec29 upstream.
Jonathan Calmels from NVIDIA reported that he's able to bypass the
mount visibility security check in place in the Linux kernel by using
a combination of the unbindable property along with the private mount
propagation option to allow a unprivileged user to see a path which
was purposefully hidden by the root user.
Reproducer:
# Hide a path to all users using a tmpfs
root@castiana:~# mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /sys/devices/
root@castiana:~#
# As an unprivileged user, unshare user namespace and mount namespace
stgraber@castiana:~$ unshare -U -m -r
# Confirm the path is still not accessible
root@castiana:~# ls /sys/devices/
# Make /sys recursively unbindable and private
root@castiana:~# mount --make-runbindable /sys
root@castiana:~# mount --make-private /sys
# Recursively bind-mount the rest of /sys over to /mnnt
root@castiana:~# mount --rbind /sys/ /mnt
# Access our hidden /sys/device as an unprivileged user
root@castiana:~# ls /mnt/devices/
breakpoint cpu cstate_core cstate_pkg i915 intel_pt isa kprobe
LNXSYSTM:00 msr pci0000:00 platform pnp0 power software system
tracepoint uncore_arb uncore_cbox_0 uncore_cbox_1 uprobe virtual
Solve this by teaching copy_tree to fail if a mount turns out to be
both unbindable and locked.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5ff9d8a65c ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users")
Reported-by: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 25d202ed820ee347edec0bf3bf553544556bf64b upstream.
It was recently pointed out that the one instance of testing MNT_LOCKED
outside of the namespace_sem is in ksys_umount.
Fix that by adding a test inside of do_umount with namespace_sem and
the mount_lock held. As it helps to fail fails the existing test is
maintained with an additional comment pointing out that it may be racy
because the locks are not held.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: 5ff9d8a65c ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 45ae932d246f721e6584430017176cbcadfde610 upstream.
bs.bh was taken in previous ext4_xattr_block_find() call,
it should be released before re-using
Fixes: 7e01c8e542 ("ext3/4: fix uninitialized bs in ...")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 2.6.26
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9e4028935cca3f9ef9b6a90df9da6f1f94853536 upstream.
Currently bh is set to NULL only during first iteration of for cycle,
then this pointer is not cleared after end of using.
Therefore rollback after errors can lead to extra brelse(bh) call,
decrements bh counter and later trigger an unexpected warning in __brelse()
Patch moves brelse() calls in body of cycle to exclude requirement of
brelse() call in rollback.
Fixes: 33afdcc540 ("ext4: add a function which sets up group blocks ...")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.3+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ac765f83f1397646c11092a032d4f62c3d478b81 upstream.
We currently allow cloning a range from a file which includes the last
block of the file even if the file's size is not aligned to the block
size. This is fine and useful when the destination file has the same size,
but when it does not and the range ends somewhere in the middle of the
destination file, it leads to corruption because the bytes between the EOF
and the end of the block have undefined data (when there is support for
discard/trimming they have a value of 0x00).
Example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ export foo_size=$((256 * 1024 + 100))
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0x3c 0 $foo_size" /mnt/foo
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xb5 0 1M" /mnt/bar
$ xfs_io -c "reflink /mnt/foo 0 512K $foo_size" /mnt/bar
$ od -A d -t x1 /mnt/bar
0000000 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5
*
0524288 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c
*
0786528 3c 3c 3c 3c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0786544 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
0790528 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5
*
1048576
The bytes in the range from 786532 (512Kb + 256Kb + 100 bytes) to 790527
(512Kb + 256Kb + 4Kb - 1) got corrupted, having now a value of 0x00 instead
of 0xb5.
This is similar to the problem we had for deduplication that got recently
fixed by commit de02b9f6bb65 ("Btrfs: fix data corruption when
deduplicating between different files").
Fix this by not allowing such operations to be performed and return the
errno -EINVAL to user space. This is what XFS is doing as well at the VFS
level. This change however now makes us return -EINVAL instead of
-EOPNOTSUPP for cases where the source range maps to an inline extent and
the destination range's end is smaller then the destination file's size,
since the detection of inline extents is done during the actual process of
dropping file extent items (at __btrfs_drop_extents()). Returning the
-EINVAL error is done early on and solely based on the input parameters
(offsets and length) and destination file's size. This makes us consistent
with XFS and anyone else supporting cloning since this case is now checked
at a higher level in the VFS and is where the -EINVAL will be returned
from starting with kernel 4.20 (the VFS changed was introduced in 4.20-rc1
by commit 07d19dc9fbe9 ("vfs: avoid problematic remapping requests into
partial EOF block"). So this change is more geared towards stable kernels,
as it's unlikely the new VFS checks get removed intentionally.
A test case for fstests follows soon, as well as an update to filter
existing tests that expect -EOPNOTSUPP to accept -EINVAL as well.
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 29aa30167a0a2e6045a0d6d2e89d8168132333d5 upstream.
Somehow, file system metadata was corrupted, which causes
ocfs2_check_dir_entry() to fail in function ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el().
According to the original design intention, if above happens we should
skip the problematic block and continue to retrieve dir entry. But
there is obviouse misuse of brelse around related code.
After failure of ocfs2_check_dir_entry(), current code just moves to
next position and uses the problematic buffer head again and again
during which the problematic buffer head is released for multiple times.
I suppose, this a serious issue which is long-lived in ocfs2. This may
cause other file systems which is also used in a the same host insane.
So we should also consider about bakcporting this patch into linux
-stable.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/HK2PR06MB045211675B43EED794E597B6D56E0@HK2PR06MB0452.apcprd06.prod.outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Suggested-by: Changkuo Shi <shi.changkuo@h3c.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 24962af7e1041b7e50c1bc71d8d10dc678c556b5 upstream.
The current code does not make sure to page align bss before calling
vm_brk(), and this can lead to a VM_BUG_ON() in __mm_populate() due to
the requested lenght not being correctly aligned.
Let us make sure to align it properly.
Kees: only applicable to CONFIG_USELIB kernels: 32-bit and configured
for libc5.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180705145539.9627-1-osalvador@techadventures.net
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reported-by: syzbot+5dcb560fe12aa5091c06@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 0036d1f7eb95bcc52977f15507f00dd07018e7e2 upstream.
A double-bug exists in the bss calculation code, where an overflow can
happen in the "last_bss - elf_bss" calculation, but vm_brk internally
aligns the argument, underflowing it, wrapping back around safe. We
shouldn't depend on these bugs staying in sync, so this cleans up the
bss padding handling to avoid the overflow.
This moves the bss padzero() before the last_bss > elf_bss case, since
the zero-filling of the ELF_PAGE should have nothing to do with the
relationship of last_bss and elf_bss: any trailing portion should be
zeroed, and a zero size is already handled by padzero().
Then it handles the math on elf_bss vs last_bss correctly. These need
to both be ELF_PAGE aligned to get the comparison correct, since that's
the expected granularity of the mappings. Since elf_bss already had
alignment-based padding happen in padzero(), the "start" of the new
vm_brk() should be moved forward as done in the original code. However,
since the "end" of the vm_brk() area will already become PAGE_ALIGNed in
vm_brk() then last_bss should get aligned here to avoid hiding it as a
side-effect.
Additionally makes a cosmetic change to the initial last_bss calculation
so it's easier to read in comparison to the load_addr calculation above
it (i.e. the only difference is p_filesz vs p_memsz).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468014494-25291-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ecc2bc8ac03884266cf73f8a2a42b911465b2fbc upstream.
load_elf_library doesn't handle vm_brk failure although nothing really
indicates it cannot do that because the function is allowed to fail due
to vm_mmap failures already. This might be not a problem now but later
patch will make vm_brk killable (resp. mmap_sem for write waiting will
become killable) and so the failure will be more probable.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 4c316f2f3ff315cb48efb7435621e5bfb81df96d upstream.
Otherwise fuse_dev_do_write() could come in and finish off the request, and
the set_bit(FR_SENT, ...) could trigger the WARN_ON(test_bit(FR_SENT, ...))
in request_end().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+ef054c4d3f64cd7f7cec@syzkaller.appspotmai
Fixes: 46c34a348b ("fuse: no fc->lock for pqueue parts")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 908a572b80f6e9577b45e81b3dfe2e22111286b8 upstream.
Using waitqueue_active() is racy. Make sure we issue a wake_up()
unconditionally after storing into fc->blocked. After that it's okay to
optimize with waitqueue_active() since the first wake up provides the
necessary barrier for all waiters, not the just the woken one.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 3c18ef8117 ("fuse: optimize wake_up")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b4dc44b3cac9e8327e0655f530ed0c46f2e6214c ]
the 9p client code overwrites our glock.client_id pointing to a static
buffer by an allocated string holding the network provided value which
we do not care about; free and reset the value as appropriate.
This is almost identical to the leak in v9fs_file_getlock() fixed by
Al Viro in commit ce85dd58ad ("9p: we are leaking glock.client_id
in v9fs_file_getlock()"), which was returned as an error by a coverity
false positive -- while we are here attempt to make the code slightly
more robust to future change of the net/9p/client code and hopefully
more clear to coverity that there is no problem.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536339057-21974-5-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
