commit 4f996e234dad488e5d9ba0858bc1bae12eff82c3 upstream.
Atomic allocations can trigger async map extensions which is serviced
by chunk->map_extend_work. pcpu_balance_work which is responsible for
destroying idle chunks wasn't synchronizing properly against
chunk->map_extend_work and may end up freeing the chunk while the work
item is still in flight.
This patch fixes the bug by rolling async map extension operations
into pcpu_balance_work.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: 9c824b6a17 ("percpu: make sure chunk->map array has available space")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb0a4a47ae89aaa0674ab3180de6a162f3be2ddf upstream.
Overlayfs uses separate inodes even in the case of hard links on the
underlying filesystems. This is a problem for AF_UNIX socket
implementation which indexes sockets based on the inode. This resulted in
hard linked sockets not working.
The fix is to use the real, underlying inode.
Test case follows:
-- ovl-sock-test.c --
#include <unistd.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#define SOCK "test-sock"
#define SOCK2 "test-sock2"
int main(void)
{
int fd, fd2;
struct sockaddr_un addr = {
.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
.sun_path = SOCK,
};
struct sockaddr_un addr2 = {
.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
.sun_path = SOCK2,
};
unlink(SOCK);
unlink(SOCK2);
if ((fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
err(1, "socket");
if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1)
err(1, "bind");
if (listen(fd, 0) == -1)
err(1, "listen");
if (link(SOCK, SOCK2) == -1)
err(1, "link");
if ((fd2 = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
err(1, "socket");
if (connect(fd2, (struct sockaddr *) &addr2, sizeof(addr2)) == -1)
err (1, "connect");
return 0;
}
----
Reported-by: Alexander Morozov <alexandr.morozov@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dbd4d7ca563fd0a8949718d35ce197e5642d5d9d upstream.
We validate pstate using PSR_MODE32_BIT, which is part of the
user-provided pstate (and cannot be trusted). Also, we conflate
validation of AArch32 and AArch64 pstate values, making the code
difficult to reason about.
Instead, validate the pstate value based on the associated task. The
task may or may not be current (e.g. when using ptrace), so this must be
passed explicitly by callers. To avoid circular header dependencies via
sched.h, is_compat_task is pulled out of asm/ptrace.h.
To make the code possible to reason about, the AArch64 and AArch32
validation is split into separate functions. Software must respect the
RES0 policy for SPSR bits, and thus the kernel mirrors the hardware
policy (RAZ/WI) for bits as-yet unallocated. When these acquire an
architected meaning writes may be permitted (potentially with additional
validation).
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[ rebased for v4.1+
This avoids a user-triggerable Oops() if a task is switched to a mode
not supported by the kernel (e.g. switching a 64-bit task to AArch32).
]
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [backport]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ae4ea9a2460c7fee2ae8feeb4dfe96f5f6c3e562 upstream.
Commit 7ea0ed2b5b ("ipmi: Make the message handler easier to use for
SMI interfaces") changed handle_new_recv_msgs() to call handle_one_recv_msg()
for a smi_msg while the smi_msg is still connected to waiting_rcv_msgs list.
That could lead to following list corruption problems:
1) low-level function treats smi_msg as not connected to list
handle_one_recv_msg() could end up calling smi_send(), which
assumes the msg is not connected to list.
For example, the following sequence could corrupt list by
doing list_add_tail() for the entry still connected to other list.
handle_new_recv_msgs()
msg = list_entry(waiting_rcv_msgs)
handle_one_recv_msg(msg)
handle_ipmb_get_msg_cmd(msg)
smi_send(msg)
spin_lock(xmit_msgs_lock)
list_add_tail(msg)
spin_unlock(xmit_msgs_lock)
2) race between multiple handle_new_recv_msgs() instances
handle_new_recv_msgs() once releases waiting_rcv_msgs_lock before calling
handle_one_recv_msg() then retakes the lock and list_del() it.
If others call handle_new_recv_msgs() during the window shown below
list_del() will be done twice for the same smi_msg.
handle_new_recv_msgs()
spin_lock(waiting_rcv_msgs_lock)
msg = list_entry(waiting_rcv_msgs)
spin_unlock(waiting_rcv_msgs_lock)
|
| handle_one_recv_msg(msg)
|
spin_lock(waiting_rcv_msgs_lock)
list_del(msg)
spin_unlock(waiting_rcv_msgs_lock)
Fixes: 7ea0ed2b5b ("ipmi: Make the message handler easier to use for SMI interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com>
[Added a comment to describe why this works.]
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Tested-by: Ye Feng <yefeng.yl@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d3922b69617b62bb2509936b68301f837229d9f0 upstream.
- Fixed black screen for some resolutions of G200e rev4
- Fixed testm & testn which had predetermined value.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Larouche <mathieu.larouche@matrox.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 522e5cb76d0663c88f96b6a8301451c8efa37207 upstream.
There is a race condition in the AMD IOMMU init code that
causes requested unity mappings to be blocked by the IOMMU
for a short period of time. This results on boot failures
and IO_PAGE_FAULTs on some machines.
Fix this by making sure the unity mappings are installed
before all other DMA is blocked.
Fixes: aafd8ba0ca ('iommu/amd: Implement add_device and remove_device')
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a4c34ff1c029e90e7d5f8dd8d29b0a93b31c3cb2 upstream.
This seems to be required on some X58 chipsets on systems
with more than one IOMMU. QI does not work until it is
enabled on all IOMMUs in the system.
Reported-by: Dheeraj CVR <cvr.dheeraj@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Dheeraj CVR <cvr.dheeraj@gmail.com>
Fixes: 5f0a7f7614 ('iommu/vt-d: Make root entry visible for hardware right after allocation')
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9aeb26cfc2abc96be42b9df2d0f2dc5d805084ff upstream.
The map_sg callback is missing from arm_smmu_ops, but is required by
iommu.h. Similarly to most other IOMMU drivers, connect it to
default_iommu_map_sg.
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe.brucker@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7e1b1fc4dabd6ec8e28baa0708866e13fa93c9b3 upstream.
Modules which register drivers via standard path (driver_register) in
parallel can cause a warning:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3492 at ../fs/sysfs/dir.c:31 sysfs_warn_dup+0x62/0x80
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/module/saa7146/drivers'
Modules linked in: hexium_gemini(+) mxb(+) ...
...
Call Trace:
...
[<ffffffff812e63a2>] sysfs_warn_dup+0x62/0x80
[<ffffffff812e6487>] sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x77/0x90
[<ffffffff8140f2c4>] kobject_add_internal+0xb4/0x340
[<ffffffff8140f5b8>] kobject_add+0x68/0xb0
[<ffffffff8140f631>] kobject_create_and_add+0x31/0x70
[<ffffffff8157a703>] module_add_driver+0xc3/0xd0
[<ffffffff8155e5d4>] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x280
[<ffffffff815604c0>] driver_register+0x60/0xe0
[<ffffffff8145bed0>] __pci_register_driver+0x60/0x70
[<ffffffffa0273e14>] saa7146_register_extension+0x64/0x90 [saa7146]
[<ffffffffa0033011>] hexium_init_module+0x11/0x1000 [hexium_gemini]
...
As can be (mostly) seen, driver_register causes this call sequence:
-> bus_add_driver
-> module_add_driver
-> module_create_drivers_dir
The last one creates "drivers" directory in /sys/module/<...>. When
this is done in parallel, the directory is attempted to be created
twice at the same time.
This can be easily reproduced by loading mxb and hexium_gemini in
parallel:
while :; do
modprobe mxb &
modprobe hexium_gemini
wait
rmmod mxb hexium_gemini saa7146_vv saa7146
done
saa7146 calls pci_register_driver for both mxb and hexium_gemini,
which means /sys/module/saa7146/drivers is to be created for both of
them.
Fix this by a new mutex in module_create_drivers_dir which makes the
test-and-create "drivers" dir atomic.
I inverted the condition and removed 'return' to avoid multiple
unlocks or a goto.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Fixes: fe480a2675 (Modules: only add drivers/ direcory if needed)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 70c8217acd4383e069fe1898bbad36ea4fcdbdcc upstream.
If a task uses a non constant string for the format parameter in
trace_printk(), then the trace_printk_fmt variable is set to NULL. This
variable is then saved in the __trace_printk_fmt section.
The function hold_module_trace_bprintk_format() checks to see if duplicate
formats are used by modules, and reuses them if so (saves them to the list
if it is new). But this function calls lookup_format() that does a strcmp()
to the value (which is now NULL) and can cause a kernel oops.
This wasn't an issue till 3debb0a9ddb ("tracing: Fix trace_printk() to print
when not using bprintk()") which added "__used" to the trace_printk_fmt
variable, and before that, the kernel simply optimized it out (no NULL value
was saved).
The fix is simply to handle the NULL pointer in lookup_format() and have the
caller ignore the value if it was NULL.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464769870-18344-1-git-send-email-zhengjun.xing@intel.com
Reported-by: xingzhen <zhengjun.xing@intel.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Fixes: 3debb0a9ddb ("tracing: Fix trace_printk() to print when not using bprintk()")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6dd2e27a103d716921cc4a1a96a9adc0a8e3ab57 upstream.
The usage Confidence is mandary to Windows Precision Touchpad devices. If
it is examined in input_mapping on a WIndows Precision Touchpad, a new add
quirk MT_QUIRK_CONFIDENCE desgned for such devices will be applied to the
device. A touch with the confidence bit is not set is determined as
invalid.
Tested on Dell XPS13 9343
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> # XPS 13 9350, BIOS 1.4.3
Signed-off-by: Allen Hung <allen_hung@dell.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 93a2001bdfd5376c3dc2158653034c20392d15c5 upstream.
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed596a4a88bd161f868ccba078557ee7ede8a6ef upstream.
Flushing a work that reschedules itself is not a sensible operation. It needs
to be killed. Failure to do so leads to a kernel panic in the timer code.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ff30ef40deca4658e27b0c596e7baf39115e858f upstream.
I couldn't get Xen to boot a L2 HVM when it was nested under KVM - it was
getting a GP(0) on a rather unspecial vmread from Xen:
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.7.0-rc x86_64 debug=n Not tainted ]----
(XEN) CPU: 1
(XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0801e629e>] vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450
(XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010202 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
(XEN) rax: ffff82d0801e6288 rbx: ffff83003ffbfb7c rcx: fffffffffffab928
(XEN) rdx: 0000000000000000 rsi: 0000000000000000 rdi: ffff83000bdd0000
(XEN) rbp: ffff83000bdd0000 rsp: ffff83003ffbfab0 r8: ffff830038813910
(XEN) r9: ffff83003faf3958 r10: 0000000a3b9f7640 r11: ffff83003f82d418
(XEN) r12: 0000000000000000 r13: ffff83003ffbffff r14: 0000000000004802
(XEN) r15: 0000000000000008 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000001526e0
(XEN) cr3: 000000003fc79000 cr2: 0000000000000000
(XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008
(XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d0801e629e> (vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450):
(XEN) 00 00 41 be 02 48 00 00 <44> 0f 78 74 24 08 0f 86 38 56 00 00 b8 08 68 00
(XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83003ffbfab0:
...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801e629e>] vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801f3695>] get_page_from_gfn_p2m+0x165/0x300
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801bfe32>] hvmemul_get_seg_reg+0x52/0x60
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801bfe93>] hvm_emulate_prepare+0x53/0x70
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801ccacb>] handle_mmio+0x2b/0xd0
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801be591>] emulate.c#_hvm_emulate_one+0x111/0x2c0
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801cd6a4>] handle_hvm_io_completion+0x274/0x2a0
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801f334a>] __get_gfn_type_access+0xfa/0x270
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012f3bb>] timer.c#add_entry+0x4b/0xb0
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012f80c>] timer.c#remove_entry+0x7c/0x90
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801c8433>] hvm_do_resume+0x23/0x140
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801e4fe7>] vmx_do_resume+0xa7/0x140
(XEN) [<ffff82d080164aeb>] context_switch+0x13b/0xe40
(XEN) [<ffff82d080128e6e>] schedule.c#schedule+0x22e/0x570
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012c0cc>] softirq.c#__do_softirq+0x5c/0x90
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801602c5>] domain.c#idle_loop+0x25/0x50
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 1:
(XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0000]
(XEN) ****************************************
Tracing my host KVM showed it was the one injecting the GP(0) when
emulating the VMREAD and checking the destination segment permissions in
get_vmx_mem_address():
3) | vmx_handle_exit() {
3) | handle_vmread() {
3) | nested_vmx_check_permission() {
3) | vmx_get_segment() {
3) 0.074 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_base();
3) 0.065 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_selector();
3) 0.066 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
3) 1.636 us | }
3) 0.058 us | vmx_get_rflags();
3) 0.062 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
3) 3.469 us | }
3) | vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits() {
3) 0.058 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
3) 0.662 us | }
3) | get_vmx_mem_address() {
3) 0.068 us | vmx_cache_reg();
3) | vmx_get_segment() {
3) 0.074 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_base();
3) 0.068 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_selector();
3) 0.071 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
3) 1.756 us | }
3) | kvm_queue_exception_e() {
3) 0.066 us | kvm_multiple_exception();
3) 0.684 us | }
3) 4.085 us | }
3) 9.833 us | }
3) + 10.366 us | }
Cross-checking the KVM/VMX VMREAD emulation code with the Intel Software
Developper Manual Volume 3C - "VMREAD - Read Field from Virtual-Machine
Control Structure", I found that we're enforcing that the destination
operand is NOT located in a read-only data segment or any code segment when
the L1 is in long mode - BUT that check should only happen when it is in
protected mode.
Shuffling the code a bit to make our emulation follow the specification
allows me to boot a Xen dom0 in a nested KVM and start HVM L2 guests
without problems.
Fixes: f9eb4af67c ("KVM: nVMX: VMX instructions: add checks for #GP/#SS exceptions")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit caf1ff26e1aa178133df68ac3d40815fed2187d9 upstream.
These days, we experienced one guest crash with 8 cores and 3 disks,
with qemu error logs as bellow:
qemu-system-x86_64: /build/qemu-2.0.0/kvm-all.c:984:
kvm_irqchip_commit_routes: Assertion `ret == 0' failed.
And then we found one patch(bdf026317d) in qemu tree, which said
could fix this bug.
Execute the following script will reproduce the BUG quickly:
irq_affinity.sh
========================================================================
vda_irq_num=25
vdb_irq_num=27
while [ 1 ]
do
for irq in {1,2,4,8,10,20,40,80}
do
echo $irq > /proc/irq/$vda_irq_num/smp_affinity
echo $irq > /proc/irq/$vdb_irq_num/smp_affinity
dd if=/dev/vda of=/dev/zero bs=4K count=100 iflag=direct
dd if=/dev/vdb of=/dev/zero bs=4K count=100 iflag=direct
done
done
========================================================================
The following qemu log is added in the qemu code and is displayed when
this bug reproduced:
kvm_irqchip_commit_routes: max gsi: 1008, nr_allocated_irq_routes: 1024,
irq_routes->nr: 1024, gsi_count: 1024.
That's to say when irq_routes->nr == 1024, there are 1024 routing entries,
but in the kernel code when routes->nr >= 1024, will just return -EINVAL;
The nr is the number of the routing entries which is in of
[1 ~ KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES], not the index in [0 ~ KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES - 1].
This patch fix the BUG above.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <lixiubo@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Tang <tangwei@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Zhuoyu <zhangzhuoyu@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 38327424b40bcebe2de92d07312c89360ac9229a upstream.
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've
added a check to fix that.
This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():
(1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult
to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
attempt.
(2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to
time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use
of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.
(3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
so that it fails with EDQUOT.
The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:
echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t
The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.
Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:
kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092
RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
kfree+0xde/0x1bc
assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
__key_link_end+0x55/0x63
key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fixes: f70e2e0619 ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 903ce4abdf374e3365d93bcb3df56c62008835ba ]
It was first reported and reproduced by Petr (thanks!) in
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=119581
free_percpu(rt->rt6i_pcpu) used to always happen in ip6_dst_destroy().
However, after fixing a deadlock bug in
commit 9c7370a166 ("ipv6: Fix a potential deadlock when creating pcpu rt"),
free_percpu() is not called before setting non_pcpu_rt->rt6i_pcpu to NULL.
It is worth to note that rt6i_pcpu is protected by table->tb6_lock.
kmemleak somehow did not report it. We nailed it down by
observing the pcpu entries in /proc/vmallocinfo (first suggested
by Hannes, thanks!).
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Fixes: 9c7370a166 ("ipv6: Fix a potential deadlock when creating pcpu rt")
Reported-by: Petr Novopashenniy <pety@rusnet.ru>
Tested-by: Petr Novopashenniy <pety@rusnet.ru>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Petr Novopashenniy <pety@rusnet.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c086e7096170390594c425114d98172bc9aceb8a ]
Several Lenovo users have reported problems with their Sierra
Wireless EM7455 modem. The driver has loaded successfully and
the MBIM management channel has appeared to work, including
establishing a connection to the mobile network. But no frames
have been received over the data interface.
The problem affects all EM7455 and MC7455, and is assumed to
affect other modems based on the same Qualcomm chipset and
baseband firmware.
Testing narrowed the problem down to what seems to be a
firmware timing bug during initialization. Adding a short sleep
while probing is sufficient to make the problem disappear.
Experiments have shown that 1-2 ms is too little to have any
effect, while 10-20 ms is enough to reliably succeed.
Reported-by: Stefan Armbruster <ml001@armbruster-it.de>
Reported-by: Ralph Plawetzki <ralph@purejava.org>
Reported-by: Andreas Fett <andreas.fett@secunet.com>
Reported-by: Rasmus Lerdorf <rasmus@lerdorf.com>
Reported-by: Samo Ratnik <samo.ratnik@gmail.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Aleksander Morgado <aleksander@aleksander.es>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 82a31b9231f02d9c1b7b290a46999d517b0d312a ]
Similar to commit 9b368814b336 ("net: fix bridge multicast packet checksum validation")
we need to fixup the checksum for CHECKSUM_COMPLETE when
pushing skb on RX path. Otherwise we get similar splats.
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit eb70db8756717b90c01ccc765fdefc4dd969fc74 ]
People who use PACKET_FANOUT_HASH want a symmetric hash, meaning that
they want packets going in both directions on a flow to hash to the
same bucket.
The core kernel SKB hash became non-symmetric when the ipv6 flow label
and other entities were incorporated into the standard flow hash order
to increase entropy.
But there are no users of PACKET_FANOUT_HASH who want an assymetric
hash, they all want a symmetric one.
Therefore, use the flow dissector to compute a flat symmetric hash
over only the protocol, addresses and ports. This hash does not get
installed into and override the normal skb hash, so this change has
no effect whatsoever on the rest of the stack.
Reported-by: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org>
Tested-by: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8974189222159154c55f24ddad33e3613960521a upstream.
As per commit:
b7fa30c9cc48 ("sched/fair: Fix post_init_entity_util_avg() serialization")
> the code generated from update_cfs_rq_load_avg():
>
> if (atomic_long_read(&cfs_rq->removed_load_avg)) {
> s64 r = atomic_long_xchg(&cfs_rq->removed_load_avg, 0);
> sa->load_avg = max_t(long, sa->load_avg - r, 0);
> sa->load_sum = max_t(s64, sa->load_sum - r * LOAD_AVG_MAX, 0);
> removed_load = 1;
> }
>
> turns into:
>
> ffffffff81087064: 49 8b 85 98 00 00 00 mov 0x98(%r13),%rax
> ffffffff8108706b: 48 85 c0 test %rax,%rax
> ffffffff8108706e: 74 40 je ffffffff810870b0 <update_blocked_averages+0xc0>
> ffffffff81087070: 4c 89 f8 mov %r15,%rax
> ffffffff81087073: 49 87 85 98 00 00 00 xchg %rax,0x98(%r13)
> ffffffff8108707a: 49 29 45 70 sub %rax,0x70(%r13)
> ffffffff8108707e: 4c 89 f9 mov %r15,%rcx
> ffffffff81087081: bb 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%ebx
> ffffffff81087086: 49 83 7d 70 00 cmpq $0x0,0x70(%r13)
> ffffffff8108708b: 49 0f 49 4d 70 cmovns 0x70(%r13),%rcx
>
> Which you'll note ends up with sa->load_avg -= r in memory at
> ffffffff8108707a.
So I _should_ have looked at other unserialized users of ->load_avg,
but alas. Luckily nikbor reported a similar /0 from task_h_load() which
instantly triggered recollection of this here problem.
Aside from the intermediate value hitting memory and causing problems,
there's another problem: the underflow detection relies on the signed
bit. This reduces the effective width of the variables, IOW its
effectively the same as having these variables be of signed type.
This patch changes to a different means of unsigned underflow
detection to not rely on the signed bit. This allows the variables to
use the 'full' unsigned range. And it does so with explicit LOAD -
STORE to ensure any intermediate value will never be visible in
memory, allowing these unserialized loads.
Note: GCC generates crap code for this, might warrant a look later.
Note2: I say 'full' above, if we end up at U*_MAX we'll still explode;
maybe we should do clamping on add too.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yuyang Du <yuyang.du@intel.com>
Cc: bsegall@google.com
Cc: kernel@kyup.com
Cc: morten.rasmussen@arm.com
Cc: pjt@google.com
Cc: steve.muckle@linaro.org
Fixes: 9d89c257df ("sched/fair: Rewrite runnable load and utilization average tracking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160617091948.GJ30927@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ac1c17b2044a1b4b2fbed74451947e905fc2992 upstream.
During page migrations UBIFS might get confused
and the following assert triggers:
[ 213.480000] UBIFS assert failed in ubifs_set_page_dirty at 1451 (pid 436)
[ 213.490000] CPU: 0 PID: 436 Comm: drm-stress-test Not tainted 4.4.4-00176-geaa802524636-dirty #1008
[ 213.490000] Hardware name: Allwinner sun4i/sun5i Families
[ 213.490000] [<c0015e70>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0012cdc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[ 213.490000] [<c0012cdc>] (show_stack) from [<c02ad834>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[ 213.490000] [<c02ad834>] (dump_stack) from [<c0236ee8>] (ubifs_set_page_dirty+0x44/0x50)
[ 213.490000] [<c0236ee8>] (ubifs_set_page_dirty) from [<c00fa0bc>] (try_to_unmap_one+0x10c/0x3a8)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fa0bc>] (try_to_unmap_one) from [<c00fadb4>] (rmap_walk+0xb4/0x290)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fadb4>] (rmap_walk) from [<c00fb1bc>] (try_to_unmap+0x64/0x80)
[ 213.490000] [<c00fb1bc>] (try_to_unmap) from [<c010dc28>] (migrate_pages+0x328/0x7a0)
[ 213.490000] [<c010dc28>] (migrate_pages) from [<c00d0cb0>] (alloc_contig_range+0x168/0x2f4)
[ 213.490000] [<c00d0cb0>] (alloc_contig_range) from [<c010ec00>] (cma_alloc+0x170/0x2c0)
[ 213.490000] [<c010ec00>] (cma_alloc) from [<c001a958>] (__alloc_from_contiguous+0x38/0xd8)
[ 213.490000] [<c001a958>] (__alloc_from_contiguous) from [<c001ad44>] (__dma_alloc+0x23c/0x274)
[ 213.490000] [<c001ad44>] (__dma_alloc) from [<c001ae08>] (arm_dma_alloc+0x54/0x5c)
[ 213.490000] [<c001ae08>] (arm_dma_alloc) from [<c035cecc>] (drm_gem_cma_create+0xb8/0xf0)
[ 213.490000] [<c035cecc>] (drm_gem_cma_create) from [<c035cf20>] (drm_gem_cma_create_with_handle+0x1c/0xe8)
[ 213.490000] [<c035cf20>] (drm_gem_cma_create_with_handle) from [<c035d088>] (drm_gem_cma_dumb_create+0x3c/0x48)
[ 213.490000] [<c035d088>] (drm_gem_cma_dumb_create) from [<c0341ed8>] (drm_ioctl+0x12c/0x444)
[ 213.490000] [<c0341ed8>] (drm_ioctl) from [<c0121adc>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x3f4/0x614)
[ 213.490000] [<c0121adc>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0121d30>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c)
[ 213.490000] [<c0121d30>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000f2c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x34)
UBIFS is using PagePrivate() which can have different meanings across
filesystems. Therefore the generic page migration code cannot handle this
case correctly.
We have to implement our own migration function which basically does a
plain copy but also duplicates the page private flag.
UBIFS is not a block device filesystem and cannot use buffer_migrate_page().
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
[rw: Massaged changelog, build fixes, etc...]
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1118dce773d84f39ebd51a9fe7261f9169cb056e upstream.
Export these symbols such that UBIFS can implement
->migratepage.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 797179bc4fe06c89e47a9f36f886f68640b423f8 upstream.
Copy __kvm_mips_vcpu_run() into unmapped memory, so that we can never
get a TLB refill exception in it when KVM is built as a module.
This was observed to happen with the host MIPS kernel running under
QEMU, due to a not entirely transparent optimisation in the QEMU TLB
handling where TLB entries replaced with TLBWR are copied to a separate
part of the TLB array. Code in those pages continue to be executable,
but those mappings persist only until the next ASID switch, even if they
are marked global.
An ASID switch happens in __kvm_mips_vcpu_run() at exception level after
switching to the guest exception base. Subsequent TLB mapped kernel
instructions just prior to switching to the guest trigger a TLB refill
exception, which enters the guest exception handlers without updating
EPC. This appears as a guest triggered TLB refill on a host kernel
mapped (host KSeg2) address, which is not handled correctly as user
(guest) mode accesses to kernel (host) segments always generate address
error exceptions.
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 56530f5d2ddc9b9fade7ef8db9cb886e9dc689b5 upstream.
Currently pmd_mknotpresent will use a zero entry to respresent an
invalidated pmd.
Unfortunately this definition clashes with pmd_none, thus it is
possible for a race condition to occur if zap_pmd_range sees pmd_none
whilst __split_huge_pmd_locked is running too with pmdp_invalidate
just called.
This patch fixes the race condition by modifying pmd_mknotpresent to
create non-zero faulting entries (as is done in other architectures),
removing the ambiguity with pmd_none.
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: using L_PMD_SECT_VALID instead of PMD_TYPE_SECT]
Fixes: 8d96250700 ("ARM: mm: Transparent huge page support for LPAE systems.")
Reported-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 624531886987f0f1b5d01fb598034d039198e090 upstream.
In a subsequent patch, pmd_mknotpresent will clear the valid bit of the
pmd entry, resulting in a not-present entry from the hardware's
perspective. Unfortunately, pmd_present simply checks for a non-zero pmd
value and will therefore continue to return true even after a
pmd_mknotpresent operation. Since pmd_mknotpresent is only used for
managing huge entries, this is only an issue for the 3-level case.
This patch fixes the 3-level pmd_present implementation to take into
account the valid bit. For bisectability, the change is made before the
fix to pmd_mknotpresent.
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: comment update regarding pmd_mknotpresent patch]
Fixes: 8d96250700 ("ARM: mm: Transparent huge page support for LPAE systems.")
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Steve Capper <Steve.Capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 20c15226d1c73150c4d9107301cac5dda0b7f995 upstream.
The value used for Micrel PHY mask is not correct. Use the
MICREL_PHY_ID_MASK definition instead.
Thanks to Jiri Luznicky for proposing the fix at
https://community.freescale.com/thread/387739
Fixes: 709bc0657f ("ARM: imx6ul: add fec MAC refrence clock and phy fixup init")
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e547f2628327fec6afd2e03b46f113f614cca05b upstream.
Olga Kornievskaia reports that the following test fails to trigger
an OPEN_DOWNGRADE on the wire, and only triggers the final CLOSE.
fd0 = open(foo, RDRW) -- should be open on the wire for "both"
fd1 = open(foo, RDONLY) -- should be open on the wire for "read"
close(fd0) -- should trigger an open_downgrade
read(fd1)
close(fd1)
The issue is that we're missing a check for whether or not the current
state transitioned from an O_RDWR state as opposed to having transitioned
from a combination of O_RDONLY and O_WRONLY.
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Fixes: cd9288ffae ("NFSv4: Fix another bug in the close/open_downgrade code")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d20cb71dbf3487f24549ede1a8e2d67579b4632e upstream.
In "NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-specific atomic open code"
unconditional d_drop() after the ->open_context() had been removed. It had
been correct for success cases (there ->open_context() itself had been doing
dcache manipulations), but not for error ones. Only one of those (ENOENT)
got a compensatory d_drop() added in that commit, but in fact it should've
been done for all errors. As it is, the case of O_CREAT non-exclusive open
on a hashed negative dentry racing with e.g. symlink creation from another
client ended up with ->open_context() getting an error and proceeding to
call nfs_lookup(). On a hashed dentry, which would've instantly triggered
BUG_ON() in d_materialise_unique() (or, these days, its equivalent in
d_splice_alias()).
Tested-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4 upstream.
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 485e71e8fb6356c08c7fc6bcce4bf02c9a9a663f upstream.
Factor out part of posix_acl_xattr_set into a common function that takes
a posix_acl, which nfsd can also call.
The prototype already exists in include/linux/posix_acl.h.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5cc1fb2a093e254b656c64ff24b0b76bed1d34d9 upstream.
To avoid racing entry into nfs4_get_vfs_file().
Make init_open_stateid() return with locked stateid to be unlocked
by the caller.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit feb9dad5209280085d5b0c094fa67e7a8d75c81a upstream.
It used to be the case that state had an rwlock that was locked for write
by downgrades, but for read for upgrades (opens). Well, the problem is
if there are two competing opens for the same state, they step on
each other toes potentially leading to leaking file descriptors
from the state structure, since access mode is a bitmap only set once.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d50039ea5ee63c589b0434baa5ecf6e5075bb6f9 upstream.
Also simplify the logic a bit.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 62a584fe05eef1f80ed49a286a29328f1a224fb9 upstream.
As vm.dirty_[background_]bytes can't be applied verbatim to multiple
cgroup writeback domains, they get converted to percentages in
domain_dirty_limits() and applied the same way as
vm.dirty_[background]ratio. However, if the specified bytes is lower
than 1% of available memory, the calculated ratios become zero and the
writeback domain gets throttled constantly.
Fix it by using per-PAGE_SIZE instead of percentage for ratio
calculations. Also, the updated DIV_ROUND_UP() usages now should
yield 1/4096 (0.0244%) as the minimum ratio as long as the specified
bytes are above zero.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/57333E75.3080309@huawei.com
Fixes: 9fc3a43e17 ("writeback: separate out domain_dirty_limits()")
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Adjusted comment based on Jan's suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
commit f840ab18bdf2e415dac21d09fbbbd2873111bd48 upstream.
The freq_table array is not populated before calling
thermal_of_cooling_register. The code which populates the freq table was
introduced in commit f6859014.
This should be done before registering new thermal cooling device.
The log shows effects of this wrong decision.
[ 2.172614] cpu cpu1: Failed to get voltage for frequency 1984518656000: -34
[ 2.220863] cpu cpu0: Failed to get voltage for frequency 1984524416000: -34
Fixes: f6859014c7 ("thermal: cpu_cooling: Store frequencies in descending order")
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Luba <lukasz.luba@arm.com>
Acked-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a44323e2a8f342848bb77e8e04fcd85fcb91b3b4 upstream.
The current code goes through a lot of indirection just to call a
known handler. Simplify it: just call the handlers directly.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 85b03b3033fd4eba82665b3b9902c095a08cc52f upstream.
This reverts commit 923b93e451.
Make sure consumers do not overwrite gpio flags for pins that have
already been claimed.
While adding support for gpio drivers to refuse a request using
unsupported flags, the order of when the requested flag was checked and
the new flags were applied was reversed to that consumers could
overwrite flags for already requested gpios.
This not only affects device-tree setups where two drivers could request
the same gpio using conflicting configurations, but also allowed user
space to clear gpio flags for already claimed pins simply by attempting
to export them through the sysfs interface. By for example clearing the
FLAG_ACTIVE_LOW flag this way, user space could effectively change the
polarity of a signal.
Reverting this change obviously prevents gpio drivers from doing sanity
checks on the flags in their request callbacks. Fortunately only one
recently added driver (gpio-tps65218 in v4.6) appears to do this, and a
follow up patch could restore this functionality through a different
interface.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1ead852dd88779eda12cb09cc894a03d9abfe1ec upstream.
Fix boot crash that triggers if this driver is built into a kernel and
run on non-AMD systems.
AMD northbridges users call amd_cache_northbridges() and it returns
a negative value to signal that we weren't able to cache/detect any
northbridges on the system.
At least, it should do so as all its callers expect it to do so. But it
does return a negative value only when kmalloc() fails.
Fix it to return -ENODEV if there are no NBs cached as otherwise, amd_nb
users like amd64_edac, for example, which relies on it to know whether
it should load or not, gets loaded on systems like Intel Xeons where it
shouldn't.
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466097230-5333-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5761BEB0.9000807@cybernetics.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dcfc47248d3f7d28df6f531e6426b933de94370d upstream.
Fix kprobe_fault_handler() to clear the TF (trap flag) bit of
the flags register in the case of a fault fixup on single-stepping.
If we put a kprobe on the instruction which caused a
page fault (e.g. actual mov instructions in copy_user_*),
that fault happens on the single-stepping buffer. In this
case, kprobes resets running instance so that the CPU can
retry execution on the original ip address.
However, current code forgets to reset the TF bit. Since this
fault happens with TF bit set for enabling single-stepping,
when it retries, it causes a debug exception and kprobes
can not handle it because it already reset itself.
On the most of x86-64 platform, it can be easily reproduced
by using kprobe tracer. E.g.
# cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
# echo p copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+5 > kprobe_events
# echo 1 > events/kprobes/enable
And you'll see a kernel panic on do_debug(), since the debug
trap is not handled by kprobes.
To fix this problem, we just need to clear the TF bit when
resetting running kprobe.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: systemtap@sourceware.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160611140648.25885.37482.stgit@devbox
[ Updated the comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c77679cadb118c0aa99e6f88533d91765a131ba upstream.
For newer versions of Syslinux, we need ldlinux.c32 in addition to
isolinux.bin to reside on the boot disk, so if the latter is found,
copy it, too, to the isoimage tree.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4c5ea0a9cd02d6aa8adc86e100b2a4cff8d614ff upstream.
The following scenario is possible:
CPU 1 CPU 2
static_key_slow_inc()
atomic_inc_not_zero()
-> key.enabled == 0, no increment
jump_label_lock()
atomic_inc_return()
-> key.enabled == 1 now
static_key_slow_inc()
atomic_inc_not_zero()
-> key.enabled == 1, inc to 2
return
** static key is wrong!
jump_label_update()
jump_label_unlock()
Testing the static key at the point marked by (**) will follow the
wrong path for jumps that have not been patched yet. This can
actually happen when creating many KVM virtual machines with userspace
LAPIC emulation; just run several copies of the following program:
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
int main(void)
{
for (;;) {
int kvmfd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDONLY);
int vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, 0);
close(ioctl(vmfd, KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 1));
close(vmfd);
close(kvmfd);
}
return 0;
}
Every KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl will attempt a static_key_slow_inc() call.
The static key's purpose is to skip NULL pointer checks and indeed one
of the processes eventually dereferences NULL.
As explained in the commit that introduced the bug:
706249c222 ("locking/static_keys: Rework update logic")
jump_label_update() needs key.enabled to be true. The solution adopted
here is to temporarily make key.enabled == -1, and use go down the
slow path when key.enabled <= 0.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 706249c222 ("locking/static_keys: Rework update logic")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466527937-69798-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com
[ Small stylistic edits to the changelog and the code. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2c610022711675ee908b903d242f0b90e1db661f upstream.
While this prior commit:
54cf809b9512 ("locking,qspinlock: Fix spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait()")
... fixes spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait() for the usage
in ipc/sem and netfilter, it does not in fact work right for the
usage in task_work and futex.
So while the 2 locks crossed problem:
spin_lock(A) spin_lock(B)
if (!spin_is_locked(B)) spin_unlock_wait(A)
foo() foo();
... works with the smp_mb() injected by both spin_is_locked() and
spin_unlock_wait(), this is not sufficient for:
flag = 1;
smp_mb(); spin_lock()
spin_unlock_wait() if (!flag)
// add to lockless list
// iterate lockless list
... because in this scenario, the store from spin_lock() can be delayed
past the load of flag, uncrossing the variables and loosing the
guarantee.
This patch reworks spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait() to work in
both cases by exploiting the observation that while the lock byte
store can be delayed, the contender must have registered itself
visibly in other state contained in the word.
It also allows for architectures to override both functions, as PPC
and ARM64 have an additional issue for which we currently have no
generic solution.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Giovanni Gherdovich <ggherdovich@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pan Xinhui <xinhui.pan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Waiman Long <waiman.long@hpe.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Fixes: 54cf809b9512 ("locking,qspinlock: Fix spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait()")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0422e83d84ae24b933e4b0d4c1e0f0b4ae8a0a3b upstream.
Recursive locking for ww_mutexes was originally conceived as an
exception. However, it is heavily used by the DRM atomic modesetting
code. Currently, the recursive deadlock is checked after we have queued
up for a busy-spin and as we never release the lock, we spin until
kicked, whereupon the deadlock is discovered and reported.
A simple solution for the now common problem is to move the recursive
deadlock discovery to the first action when taking the ww_mutex.
Suggested-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464293297-19777-1-git-send-email-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3993546646baf1dab5f5c4f7d9bb58f2046fd1c1 upstream.
The kernel-doc for the of_irq_get[_byname]() is clearly inadequate in
describing the return values -- of_irq_get_byname() is documented better
than of_irq_get() but it still doesn't mention that 0 is returned iff
irq_create_of_mapping() fails (it doesn't return an error code in this
case). Document all possible return value variants, making the writing
of the word "IRQ" consistent, while at it...
Fixes: 9ec36cafe4 ("of/irq: do irq resolution in platform_get_irq")
Fixes: ad69674e73 ("of/irq: do irq resolution in platform_get_irq_byname()")
Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b3c0a4dab7e35a9b6d69c0415641d2280fdefb2b upstream.
Because of an improper dereference, a stray 'C' character was output to
the modalias when no 'compatible' was specified. This is the case for
some old PowerMac drivers which only set the 'name' property. Fix it to
let them match again.
Reported-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Cc: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Fixes: 6543becf26 ("mod/file2alias: make modalias generation safe for cross compiling")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 97c1df3e54e811aed484a036a798b4b25d002ecf upstream.
Add this trivial missing error handling.
Fixes: 1b852bceb0 ("mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>