commit 65de03e251382306a4575b1779c57c87889eee49 upstream.
cgroup writeback tries to refresh the associated wb immediately if the
current wb is dead. This is to avoid keeping issuing IOs on the stale
wb after memcg - blkcg association has changed (ie. when blkcg got
disabled / enabled higher up in the hierarchy).
Unfortunately, the logic gets triggered spuriously on inodes which are
associated with dead cgroups. When the logic is triggered on dead
cgroups, the attempt fails only after doing quite a bit of work
allocating and initializing a new wb.
While c3aab9a0bd91 ("mm/filemap.c: don't initiate writeback if mapping
has no dirty pages") alleviated the issue significantly as it now only
triggers when the inode has dirty pages. However, the condition can
still be triggered before the inode is switched to a different cgroup
and the logic simply doesn't make sense.
Skip the immediate switching if the associated memcg is dying.
This is a simplified version of the following two patches:
* https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190513183053.GA73423@dennisz-mbp/
* http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156355839560.2063.5265687291430814589.stgit@buzz
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Fixes: e8a7abf5a5 ("writeback: disassociate inodes from dying bdi_writebacks")
Acked-by: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit be3df3dd4c70ee020587a943a31b98a0fb4b6424 ]
If the delegation is marked as being revoked, we must not use it
for cached opens.
Fixes: 869f9dfa4d ("NFSv4: Fix races between nfs_remove_bad_delegation() and delegation return")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 351e5d869e5ac10cb40c78b5f2d7dfc816ad4587 upstream.
Configfs abuses symlink(2). Unlike the normal filesystems, it
wants the target resolved at symlink(2) time, like link(2) would've
done. The problem is that ->symlink() is called with the parent
directory locked exclusive, so resolving the target inside the
->symlink() is easily deadlocked.
Short of really ugly games in sys_symlink() itself, all we can
do is to unlock the parent before resolving the target and
relock it after. However, that invalidates the checks done
by the caller of ->symlink(), so we have to
* check that dentry is still where it used to be
(it couldn't have been moved, but it could've been unhashed)
* recheck that it's still negative (somebody else
might've successfully created a symlink with the same name
while we were looking the target up)
* recheck the permissions on the parent directory.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea60ed6fcf29eebc78f2ce91491e6309ee005a01 upstream.
KASAN reports a use-after-free when running xfstest generic/531, with the
following trace:
[ 293.903362] kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[ 293.903365] rb_erase+0x1f/0x790
[ 293.903370] __ceph_remove_cap+0x201/0x370
[ 293.903375] __ceph_remove_caps+0x4b/0x70
[ 293.903380] ceph_evict_inode+0x4e/0x360
[ 293.903386] evict+0x169/0x290
[ 293.903390] __dentry_kill+0x16f/0x250
[ 293.903394] dput+0x1c6/0x440
[ 293.903398] __fput+0x184/0x330
[ 293.903404] task_work_run+0xb9/0xe0
[ 293.903410] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd3/0xe0
[ 293.903413] do_syscall_64+0x1a0/0x1c0
[ 293.903417] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This happens because __ceph_remove_cap() may queue a cap release
(__ceph_queue_cap_release) which can be scheduled before that cap is
removed from the inode list with
rb_erase(&cap->ci_node, &ci->i_caps);
And, when this finally happens, the use-after-free will occur.
This can be fixed by removing the cap from the inode list before being
removed from the session list, and thus eliminating the risk of an UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
During backport 1e2e547a93a "do d_instantiate/unlock_new_inode
combinations safely", there was a error instantiating sequence of
attaching dentry to inode and calling security_d_instantiate().
Before commit ce23e640133 "->getxattr(): pass dentry and inode as
separate arguments" and b96809173e9 "security_d_instantiate(): move to
the point prior to attaching dentry to inode", security_d_instantiate()
should be called beind __d_instantiate(), otherwise it will trigger
below problem when CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK on ext4 was enabled because
d_inode(dentry) used by ->getxattr() is NULL before __d_instantiate()
instantiate inode.
[ 31.858026] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffff70
...
[ 31.882024] Call Trace:
[ 31.882378] [<ffffffffa347f75c>] ext4_xattr_get+0x8c/0x3e0
[ 31.883195] [<ffffffffa3489454>] ext4_xattr_security_get+0x24/0x40
[ 31.884086] [<ffffffffa336a56b>] generic_getxattr+0x5b/0x90
[ 31.884907] [<ffffffffa3700514>] smk_fetch+0xb4/0x150
[ 31.885634] [<ffffffffa3700772>] smack_d_instantiate+0x1c2/0x550
[ 31.886508] [<ffffffffa36f9a5a>] security_d_instantiate+0x3a/0x80
[ 31.887389] [<ffffffffa3353b26>] d_instantiate_new+0x36/0x130
[ 31.888223] [<ffffffffa342b1ef>] ext4_mkdir+0x4af/0x6a0
[ 31.888928] [<ffffffffa3343470>] vfs_mkdir+0x100/0x280
[ 31.889536] [<ffffffffa334b086>] SyS_mkdir+0xb6/0x170
[ 31.890255] [<ffffffffa307c855>] ? trace_do_page_fault+0x95/0x2b0
[ 31.891134] [<ffffffffa3c5e078>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x73
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.16, 4.4
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d46b0da7a33dd8c99d969834f682267a45444ab3 ]
There's a deadlock that is possible and can easily be seen with
a test where multiple readers open/read/close of the same file
and a disruption occurs causing reconnect. The deadlock is due
a reader thread inside cifs_strict_readv calling down_read and
obtaining lock_sem, and then after reconnect inside
cifs_reopen_file calling down_read a second time. If in
between the two down_read calls, a down_write comes from
another process, deadlock occurs.
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
cifs_strict_readv()
down_read(&cifsi->lock_sem);
_cifsFileInfo_put
OR
cifs_new_fileinfo
down_write(&cifsi->lock_sem);
cifs_reopen_file()
down_read(&cifsi->lock_sem);
Fix the above by changing all down_write(lock_sem) calls to
down_write_trylock(lock_sem)/msleep() loop, which in turn
makes the second down_read call benign since it will never
block behind the writer while holding lock_sem.
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed--by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 19957a181608d25c8f4136652d0ea00b3738972d upstream.
Due to an inverted logic mistake in xfs_buftarg_isolate()
the xfs_buffers with zero b_lru_ref will take another trip
around LRU, while isolating buffers with non-zero b_lru_ref.
Additionally those isolated buffers end up right back on the LRU
once they are released, because b_lru_ref remains elevated.
Fix that circuitous route by leaving them on the LRU
as originally intended.
Signed-off-by: Vratislav Bendel <vbendel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Lyakas <alex@zadara.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b24e7598db62386a95a3c8b9c75630c5d56fe077 upstream.
If writeback cache is enabled, then writes might get reordered with
chmod/chown/utimes. The problem with this is that performing the write in
the fuse daemon might itself change some of these attributes. In such case
the following sequence of operations will result in file ending up with the
wrong mode, for example:
int fd = open ("suid", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL);
write (fd, "1", 1);
fchown (fd, 0, 0);
fchmod (fd, 04755);
close (fd);
This patch fixes this by flushing pending writes before performing
chown/chmod/utimes.
Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4d99ff8f12 ("fuse: Turn writeback cache on")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 2abb7d3b12d007c30193f48bebed781009bebdd2 ]
In ocfs2_info_scan_inode_alloc(), there is an if statement on line 283
to check whether inode_alloc is NULL:
if (inode_alloc)
When inode_alloc is NULL, it is used on line 287:
ocfs2_inode_lock(inode_alloc, &bh, 0);
ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested(inode, ...)
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur.
To fix this bug, inode_alloc is checked on line 286.
This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190726033717.32359-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 56e94ea132bb5c2c1d0b60a6aeb34dcb7d71a53d ]
In ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry(), there is an if statement on line 2136 to
check whether loc->xl_entry is NULL:
if (loc->xl_entry)
When loc->xl_entry is NULL, it is used on line 2158:
ocfs2_xa_add_entry(loc, name_hash);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_hash = cpu_to_le32(name_hash);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_offset = cpu_to_le16(loc->xl_size);
and line 2164:
ocfs2_xa_add_namevalue(loc, xi);
loc->xl_entry->xe_value_size = cpu_to_le64(xi->xi_value_len);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_len = xi->xi_name_len;
Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur.
To fix these bugs, if loc-xl_entry is NULL, ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry()
abnormally returns with -EINVAL.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove now-unused ocfs2_xa_add_entry()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190726101447.9153-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dd19c106a36690b47bb1acc68372f2b472b495b8 ]
After 'Initial git repository build' commit,
'mapping_table_ERRHRD' variable has not been used.
So 'mapping_table_ERRHRD' const variable could be removed
to mute below warning message:
fs/cifs/netmisc.c:120:40: warning: unused variable 'mapping_table_ERRHRD' [-Wunused-const-variable]
static const struct smb_to_posix_error mapping_table_ERRHRD[] = {
^
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b5372fe5dc84235dbe04998efdede3c4daa866a9 ]
Commit 8099b047ecc4 ("exec: load_script: don't blindly truncate
shebang string") was trying to protect against a confused exec of a
truncated interpreter path. However, it was overeager and also refused
to truncate arguments as well, which broke userspace, and it was
reverted. This attempts the protection again, but allows arguments to
remain truncated. In an effort to improve readability, helper functions
and comments have been added.
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Samuel Dionne-Riel <samuel@dionne-riel.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
Cc: Graham Christensen <graham@grahamc.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 4b654acdae850f48b8250b9a578a4eaa518c7a6f upstream.
In btrfs_read_block_groups(), if we have an invalid block group which
has mixed type (DATA|METADATA) while the fs doesn't have MIXED_GROUPS
feature, we error out without freeing the block group cache.
This patch will add the missing btrfs_put_block_group() to prevent
memory leak.
Note for stable backports: the file to patch in versions <= 5.3 is
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
Fixes: 49303381f19a ("Btrfs: bail out if block group has different mixed flag")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 03d9a9fe3f3aec508e485dd3dcfa1e99933b4bdb upstream.
According to MS-CIFS specification MID 0xFFFF should not be used by the
CIFS client, but we actually do. Besides, this has proven to cause races
leading to oops between SendReceive2/cifs_demultiplex_thread. On SMB1,
MID is a 2 byte value easy to reach in CurrentMid which may conflict with
an oplock break notification request coming from server
Signed-off-by: Roberto Bergantinos Corpas <rbergant@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c9fbd7bbc23dbdd73364be4d045e5d3612cf6e82 upstream.
We recently had an oops reported on a 4.14 kernel in
xfs_reclaim_inodes_count() where sb->s_fs_info pointed to garbage
and so the m_perag_tree lookup walked into lala land.
Essentially, the machine was under memory pressure when the mount
was being run, xfs_fs_fill_super() failed after allocating the
xfs_mount and attaching it to sb->s_fs_info. It then cleaned up and
freed the xfs_mount, but the sb->s_fs_info field still pointed to
the freed memory. Hence when the superblock shrinker then ran
it fell off the bad pointer.
With the superblock shrinker problem fixed at teh VFS level, this
stale s_fs_info pointer is still a problem - we use it
unconditionally in ->put_super when the superblock is being torn
down, and hence we can still trip over it after a ->fill_super
call failure. Hence we need to clear s_fs_info if
xfs-fs_fill_super() fails, and we need to check if it's valid in
the places it can potentially be dereferenced after a ->fill_super
failure.
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c82e5ac7fe3570a269c0929bf7899f62048e7dbc ]
Currently the client indicates that a dentry is stale when inode
numbers or type types between a local inode and a remote file
don't match. If this is the case attributes is not being copied
from remote to local, so, it is already known that the local copy
has stale metadata. That's why the inode needs to be marked for
revalidation in order to tell the VFS to lookup the dentry again
before openning a file. This prevents unexpected stale errors
to be returned to the user space when openning a file.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a108471b5730b52017e73b58c9f486319d2ac308 ]
Commit 7196ac113a ("Fix to check Unique id and FileType when client
refer file directly.") checks whether the uniqueid of an inode has
changed when getting the inode info, but only when using the UNIX
extensions. Add a similar check for SMB2+, since this can be done
without an extra network roundtrip.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 0b3d0ef9840f7be202393ca9116b857f6f793715 upstream.
Mark inode for force revalidation if LOOKUP_REVAL flag is set.
This tells the client to actually send a QueryInfo request to
the server to obtain the latest metadata in case a directory
or a file were changed remotely. Only do that if the client
doesn't have a lease for the file to avoid unneeded round
trips to the server.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30573a82fb179420b8aac30a3a3595aa96a93156 upstream.
Currently if the client identifies problems when processing
metadata returned in CREATE response, the open handle is being
leaked. This causes multiple problems like a file missing a lease
break by that client which causes high latencies to other clients
accessing the file. Another side-effect of this is that the file
can't be deleted.
Fix this by closing the file after the client hits an error after
the file was opened and the open descriptor wasn't returned to
the user space. Also convert -ESTALE to -EOPENSTALE to allow
the VFS to revalidate a dentry and retry the open.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 750670341a24cb714e624e0fd7da30900ad93752 ]
When filling an inode with info from the MDS, i_blkbits is being
initialized using fl_stripe_unit, which contains the stripe unit in
bytes. Unfortunately, this doesn't make sense for directories as they
have fl_stripe_unit set to '0'. This means that i_blkbits will be set
to 0xff, causing an UBSAN undefined behaviour in i_blocksize():
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/fs.h:731:12
shift exponent 255 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
Fix this by initializing i_blkbits to CEPH_BLOCK_SHIFT if fl_stripe_unit
is zero.
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c87a37ebd40b889178664c2c09cc187334146292 ]
Currently on mmap cache policy, we always attach writeback_fid
whether mmap type is SHARED or PRIVATE. However, in the use case
of kata-container which combines 9p(Guest OS) with overlayfs(Host OS),
this behavior will trigger overlayfs' copy-up when excute command
inside container.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190820100325.10313-1-cgxu519@zoho.com.cn
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@zoho.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e2751463eaa6f9fec8fea80abbdc62dbc487b3c5 ]
In encode_attrs(), there is an if statement on line 1145 to check
whether label is NULL:
if (label && (attrmask[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL))
When label is NULL, it is used on lines 1178-1181:
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->lfs);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->pi);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->len);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, label->label, label->len);
To fix these bugs, label is checked before being used.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0a3775e4f883912944481cf2ef36eb6383a9cc74 ]
There is a scenario causing ocfs2 umount hang when multiple hosts are
rebooting at the same time.
NODE1 NODE2 NODE3
send unlock requset to NODE2
dies
become recovery master
recover NODE2
find NODE2 dead
mark resource RECOVERING
directly remove lock from grant list
calculate usage but RECOVERING marked
**miss the window of purging
clear RECOVERING
To reproduce this issue, crash a host and then umount ocfs2
from another node.
To solve this, just let unlock progress wait for recovery done.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1550124866-20367-1-git-send-email-gechangwei@live.cn
Signed-off-by: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 07bfa4415ab607e459b69bd86aa7e7602ce10b4f ]
If userspace reads the buffer via blockdev while mounting,
sb_getblk()+modify can race with buffer read via blockdev.
For example,
FS userspace
bh = sb_getblk()
modify bh->b_data
read
ll_rw_block(bh)
fill bh->b_data by on-disk data
/* lost modified data by FS */
set_buffer_uptodate(bh)
set_buffer_uptodate(bh)
Userspace should not use the blockdev while mounting though, the udev
seems to be already doing this. Although I think the udev should try to
avoid this, workaround the race by small overhead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pnk7l3sw.fsf_-_@mail.parknet.co.jp
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 13fc1d271a2e3ab8a02071e711add01fab9271f6 ]
There is a race between setting up a qgroup rescan worker and completing
a qgroup rescan worker that can lead to callers of the qgroup rescan wait
ioctl to either not wait for the rescan worker to complete or to hang
forever due to missing wake ups. The following diagram shows a sequence
of steps that illustrates the race.
CPU 1 CPU 2 CPU 3
btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan()
btrfs_qgroup_rescan()
qgroup_rescan_init()
mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
spin_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock)
fs_info->qgroup_flags |=
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN
init_completion(
&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion)
fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = true
mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock)
btrfs_init_work()
--> starts the worker
btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker()
mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
fs_info->qgroup_flags &=
~BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN
mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
starts transaction, updates qgroup status
item, etc
btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan()
btrfs_qgroup_rescan()
qgroup_rescan_init()
mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
spin_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock)
fs_info->qgroup_flags |=
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN
init_completion(
&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion)
fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = true
mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock)
btrfs_init_work()
--> starts another worker
mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = false
mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
complete_all(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion)
Before the rescan worker started by the task at CPU 3 completes, if
another task calls btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan(), it will get -EINPROGRESS
because the flag BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN is set at
fs_info->qgroup_flags, which is expected and correct behaviour.
However if other task calls btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan_wait() before the
rescan worker started by the task at CPU 3 completes, it will return
immediately without waiting for the new rescan worker to complete,
because fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running is set to false by CPU 2.
This race is making test case btrfs/171 (from fstests) to fail often:
btrfs/171 9s ... - output mismatch (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad)
# --- tests/btrfs/171.out 2018-09-16 21:30:48.505104287 +0100
# +++ /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad 2019-09-19 02:01:36.938486039 +0100
# @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
# QA output created by 171
# +ERROR: quota rescan failed: Operation now in progress
# Silence is golden
# ...
# (Run 'diff -u /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/tests/btrfs/171.out /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad' to see the entire diff)
That is because the test calls the btrfs-progs commands "qgroup quota
rescan -w", "qgroup assign" and "qgroup remove" in a sequence that makes
calls to the rescan start ioctl fail with -EINPROGRESS (note the "btrfs"
commands 'qgroup assign' and 'qgroup remove' often call the rescan start
ioctl after calling the qgroup assign ioctl,
btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_assign()), since previous waits didn't actually wait
for a rescan worker to complete.
Another problem the race can cause is missing wake ups for waiters,
since the call to complete_all() happens outside a critical section and
after clearing the flag BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN. In the sequence
diagram above, if we have a waiter for the first rescan task (executed
by CPU 2), then fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion.wait is not empty, and
if after the rescan worker clears BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN and
before it calls complete_all() against
fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion, the task at CPU 3 calls
init_completion() against fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion which
re-initilizes its wait queue to an empty queue, therefore causing the
rescan worker at CPU 2 to call complete_all() against an empty queue,
never waking up the task waiting for that rescan worker.
Fix this by clearing BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN and setting
fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running to false in the same critical section,
delimited by the mutex fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock, as well as doing the
call to complete_all() in that same critical section. This gives the
protection needed to avoid rescan wait ioctl callers not waiting for a
running rescan worker and the lost wake ups problem, since setting that
rescan flag and boolean as well as initializing the wait queue is done
already in a critical section delimited by that mutex (at
qgroup_rescan_init()).
Fixes: 57254b6ebc ("Btrfs: add ioctl to wait for qgroup rescan completion")
Fixes: d2c609b834d62f ("btrfs: properly track when rescan worker is running")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 6af112b11a4bc1b560f60a618ac9c1dcefe9836e upstream.
When doing any form of incremental send the parent and the child trees
need to be compared via btrfs_compare_trees. This can result in long
loop chains without ever relinquishing the CPU. This causes softlockup
detector to trigger when comparing trees with a lot of items. Example
report:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 24s! [snapperd:16153]
CPU: 0 PID: 16153 Comm: snapperd Not tainted 5.2.9-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased)
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO)
pc : __ll_sc_arch_atomic_sub_return+0x14/0x20
lr : btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0xe0/0x1e8 [btrfs]
sp : ffff00001273b7e0
Call trace:
__ll_sc_arch_atomic_sub_return+0x14/0x20
release_extent_buffer+0xdc/0x120 [btrfs]
free_extent_buffer.part.0+0xb0/0x118 [btrfs]
free_extent_buffer+0x24/0x30 [btrfs]
btrfs_release_path+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs]
btrfs_free_path.part.0+0x20/0x40 [btrfs]
btrfs_free_path+0x24/0x30 [btrfs]
get_inode_info+0xa8/0xf8 [btrfs]
finish_inode_if_needed+0xe0/0x6d8 [btrfs]
changed_cb+0x9c/0x410 [btrfs]
btrfs_compare_trees+0x284/0x648 [btrfs]
send_subvol+0x33c/0x520 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_send+0x8a0/0xaf0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x199c/0x2288 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x4b0/0x820
ksys_ioctl+0x84/0xb8
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x188
el0_svc_handler+0x34/0x90
el0_svc+0x8/0xc
Fix this by adding a call to cond_resched at the beginning of the main
loop in btrfs_compare_trees.
Fixes: 7069830a9e ("Btrfs: add btrfs_compare_trees function")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5c2e9f346b815841f9bed6029ebcb06415caf640 upstream.
When filtering xattr list for reading, presence of trusted xattr
results in a security audit log. However, if there is other content
no errno will be set, and if there isn't, the errno will be -ENODATA
and not -EPERM as is usually associated with a lack of capability.
The check does not block the request to list the xattrs present.
Switch to ns_capable_noaudit to reflect a more appropriate check.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18+
Fixes: a082c6f680da ("ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin")
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a016e2794fc3a245a91946038dd8f34d65e53cc3 upstream.
There may be situations when a server negotiates SMB 2.1
protocol version or higher but responds to a CREATE request
with an oplock rather than a lease.
Currently the client doesn't handle such a case correctly:
when another CREATE comes in the server sends an oplock
break to the initial CREATE and the client doesn't send
an ack back due to a wrong caching level being set (READ
instead of RWH). Missing an oplock break ack makes the
server wait until the break times out which dramatically
increases the latency of the second CREATE.
Fix this by properly detecting oplocks when using SMB 2.1
protocol version and higher.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c1e8220bd316d8ae8e524df39534b8a412a45d5e upstream.
If a program attempts to punch a hole on an inline data file, we need
to convert it to a normal file first.
This was detected using ext4/032 using the adv configuration. Simple
reproducer:
mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -O inline_data /dev/vdc
mount /vdc
echo "" > /vdc/testfile
xfs_io -c 'truncate 33554432' /vdc/testfile
xfs_io -c 'fpunch 0 1048576' /vdc/testfile
umount /vdc
e2fsck -fy /dev/vdc
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d5880c7a8620290a6c90ced7a0e8bd0ad9419601 upstream.
unlock_page() was missing in case of an already in-flight write against the
same page.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: ff17be0864 ("fuse: writepage: skip already in flight")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 2a28468e525f3924efed7f29f2bc5a2926e7e19a ]
[BUG]
With fuzzed image and MIXED_GROUPS super flag, we can hit the following
BUG_ON():
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c:491!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 1849 Comm: sync Tainted: G O 5.2.0-custom #27
RIP: 0010:update_existing_head_ref.cold+0x44/0x46 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
add_delayed_ref_head+0x20c/0x2d0 [btrfs]
btrfs_add_delayed_tree_ref+0x1fc/0x490 [btrfs]
btrfs_free_tree_block+0x123/0x380 [btrfs]
__btrfs_cow_block+0x435/0x500 [btrfs]
btrfs_cow_block+0x110/0x240 [btrfs]
btrfs_search_slot+0x230/0xa00 [btrfs]
? __lock_acquire+0x105e/0x1e20
btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x67/0xc0 [btrfs]
alloc_reserved_file_extent+0x9e/0x340 [btrfs]
__btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x78e/0x1240 [btrfs]
? kvm_clock_read+0x18/0x30
? __sched_clock_gtod_offset+0x21/0x50
btrfs_run_delayed_refs.part.0+0x4e/0x180 [btrfs]
btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x23/0x30 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x53/0x9f0 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_fs+0x7c/0x1c0 [btrfs]
? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20
sync_fs_one_sb+0x23/0x30
iterate_supers+0x95/0x100
ksys_sync+0x62/0xb0
__ia32_sys_sync+0xe/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x65/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[CAUSE]
This situation is caused by several factors:
- Fuzzed image
The extent tree of this fs missed one backref for extent tree root.
So we can allocated space from that slot.
- MIXED_BG feature
Super block has MIXED_BG flag.
- No mixed block groups exists
All block groups are just regular ones.
This makes data space_info->block_groups[] contains metadata block
groups. And when we reserve space for data, we can use space in
metadata block group.
Then we hit the following file operations:
- fallocate
We need to allocate data extents.
find_free_extent() choose to use the metadata block to allocate space
from, and choose the space of extent tree root, since its backref is
missing.
This generate one delayed ref head with is_data = 1.
- extent tree update
We need to update extent tree at run_delayed_ref time.
This generate one delayed ref head with is_data = 0, for the same
bytenr of old extent tree root.
Then we trigger the BUG_ON().
[FIX]
The quick fix here is to check block_group->flags before using it.
The problem can only happen for MIXED_GROUPS fs. Regular filesystems
won't have space_info with DATA|METADATA flag, and no way to hit the
bug.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203255
Reported-by: Jungyeon Yoon <jungyeon.yoon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c854f4d681365498f53ba07843a16423625aa7e9 ]
As Jungyeon Reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233
- Reproduces
gcc poc_13.c
./run.sh f2fs
- Kernel messages
F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2133!
RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x35d/0x3e0
Call Trace:
f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16c/0x5a0
do_write_page+0x57/0x100
f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0
__write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0
f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670
f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x364/0x13a0
f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130
f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810
do_fsync+0x33/0x60
__x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The testcase fails because that, in fuzzed image, current segment was
allocated with LFS type, its .next_blkoff should point to an unused
block address, but actually, its bitmap shows it's not. So during
allocation, f2fs crash when setting bitmap.
Introducing sanity_check_curseg() to check such inconsistence of
current in-used segment.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a37d0862d17411edb67677a580a6f505ec2225f6 ]
As Pavel Machek reported:
"We normally use -EUCLEAN to signal filesystem corruption. Plus, it is
good idea to report it to the syslog and mark filesystem as "needing
fsck" if filesystem can do that."
Still we need improve the original patch with:
- use unlikely keyword
- add message print
- return EUCLEAN
However, after rethink this patch, I don't think we should add such
condition check here as below reasons:
- We have already checked the field in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(),
- If there is fs corrupt or security vulnerability, there is nothing
to guarantee the field is integrated after the check, unless we do
the check before each of its use, however no filesystem does that.
- We only have similar check for bitmap, which was added due to there
is bitmap corruption happened on f2fs' runtime in product.
- There are so many key fields in SB/CP/NAT did have such check
after f2fs_sanity_check_{sb,cp,..}.
So I propose to revert this unneeded check.
This reverts commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1166c1f2f69117ad254189ca781287afa6e550b6 ]
As a part of the sanity checking while mounting, distinct segment number
assignment to data and node segments is verified. Fixing a small bug in
this verification between node and data segments. We need to check all
the data segments with all the node segments.
Fixes: 042be0f849e5f ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check with current segment number")
Signed-off-by: Surbhi Palande <csurbhi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 478228e57f81f6cb60798d54fc02a74ea7dd267e ]
It's safer to zero out the password so that it can never be disclosed.
Fixes: 0c219f5799c7 ("cifs: set domainName when a domain-key is used in multiuser")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f2aee329a68f5a907bcff11a109dfe17c0b41aeb ]
RHBZ: 1710429
When we use a domain-key to authenticate using multiuser we must also set
the domainnmame for the new volume as it will be used and passed to the server
in the NTLMSSP Domain-name.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d33d4beb522987d1c305c12500796f9be3687dee ]
Ensure we update the write result count on success, since the
RPC call itself does not do so.
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 71affe9be45a5c60b9772e1b2701710712637274 ]
If we received a reply from the server with a zero length read and
no error, then that implies we are at eof.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 17d8c5d145000070c581f2a8aa01edc7998582ab ]
Initialise the result count to 0 rather than initialising it to the
argument count. The reason is that we want to ensure we record the
I/O stats correctly in the case where an error is returned (for
instance in the layoutstats).
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 90cf500e338ab3f3c0f126ba37e36fb6a9058441 ]
Currently, we are translating RPC level errors such as timeouts,
as well as interrupts etc into EOPENSTALE, which forces a single
replay of the open attempt. What we actually want to do is
force the replay only in the cases where the returned error
indicates that the file may have changed on the server.
So the fix is to spell out the exact set of errors where we want
to return EOPENSTALE.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 410f954cb1d1c79ae485dd83a175f21954fd87cd upstream.
Sometimes when fsync'ing a file we need to log that other inodes exist and
when we need to do that we acquire a reference on the inodes and then drop
that reference using iput() after logging them.
That generally is not a problem except if we end up doing the final iput()
(dropping the last reference) on the inode and that inode has a link count
of 0, which can happen in a very short time window if the logging path
gets a reference on the inode while it's being unlinked.
In that case we end up getting the eviction callback, btrfs_evict_inode(),
invoked through the iput() call chain which needs to drop all of the
inode's items from its subvolume btree, and in order to do that, it needs
to join a transaction at the helper function evict_refill_and_join().
However because the task previously started a transaction at the fsync
handler, btrfs_sync_file(), it has current->journal_info already pointing
to a transaction handle and therefore evict_refill_and_join() will get
that transaction handle from btrfs_join_transaction(). From this point on,
two different problems can happen:
1) evict_refill_and_join() will often change the transaction handle's
block reserve (->block_rsv) and set its ->bytes_reserved field to a
value greater than 0. If evict_refill_and_join() never commits the
transaction, the eviction handler ends up decreasing the reference
count (->use_count) of the transaction handle through the call to
btrfs_end_transaction(), and after that point we have a transaction
handle with a NULL ->block_rsv (which is the value prior to the
transaction join from evict_refill_and_join()) and a ->bytes_reserved
value greater than 0. If after the eviction/iput completes the inode
logging path hits an error or it decides that it must fallback to a
transaction commit, the btrfs fsync handle, btrfs_sync_file(), gets a
non-zero value from btrfs_log_dentry_safe(), and because of that
non-zero value it tries to commit the transaction using a handle with
a NULL ->block_rsv and a non-zero ->bytes_reserved value. This makes
the transaction commit hit an assertion failure at
btrfs_trans_release_metadata() because ->bytes_reserved is not zero but
the ->block_rsv is NULL. The produced stack trace for that is like the
following:
[192922.917158] assertion failed: !trans->bytes_reserved, file: fs/btrfs/transaction.c, line: 816
[192922.917553] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[192922.917922] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3532!
[192922.918310] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
[192922.918666] CPU: 2 PID: 883 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.1.4-btrfs-next-47 #1
[192922.919035] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[192922.919801] RIP: 0010:assfail.constprop.25+0x18/0x1a [btrfs]
(...)
[192922.920925] RSP: 0018:ffffaebdc8a27da8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[192922.921315] RAX: 0000000000000051 RBX: ffff95c9c16a41c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[192922.921692] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff95cab6b16838 RDI: ffff95cab6b16838
[192922.922066] RBP: ffff95c9c16a41c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[192922.922442] R10: ffffaebdc8a27e70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff95ca731a0980
[192922.922820] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff95ca84c73338 R15: ffff95ca731a0ea8
[192922.923200] FS: 00007f337eda4e80(0000) GS:ffff95cab6b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[192922.923579] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[192922.923948] CR2: 00007f337edad000 CR3: 00000001e00f6002 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[192922.924329] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[192922.924711] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[192922.925105] Call Trace:
[192922.925505] btrfs_trans_release_metadata+0x10c/0x170 [btrfs]
[192922.925911] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x3e/0xaf0 [btrfs]
[192922.926324] btrfs_sync_file+0x44c/0x490 [btrfs]
[192922.926731] do_fsync+0x38/0x60
[192922.927138] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20
[192922.927543] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1c0
[192922.927939] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
(...)
[192922.934077] ---[ end trace f00808b12068168f ]---
2) If evict_refill_and_join() decides to commit the transaction, it will
be able to do it, since the nested transaction join only increments the
transaction handle's ->use_count reference counter and it does not
prevent the transaction from getting committed. This means that after
eviction completes, the fsync logging path will be using a transaction
handle that refers to an already committed transaction. What happens
when using such a stale transaction can be unpredictable, we are at
least having a use-after-free on the transaction handle itself, since
the transaction commit will call kmem_cache_free() against the handle
regardless of its ->use_count value, or we can end up silently losing
all the updates to the log tree after that iput() in the logging path,
or using a transaction handle that in the meanwhile was allocated to
another task for a new transaction, etc, pretty much unpredictable
what can happen.
In order to fix both of them, instead of using iput() during logging, use
btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), so that the logging path of fsync never drops
the last reference on an inode, that step is offloaded to a safe context
(usually the cleaner kthread).
The assertion failure issue was sporadically triggered by the test case
generic/475 from fstests, which loads the dm error target while fsstress
is running, which lead to fsync failing while logging inodes with -EIO
errors and then trying later to commit the transaction, triggering the
assertion failure.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 86968ef21596515958d5f0a40233d02be78ecec0 ]
Calling ceph_buffer_put() in __ceph_setxattr() may end up freeing the
i_xattrs.prealloc_blob buffer while holding the i_ceph_lock. This can be
fixed by postponing the call until later, when the lock is released.
The following backtrace was triggered by fstests generic/117.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2283
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 650, name: fsstress
3 locks held by fsstress/650:
#0: 00000000870a0fe8 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50
#1: 00000000ba0c4c74 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6){++++}, at: vfs_setxattr+0x55/0xa0
#2: 000000008dfbb3f2 (&(&ci->i_ceph_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: __ceph_setxattr+0x297/0x810
CPU: 1 PID: 650 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.2.0+ #437
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x67/0x90
___might_sleep.cold+0x9f/0xb1
vfree+0x4b/0x60
ceph_buffer_release+0x1b/0x60
__ceph_setxattr+0x2b4/0x810
__vfs_setxattr+0x66/0x80
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x59/0xf0
vfs_setxattr+0x81/0xa0
setxattr+0x115/0x230
? filename_lookup+0xc9/0x140
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x74/0x80
? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2e/0x60
? __sb_start_write+0x142/0x1a0
? mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50
path_setxattr+0xba/0xd0
__x64_sys_lsetxattr+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7ff23514359a
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 36e4ad0316c017d5b271378ed9a1c9a4b77fab5f upstream.
Before this patch, function read_rindex_entry would set a rgrp
glock's gl_object pointer to itself before inserting the rgrp into
the rgrp rbtree. The problem is: if another process was also reading
the rgrp in, and had already inserted its newly created rgrp, then
the second call to read_rindex_entry would overwrite that value,
then return a bad return code to the caller. Later, other functions
would reference the now-freed rgrp memory by way of gl_object.
In some cases, that could result in gfs2_rgrp_brelse being called
twice for the same rgrp: once for the failed attempt and once for
the "real" rgrp release. Eventually the kernel would panic.
There are also a number of other things that could go wrong when
a kernel module is accessing freed storage. For example, this could
result in rgrp corruption because the fake rgrp would point to a
fake bitmap in memory too, causing gfs2_inplace_reserve to search
some random memory for free blocks, and find some, since we were
never setting rgd->rd_bits to NULL before freeing it.
This patch fixes the problem by not setting gl_object until we
have successfully inserted the rgrp into the rbtree. Also, it sets
rd_bits to NULL as it frees them, which will ensure any accidental
access to the wrong rgrp will result in a kernel panic rather than
file system corruption, which is preferred.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 46d0b24c5ee10a15dfb25e20642f5a5ed59c5003 upstream.
userfaultfd_release() should clear vm_flags/vm_userfaultfd_ctx even if
mm->core_state != NULL.
Otherwise a page fault can see userfaultfd_missing() == T and use an
already freed userfaultfd_ctx.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190820160237.GB4983@redhat.com
Fixes: 04f5866e41fb ("coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c77e22834ae9a11891cb613bd9a551be1b94f2bc ]
John Hubbard reports seeing the following stack trace:
nfs4_do_reclaim
rcu_read_lock /* we are now in_atomic() and must not sleep */
nfs4_purge_state_owners
nfs4_free_state_owner
nfs4_destroy_seqid_counter
rpc_destroy_wait_queue
cancel_delayed_work_sync
__cancel_work_timer
__flush_work
start_flush_work
might_sleep:
(kernel/workqueue.c:2975: BUG)
The solution is to separate out the freeing of the state owners
from nfs4_purge_state_owners(), and perform that outside the atomic
context.
Reported-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Fixes: 0aaaf5c424 ("NFS: Cache state owners after files are closed")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7bc36e3ce91471b6377c8eadc0a2f220a2280083 ]
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c: In function ocfs2_xattr_bucket_find:
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3828:6: warning: variable last_hash set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
It's never used and can be removed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190716132110.34836-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
