If any discard requests fails, the mmc driver should not cause kernel
panic. The error handling and informing block layer about error will be
done by completion context.
Change-Id: I0c88ad851ad12c392a557bcb94d3b21dfc62d1f8
Signed-off-by: Vijay Viswanath <vviswana@codeaurora.org>
This change adds two macros, one to indicate backport support for the
new connect done event which takes connection response parameters as a
structure instead of function arguments and the other macro is to
indicate backport support for FILS shared key authentication offload to
driver.
Change-Id: I6fb562741bb2abacbe1c7c7ffbf4b2afb25e555b
CRs-Fixed: 2028536
Signed-off-by: Vidyullatha Kanchanapally <vidyullatha@codeaurora.org>
Enhance nl80211 and cfg80211 connect request and response APIs to
support FILS shared key authentication offload. The new nl80211
attributes can be used to provide additional information to the driver
to establish a FILS connection. Also enhance the set/del PMKSA to allow
support for adding and deleting PMKSA based on FILS cache identifier.
Add a new feature flag that drivers can use to advertize support for
FILS shared key authentication and association in station mode when
using their own SME.
Change-Id: I75d47301b767e691d6240fd6c20c28b9bfaaa571
Signed-off-by: Vidyullatha Kanchanapally <vkanchan@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Git-commit: a3caf7440dedd2399f90f27ff11ac390bf03e6c4
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jberg/mac80211-next.git
CRs-Fixed: 2028536
[vidyullatha@codeaurora.org: backport to kernel 4.4 - This commit includes
the changes from following commits in include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h to
compile for msm-4.4 -
4a4b8169501b18c3450ac735a7e277b24886a651 :
cfg80211: Accept multiple RSSI thresholds for CQM]
Signed-off-by: Vidyullatha Kanchanapally <vidyullatha@codeaurora.org>
The spec writes cipher/AKM suites as something like 00-0F-AC:9,
but the part after the colon isn't hex, it's decimal, so that
we've already had a few mistakes (in other code, or unmerged
patches) to e.g. write 0x000FAC10 instead of 0x000FAC0A.
Use a macro to avoid that problem.
Reviewed-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Git-commit: 228c8c6b1f4376788e9d5ab00d50b10228eb40d3
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
CRs-Fixed: 2028536
Change-Id: I1507de1ee316182d429186ff33a932675013ba7d
Signed-off-by: Vidyullatha Kanchanapally <vidyullatha@codeaurora.org>
Currently the connect event from driver takes all the connection
response parameters as arguments. With support for new features these
response parameters can grow. Use a structure to pass these parameters
rather than passing them as function arguments.
Signed-off-by: Vidyullatha Kanchanapally <vkanchan@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
[add to documentation]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Git-commit: 5349a0f7bfbdd7d81b8418c707dcd1439c714647
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jberg/mac80211-next.git
CRs-Fixed: 2028536
Change-Id: I340a96d052647f79248ef8aa2e0af2b6ba979b2d
Signed-off-by: Vidyullatha Kanchanapally <vidyullatha@codeaurora.org>
Update the volatile register set for cache bypassing. Set
only required registers as volatile and others as
non volatile in order to enable register read from
cache.
CRs-Fixed: 2031818
Change-Id: Ib53798a3f81fc133f6f3902f7bac750cca1cabc6
Signed-off-by: Aditya Bavanari <abavanar@codeaurora.org>
Some of the external SoC are flash based and can boot independently.
Extend esoc driver to support such auto boot esocs.
This patch also adds support for primary esoc. Primary esoc are
esoc that control secondary esoc such as modems. Primary esoc have
control over reset/poweroff of secondary esoc. Secondary esoc don't
have control over reset/poweroff of primary esoc. In general modems
are considered as secondary esoc while apps processor is considered
as primary esoc.
Change-Id: Id02417fcd122ac108cf75d3381ee7955f0f8f783
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@codeaurora.org>
Auto_boot esoc devices can boot and crash before
esoc driver comes up. But there is no way for the
user space code to know that it has crashed by looking
at status line alone. Hence, create a new ioctl entry
to export status of err_fatal line to user space.
Change-Id: Ie7d6115c749d4c63f06aefca29ba457d38eccc7f
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
SSR driver expects subsystem descriptor device type to be
struct platform_device, whereas esoc driver is passing a
struct device instead. This results in a NULL pointer crash
during platform_get_irq in subsystem_restart.c. Fix esoc
driver to pass platform_device.
Change-Id: I93d02623cb7ac14ea3171c3792a4c52c73a74dea
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@codeaurora.org>
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Merge 4.4.65 into android-4.4
Changes in 4.4.65:
tipc: make sure IPv6 header fits in skb headroom
tipc: make dist queue pernet
tipc: re-enable compensation for socket receive buffer double counting
tipc: correct error in node fsm
tty: nozomi: avoid a harmless gcc warning
hostap: avoid uninitialized variable use in hfa384x_get_rid
gfs2: avoid uninitialized variable warning
tipc: fix random link resets while adding a second bearer
tipc: fix socket timer deadlock
mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
xc2028: avoid use after free
netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of batch messages
tipc: check minimum bearer MTU
vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
ping: implement proper locking
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Linux 4.4.65
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
commit 321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290 upstream.
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa58 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa58 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Test perf_event::group_flags instead of group_caps
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 43a6684519ab0a6c52024b5e25322476cabad893 upstream.
We got a report of yet another bug in ping
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6
->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held.
Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier.
Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem.
Fixes: c319b4d76b ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7 upstream.
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
index 7ff2a7ec871f..33b390e7ea31
commit 05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a upstream.
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3de81b758853f0b29c61e246679d20b513c4cfec upstream.
Qian Zhang (张谦) reported a potential socket buffer overflow in
tipc_msg_build() which is also known as CVE-2016-8632: due to
insufficient checks, a buffer overflow can occur if MTU is too short for
even tipc headers. As anyone can set device MTU in a user/net namespace,
this issue can be abused by a regular user.
As agreed in the discussion on Ben Hutchings' original patch, we should
check the MTU at the moment a bearer is attached rather than for each
processed packet. We also need to repeat the check when bearer MTU is
adjusted to new device MTU. UDP case also needs a check to avoid
overflow when calculating bearer MTU.
Fixes: b97bf3fd8f ("[TIPC] Initial merge")
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Qian Zhang (张谦) <zhangqian-c@360.cn>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Adjust context
- NETDEV_GOING_DOWN and NETDEV_CHANGEMTU cases in net notifier were combined]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c58d6c93680f28ac58984af61d0a7ebf4319c241 upstream.
If nlh->nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because
'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes.
The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh->nlmsg_len <
NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later
trigger an out-of-bound read.
If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is
copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the
nlh->nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in
netlink_ack:
[ 41.455421] ==================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340
[ 41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987
[ 41.456431] =============================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[ 41.456431] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
...
[ 41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05 .......@EV."3...
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb ................
^^ start of batch nlmsg with
nlmsg_len=4294967280
...
[ 41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] >ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ^
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 41.456431] ==================================================================
Fix this with better validation of nlh->nlmsg_len and by setting
NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation.
CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs.
Fixes: 9ea2aa8b7d ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch")
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498 upstream.
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f1d048f24e66ba85d3dabf3d076cefa5f2b546b0 upstream.
We sometimes observe a 'deadly embrace' type deadlock occurring
between mutually connected sockets on the same node. This happens
when the one-hour peer supervision timers happen to expire
simultaneously in both sockets.
The scenario is as follows:
CPU 1: CPU 2:
-------- --------
tipc_sk_timeout(sk1) tipc_sk_timeout(sk2)
lock(sk1.slock) lock(sk2.slock)
msg_create(probe) msg_create(probe)
unlock(sk1.slock) unlock(sk2.slock)
tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit_skb()
tipc_node_xmit() tipc_node_xmit()
tipc_sk_rcv(sk2) tipc_sk_rcv(sk1)
lock(sk2.slock) lock((sk1.slock)
filter_rcv() filter_rcv()
tipc_sk_proto_rcv() tipc_sk_proto_rcv()
msg_create(probe_rsp) msg_create(probe_rsp)
tipc_sk_respond() tipc_sk_respond()
tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit_skb()
tipc_node_xmit() tipc_node_xmit()
tipc_sk_rcv(sk1) tipc_sk_rcv(sk2)
lock((sk1.slock) lock((sk2.slock)
===> DEADLOCK ===> DEADLOCK
Further analysis reveals that there are three different locations in the
socket code where tipc_sk_respond() is called within the context of the
socket lock, with ensuing risk of similar deadlocks.
We now solve this by passing a buffer queue along with all upcalls where
sk_lock.slock may potentially be held. Response or rejected message
buffers are accumulated into this queue instead of being sent out
directly, and only sent once we know we are safely outside the slock
context.
Reported-by: GUNA <gbalasun@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d2f394dc4816b7bd1b44981d83509f18f19c53f0 upstream.
In a dual bearer configuration, if the second tipc link becomes
active while the first link still has pending nametable "bulk"
updates, it randomly leads to reset of the second link.
When a link is established, the function named_distribute(),
fills the skb based on node mtu (allows room for TUNNEL_PROTOCOL)
with NAME_DISTRIBUTOR message for each PUBLICATION.
However, the function named_distribute() allocates the buffer by
increasing the node mtu by INT_H_SIZE (to insert NAME_DISTRIBUTOR).
This consumes the space allocated for TUNNEL_PROTOCOL.
When establishing the second link, the link shall tunnel all the
messages in the first link queue including the "bulk" update.
As size of the NAME_DISTRIBUTOR messages while tunnelling, exceeds
the link mtu the transmission fails (-EMSGSIZE).
Thus, the synch point based on the message count of the tunnel
packets is never reached leading to link timeout.
In this commit, we adjust the size of name distributor message so that
they can be tunnelled.
Reviewed-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <parthasarathy.bhuvaragan@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 67893f12e5374bbcaaffbc6e570acbc2714ea884 upstream.
We get a bogus warning about a potential uninitialized variable
use in gfs2, because the compiler does not figure out that we
never use the leaf number if get_leaf_nr() returns an error:
fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'get_first_leaf':
fs/gfs2/dir.c:802:9: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'dir_split_leaf':
fs/gfs2/dir.c:1021:8: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
Changing the 'if (!error)' to 'if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(error))' is
sufficient to let gcc understand that this is exactly the same
condition as in IS_ERR() so it can optimize the code path enough
to understand it.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 48dc5fb3ba53b20418de8514700f63d88c5de3a3 upstream.
The driver reads a value from hfa384x_from_bap(), which may fail,
and then assigns the value to a local variable. gcc detects that
in in the failure case, the 'rlen' variable now contains
uninitialized data:
In file included from ../drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_pci.c:220:0:
drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_hw.c: In function 'hfa384x_get_rid':
drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_hw.c:842:5: warning: 'rec' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
if (le16_to_cpu(rec.len) == 0) {
This restructures the function as suggested by Russell King, to
make it more readable and get more reliable error handling, by
handling each failure mode using a goto.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a4f642a8a3c2838ad09fe8313d45db46600e1478 upstream.
The nozomi wireless data driver has its own helper function to
transfer data from a FIFO, doing an extra byte swap on big-endian
architectures, presumably to bring the data back into byte-serial
order after readw() or readl() perform their implicit byteswap.
This helper function is used in the receive_data() function to
first read the length into a 32-bit variable, which causes
a compile-time warning:
drivers/tty/nozomi.c: In function 'receive_data':
drivers/tty/nozomi.c:857:9: warning: 'size' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
The problem is that gcc is unsure whether the data was actually
read or not. We know that it is at this point, so we can replace
it with a single readl() to shut up that warning.
I am leaving the byteswap in there, to preserve the existing
behavior, even though this seems fishy: Reading the length of
the data into a cpu-endian variable should normally not use
a second byteswap on big-endian systems, unless the hardware
is aware of the CPU endianess.
There appears to be a lot more confusion about endianess in this
driver, so it probably has not worked on big-endian systems in
a long time, if ever, and I have no way to test it. It's well
possible that this driver has not been used by anyone in a while,
the last patch that looks like it was tested on the hardware is
from 2008.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c4282ca76c5b81ed73ef4c5eb5c07ee397e51642 upstream.
commit 88e8ac7000dc ("tipc: reduce transmission rate of reset messages
when link is down") revealed a flaw in the node FSM, as defined in
the log of commit 66996b6c47 ("tipc: extend node FSM").
We see the following scenario:
1: Node B receives a RESET message from node A before its link endpoint
is fully up, i.e., the node FSM is in state SELF_UP_PEER_COMING. This
event will not change the node FSM state, but the (distinct) link FSM
will move to state RESETTING.
2: As an effect of the previous event, the local endpoint on B will
declare node A lost, and post the event SELF_DOWN to the its node
FSM. This moves the FSM state to SELF_DOWN_PEER_LEAVING, meaning
that no messages will be accepted from A until it receives another
RESET message that confirms that A's endpoint has been reset. This
is wasteful, since we know this as a fact already from the first
received RESET, but worse is that the link instance's FSM has not
wasted this information, but instead moved on to state ESTABLISHING,
meaning that it repeatedly sends out ACTIVATE messages to the reset
peer A.
3: Node A will receive one of the ACTIVATE messages, move its link FSM
to state ESTABLISHED, and start repeatedly sending out STATE messages
to node B.
4: Node B will consistently drop these messages, since it can only accept
accept a RESET according to its node FSM.
5: After four lost STATE messages node A will reset its link and start
repeatedly sending out RESET messages to B.
6: Because of the reduced send rate for RESET messages, it is very
likely that A will receive an ACTIVATE (which is sent out at a much
higher frequency) before it gets the chance to send a RESET, and A
may hence quickly move back to state ESTABLISHED and continue sending
out STATE messages, which will again be dropped by B.
7: GOTO 5.
8: After having repeated the cycle 5-7 a number of times, node A will
by chance get in between with sending a RESET, and the situation is
resolved.
Unfortunately, we have seen that it may take a substantial amount of
time before this vicious loop is broken, sometimes in the order of
minutes.
We correct this by making a small correction to the node FSM: When a
node in state SELF_UP_PEER_COMING receives a SELF_DOWN event, it now
moves directly back to state SELF_DOWN_PEER_DOWN, instead of as now
SELF_DOWN_PEER_LEAVING. This is logically consistent, since we don't
need to wait for RESET confirmation from of an endpoint that we alread
know has been reset. It also means that node B in the scenario above
will not be dropping incoming STATE messages, and the link can come up
immediately.
Finally, a symmetry comparison reveals that the FSM has a similar
error when receiving the event PEER_DOWN in state PEER_UP_SELF_COMING.
Instead of moving to PERR_DOWN_SELF_LEAVING, it should move directly
to SELF_DOWN_PEER_DOWN. Although we have never seen any negative effect
of this logical error, we choose fix this one, too.
The node FSM looks as follows after those changes:
+----------------------------------------+
| PEER_DOWN_EVT|
| |
+------------------------+----------------+ |
|SELF_DOWN_EVT | | |
| | | |
| +-----------+ +-----------+ |
| |NODE_ | |NODE_ | |
| +----------|FAILINGOVER|<---------|SYNCHING |-----------+ |
| |SELF_ +-----------+ FAILOVER_+-----------+ PEER_ | |
| |DOWN_EVT | A BEGIN_EVT A | DOWN_EVT| |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | |FAILOVER_ |FAILOVER_ |SYNCH_ |SYNCH_ | |
| | |END_EVT |BEGIN_EVT |BEGIN_EVT|END_EVT | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | +--------------+ | | |
| | +-------->| SELF_UP_ |<-------+ | |
| | +-----------------| PEER_UP |----------------+ | |
| | |SELF_DOWN_EVT +--------------+ PEER_DOWN_EVT| | |
| | | A A | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | PEER_UP_EVT| |SELF_UP_EVT | | |
| | | | | | | |
V V V | | V V V
+------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +------------+
|SELF_DOWN_ | |SELF_UP_ | |PEER_UP_ | |PEER_DOWN |
|PEER_LEAVING| |PEER_COMING| |SELF_COMING| |SELF_LEAVING|
+------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +------------+
| | A A | |
| | | | | |
| SELF_ | |SELF_ |PEER_ |PEER_ |
| DOWN_EVT| |UP_EVT |UP_EVT |DOWN_EVT |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | +--------------+ | |
|PEER_DOWN_EVT +--->| SELF_DOWN_ |<---+ SELF_DOWN_EVT|
+------------------->| PEER_DOWN |<--------------------+
+--------------+
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7c8bcfb1255fe9d929c227d67bdcd84430fd200b upstream.
In the refactoring commit d570d86497 ("tipc: enqueue arrived buffers
in socket in separate function") we did by accident replace the test
if (sk->sk_backlog.len == 0)
atomic_set(&tsk->dupl_rcvcnt, 0);
with
if (sk->sk_backlog.len)
atomic_set(&tsk->dupl_rcvcnt, 0);
This effectively disables the compensation we have for the double
receive buffer accounting that occurs temporarily when buffers are
moved from the backlog to the socket receive queue. Until now, this
has gone unnoticed because of the large receive buffer limits we are
applying, but becomes indispensable when we reduce this buffer limit
later in this series.
We now fix this by inverting the mentioned condition.
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 541726abe7daca64390c2ec34e6a203145f1686d upstream.
Nametable updates received from the network that cannot be applied
immediately are placed on a defer queue. This queue is global to the
TIPC module, which might cause problems when using TIPC in containers.
To prevent nametable updates from escaping into the wrong namespace,
we make the queue pernet instead.
Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9bd160bfa27fa41927dbbce7ee0ea779700e09ef upstream.
Expand headroom further in order to be able to fit the larger IPv6
header. Prior to this patch this caused a skb under panic for certain
tipc packets when using IPv6 UDP bearer(s).
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When user application provides invalid (out of range) stripe size and
stripe indices, while submitting requests for the stripe based image
processing by the CPP kernel driver, the driver could perform out of
bounds access of the internal buffers.
This fix ensures that stripe size and indices of frame/command buffer
are properly validated during the configuration and before processing
such requests through the CPP hardware block.
CRs-fixed: 2002207
Change-Id: Ib79e36fb507d8e75d8fc28afb990020a0e1bf845
Signed-off-by: Ravi kumar Koyyana <rkoyyana@codeaurora.org>
When the Camera application exercises 32-bit version of the V4L2 ioctl
operation, it results accessing user space memory illegally. This is
due to the direct access of user space buffer by Camera CPP driver.
Thus, fix this by copying user space buffer contents into kernel space
buffer of the driver for further processing. Only after checking for
proper length of user space buffer, proceed further. This will prevent
the buffer overflow and invalid memory access.
CRs-fixed: 2025367
Change-Id: I85cf4a961884c7bb0d036299b886044aef7baf7c
Signed-off-by: Ravi kumar Koyyana <rkoyyana@codeaurora.org>
For each input and output buffer given to mdss rotator, it is necessary
to check the range of the plane_count value against the MAX_PLANES
definition, in order to avoid any plane array out of bound access.
CRs-Fixed: 2028681
Change-Id: I117bf5daead17e5e97c62c6dc8e21d1fcc9d8e74
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Chan <bkchan@codeaurora.org>
For any given output buffer to the MDSS WFD, it is necessary to check
the range of the plane_count against the MAX_PLANES definition, in order
to avoid any out of bound access.
CRs-Fixed: 2028702
Change-Id: I4f1497a3a2e4ca2d30fc268e68cfdacc0d8539ea
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Chan <bkchan@codeaurora.org>
