commit 000ade8016400d93b4d7c89970d96b8c14773d45 upstream.
By passing a limit of 2 bytes to strncat, strncat is limited to writing
fewer bytes than what it's supposed to append to the name here.
Since the bounds are checked on the line above this, just remove the string
bounds checks entirely since they're unneeded.
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultanxda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 604d415e2bd642b7e02c80e719e0396b9d4a77a6 upstream.
syzkaller triggered a use-after-free [1], caused by a combination of
skb_get() in llc_conn_state_process() and usage of sk_eat_skb()
sk_eat_skb() is assuming the skb about to be freed is only used by
the current thread. TCP/DCCP stacks enforce this because current
thread holds the socket lock.
llc_conn_state_process() wants to make sure skb does not disappear,
and holds a reference on the skb it manipulates. But as soon as this
skb is added to socket receive queue, another thread can consume it.
This means that llc must use regular skb_unlink() and kfree_skb()
so that both producer and consumer can safely work on the same skb.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:21 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:43 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:967 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kfree_skb+0xb7/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:655
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801d1f6fba4 by task ksoftirqd/1/18
CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #295
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b6 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:272
atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:21 [inline]
refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:43 [inline]
skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:967 [inline]
kfree_skb+0xb7/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:655
llc_sap_state_process+0x9b/0x550 net/llc/llc_sap.c:224
llc_sap_rcv+0x156/0x1f0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:297
llc_sap_handler+0x65e/0xf80 net/llc/llc_sap.c:438
llc_rcv+0x79e/0xe20 net/llc/llc_input.c:208
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023
process_backlog+0x218/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:5829
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6249 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x7c5/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6315
__do_softirq+0x30c/0xb03 kernel/softirq.c:292
run_ksoftirqd+0x94/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:653
smpboot_thread_fn+0x68b/0xa00 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x35a/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:246
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:413
Allocated by task 18:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x144/0x730 mm/slab.c:3644
__alloc_skb+0x119/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:193
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:995 [inline]
llc_alloc_frame+0xbc/0x370 net/llc/llc_sap.c:54
llc_station_ac_send_xid_r net/llc/llc_station.c:52 [inline]
llc_station_rcv+0x1dc/0x1420 net/llc/llc_station.c:111
llc_rcv+0xc32/0xe20 net/llc/llc_input.c:220
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023
process_backlog+0x218/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:5829
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6249 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x7c5/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6315
__do_softirq+0x30c/0xb03 kernel/softirq.c:292
Freed by task 16383:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756
kfree_skbmem+0x154/0x230 net/core/skbuff.c:582
__kfree_skb+0x1d/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:642
sk_eat_skb include/net/sock.h:2366 [inline]
llc_ui_recvmsg+0xec2/0x1610 net/llc/af_llc.c:882
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xd0/0x110 net/socket.c:801
___sys_recvmsg+0x2b6/0x680 net/socket.c:2278
__sys_recvmmsg+0x303/0xb90 net/socket.c:2390
do_sys_recvmmsg+0x181/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2466
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2484 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2480 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:2480
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801d1f6fac0
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232
The buggy address is located 228 bytes inside of
232-byte region [ffff8801d1f6fac0, ffff8801d1f6fba8)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000747dbc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801d9be7680 index:0xffff8801d1f6fe80
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0007346e88 ffffea000705b108 ffff8801d9be7680
raw: ffff8801d1f6fe80 ffff8801d1f6f0c0 000000010000000b 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801d1f6fa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801d1f6fb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8801d1f6fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff8801d1f6fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801d1f6fc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit df132eff463873e14e019a07f387b4d577d6d1f9 upstream.
If a transport is removed by asconf but there still are some chunks with
this transport queuing on out_chunk_list, later an use-after-free issue
will be caused when accessing this transport from these chunks in
sctp_outq_flush().
This is an old bug, we fix it by clearing the transport of these chunks
in out_chunk_list when removing a transport in sctp_assoc_rm_peer().
Reported-by: syzbot+56a40ceee5fb35932f4d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 025911a5f4e36955498ed50806ad1b02f0f76288 ]
There is no need to have the '__be32 *p' variable static since new value
always be assigned before use it.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 886503f34d63e681662057448819edb5b1057a97 ]
Allow /0 as advertised for hash:net,port,net sets.
For "hash:net,port,net", ipset(8) says that "either subnet
is permitted to be a /0 should you wish to match port
between all destinations."
Make that statement true.
Before:
# ipset create cidrzero hash:net,port,net
# ipset add cidrzero 0.0.0.0/0,12345,0.0.0.0/0
ipset v6.34: The value of the CIDR parameter of the IP address is invalid
# ipset create cidrzero6 hash:net,port,net family inet6
# ipset add cidrzero6 ::/0,12345,::/0
ipset v6.34: The value of the CIDR parameter of the IP address is invalid
After:
# ipset create cidrzero hash:net,port,net
# ipset add cidrzero 0.0.0.0/0,12345,0.0.0.0/0
# ipset test cidrzero 192.168.205.129,12345,172.16.205.129
192.168.205.129,tcp:12345,172.16.205.129 is in set cidrzero.
# ipset create cidrzero6 hash:net,port,net family inet6
# ipset add cidrzero6 ::/0,12345,::/0
# ipset test cidrzero6 fe80::1,12345,ff00::1
fe80::1,tcp:12345,ff00::1 is in set cidrzero6.
See also:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200897df7ff6efb0
Signed-off-by: Eric Westbrook <linux@westbrook.io>
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7ddacfa564870cdd97275fd87decb6174abc6380 ]
Preethi reported that PMTU discovery for UDP/raw applications is not
working in the presence of VRF when the socket is not bound to a device.
The problem is that ip6_sk_update_pmtu does not consider the L3 domain
of the skb device if the socket is not bound. Update the function to
set oif to the L3 master device if relevant.
Fixes: ca254490c8 ("net: Add VRF support to IPv6 stack")
Reported-by: Preethi Ramachandra <preethir@juniper.net>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 33d9a2c72f086cbf1087b2fd2d1a15aa9df14a7f ]
eth_type_trans() assumes initial value for skb->pkt_type
is PACKET_HOST.
This is indeed the value right after a fresh skb allocation.
However, it is possible that GRO merged a packet with a different
value (like PACKET_OTHERHOST in case macvlan is used), so
we need to make sure napi->skb will have pkt_type set back to
PACKET_HOST.
Otherwise, valid packets might be dropped by the stack because
their pkt_type is not PACKET_HOST.
napi_reuse_skb() was added in commit 96e93eab20 ("gro: Add
internal interfaces for VLAN"), but this bug always has
been there.
Fixes: 96e93eab20 ("gro: Add internal interfaces for VLAN")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 16f7eb2b77b55da816c4e207f3f9440a8cafc00a ]
The various types of tunnels running over IPv4 can ask to set the DF
bit to do PMTU discovery. However, PMTU discovery is subject to the
threshold set by the net.ipv4.route.min_pmtu sysctl, and is also
disabled on routes with "mtu lock". In those cases, we shouldn't set
the DF bit.
This patch makes setting the DF bit conditional on the route's MTU
locking state.
This issue seems to be older than git history.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 62230715fd2453b3ba948c9d83cfb3ada9169169 ]
Only first fragment has the sport/dport information,
not the following ones.
If we want consistent hash for all fragments, we need to
ignore ports even for first fragment.
This bug is visible for IPv6 traffic, if incoming fragments
do not have a flow label, since skb_get_hash() will give
different results for first fragment and following ones.
It is also visible if any routing rule wants dissection
and sport or dport.
See commit 5e5d6fed3741 ("ipv6: route: dissect flow
in input path if fib rules need it") for details.
[edumazet] rewrote the changelog completely.
Fixes: 06635a35d1 ("flow_dissect: use programable dissector in skb_flow_dissect and friends")
Signed-off-by: 배석진 <soukjin.bae@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5d7a5bcb67c70cbc904057ef52d3fcfeb24420bb upstream.
When truncating the encode buffer, the page_ptr is getting
advanced, causing the next page to be skipped while encoding.
The page is still included in the response, so the response
contains a page of bogus data.
We need to adjust the page_ptr backwards to ensure we encode
the next page into the correct place.
We saw this triggered when concurrent directory modifications caused
nfsd4_encode_direct_fattr() to return nfserr_noent, and the resulting
call to xdr_truncate_encode() corrupted the READDIR reply.
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 62e3941776fea8678bb8120607039410b1b61a65 ]
p9stat_free is more of a cleanup function than a 'free' function as it
only frees the content of the struct; there are chances of use-after-free
if it is improperly used (e.g. p9stat_free called twice as it used to be
possible to)
Clearing dangling pointers makes the function idempotent and safer to use.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535410108-20650-2-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Reported-by: syzbot+d4252148d198410b864f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bb6ad5572c0022e17e846b382d7413cdcf8055be upstream.
In call_xpt_users(), we delete the entry from the list, but we
do not reinitialise it. This triggers the list poisoning when
we later call unregister_xpt_user() in nfsd4_del_conns().
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 076ed3da0c9b2f88d9157dbe7044a45641ae369e upstream.
commit 40413955ee26 ("Cipso: cipso_v4_optptr enter infinite loop") fixed
a possible infinite loop in the IP option parsing of CIPSO. The fix
assumes that ip_options_compile filtered out all zero length options and
that no other one-byte options beside IPOPT_END and IPOPT_NOOP exist.
While this assumption currently holds true, add explicit checks for zero
length and invalid length options to be safe for the future. Even though
ip_options_compile should have validated the options, the introduction of
new one-byte options can still confuse this code without the additional
checks.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Nuernberger <snu@amazon.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Simon Veith <sveith@amazon.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 94d7ee0baa8b764cf64ad91ed69464c1a6a0066b upstream.
The code following l2tp_tunnel_find() expects that a new reference is
held on sk. Either sk_receive_skb() or the discard_put error path will
drop a reference from the tunnel's socket.
This issue exists in both l2tp_ip and l2tp_ip6.
Fixes: a3c18422a4b4 ("l2tp: hold socket before dropping lock in l2tp_ip{, 6}_recv()")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7de414a9dd91426318df7b63da024b2b07e53df5 ]
Most callers of pskb_trim_rcsum() simply drop the skb when
it fails, however, ip_check_defrag() still continues to pass
the skb up to stack. This is suspicious.
In ip_check_defrag(), after we learn the skb is an IP fragment,
passing the skb to callers makes no sense, because callers expect
fragments are defrag'ed on success. So, dropping the skb when we
can't defrag it is reasonable.
Note, prior to commit 88078d98d1bb, this is not a big problem as
checksum will be fixed up anyway. After it, the checksum is not
correct on failure.
Found this during code review.
Fixes: 88078d98d1bb ("net: pskb_trim_rcsum() and CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are friends")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b336decab22158937975293aea79396525f92bb3 ]
syzbot reported an use-after-free involving sctp_id2asoc. Dmitry Vyukov
helped to root cause it and it is because of reading the asoc after it
was freed:
CPU 1 CPU 2
(working on socket 1) (working on socket 2)
sctp_association_destroy
sctp_id2asoc
spin lock
grab the asoc from idr
spin unlock
spin lock
remove asoc from idr
spin unlock
free(asoc)
if asoc->base.sk != sk ... [*]
This can only be hit if trying to fetch asocs from different sockets. As
we have a single IDR for all asocs, in all SCTP sockets, their id is
unique on the system. An application can try to send stuff on an id
that matches on another socket, and the if in [*] will protect from such
usage. But it didn't consider that as that asoc may belong to another
socket, it may be freed in parallel (read: under another socket lock).
We fix it by moving the checks in [*] into the protected region. This
fixes it because the asoc cannot be freed while the lock is held.
Reported-by: syzbot+c7dd55d7aec49d48e49a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b6168562c8ce2bd5a30e213021650422e08764dc ]
In ethtool_ioctl(), the ioctl command 'ethcmd' is checked through a switch
statement to see whether it is necessary to pre-process the ethtool
structure, because, as mentioned in the comment, the structure
ethtool_rxnfc is defined with padding. If yes, a user-space buffer 'rxnfc'
is allocated through compat_alloc_user_space(). One thing to note here is
that, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL, the size of the buffer 'rxnfc' is
partially determined by 'rule_cnt', which is actually acquired from the
user-space buffer 'compat_rxnfc', i.e., 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt', through
get_user(). After 'rxnfc' is allocated, the data in the original user-space
buffer 'compat_rxnfc' is then copied to 'rxnfc' through copy_in_user(),
including the 'rule_cnt' field. However, after this copy, no check is
re-enforced on 'rxnfc->rule_cnt'. So it is possible that a malicious user
race to change the value in the 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt' between these two
copies. Through this way, the attacker can bypass the previous check on
'rule_cnt' and inject malicious data. This can cause undefined behavior of
the kernel and introduce potential security risk.
This patch avoids the above issue via copying the value acquired by
get_user() to 'rxnfc->rule_cn', if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 38b4f18d56372e1e21771ab7b0357b853330186c ]
gred_change_table_def() takes a pointer to TCA_GRED_DPS attribute,
and expects it will be able to interpret its contents as
struct tc_gred_sopt. Pass the correct gred attribute, instead of
TCA_OPTIONS.
This bug meant the table definition could never be changed after
Qdisc was initialized (unless whatever TCA_OPTIONS contained both
passed netlink validation and was a valid struct tc_gred_sopt...).
Old behaviour:
$ ip link add type dummy
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
Now:
$ ip link add type dummy
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
gred setup vqs 4 default 0
Fixes: f62d6b936d ("[PKT_SCHED]: GRED: Use central VQ change procedure")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 4ba4c566ba8448a05e6257e0b98a21f1a0d55315 ]
The loop wants to skip previously dumped addresses, so loops until
current index >= saved index. If the message fills it wants to save
the index for the next address to dump - ie., the one that did not
fit in the current message.
Currently, it is incrementing the index counter before comparing to the
saved index, and then the saved index is off by 1 - it assumes the
current address is going to fit in the message.
Change the index handling to increment only after a succesful dump.
Fixes: 502a2ffd73 ("ipv6: convert idev_list to list macros")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ee1abcf689353f36d9322231b4320926096bdee0 ]
Commit a61bbcf28a ("[NET]: Store skb->timestamp as offset to a base
timestamp") introduces a neighbour control buffer and zeroes it out in
ndisc_rcv(), as ndisc_recv_ns() uses it.
Commit f2776ff047 ("[IPV6]: Fix address/interface handling in UDP and
DCCP, according to the scoping architecture.") introduces the usage of the
IPv6 control buffer in protocol error handlers (e.g. inet6_iif() in
present-day __udp6_lib_err()).
Now, with commit b94f1c0904 ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate
redirect, instead of rt6_redirect()."), we call protocol error handlers
from ndisc_redirect_rcv(), after the control buffer is already stolen and
some parts are already zeroed out. This implies that inet6_iif() on this
path will always return zero.
This gives unexpected results on UDP socket lookup in __udp6_lib_err(), as
we might actually need to match sockets for a given interface.
Instead of always claiming the control buffer in ndisc_rcv(), do that only
when needed.
Fixes: b94f1c0904 ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate redirect, instead of rt6_redirect().")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0fe5119e267f3e3d8ac206895f5922195ec55a8a upstream.
Recently a check was added which prevents marking of routers with zero
source address, but for IPv6 that cannot happen as the relevant RFCs
actually forbid such packets:
RFC 2710 (MLDv1):
"To be valid, the Query message MUST
come from a link-local IPv6 Source Address, be at least 24 octets
long, and have a correct MLD checksum."
Same goes for RFC 3810.
And also it can be seen as a requirement in ipv6_mc_check_mld_query()
which is used by the bridge to validate the message before processing
it. Thus any queries with :: source address won't be processed anyway.
So just remove the check for zero IPv6 source address from the query
processing function.
Fixes: 5a2de63fd1a5 ("bridge: do not add port to router list when receives query with source 0.0.0.0")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5a2de63fd1a59c30c02526d427bc014b98adf508 upstream.
Based on RFC 4541, 2.1.1. IGMP Forwarding Rules
The switch supporting IGMP snooping must maintain a list of
multicast routers and the ports on which they are attached. This
list can be constructed in any combination of the following ways:
a) This list should be built by the snooping switch sending
Multicast Router Solicitation messages as described in IGMP
Multicast Router Discovery [MRDISC]. It may also snoop
Multicast Router Advertisement messages sent by and to other
nodes.
b) The arrival port for IGMP Queries (sent by multicast routers)
where the source address is not 0.0.0.0.
We should not add the port to router list when receives query with source
0.0.0.0.
Reported-by: Ying Xu <yinxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a3c18422a4b4e108bcf6a2328f48867e1003fd95 ]
Socket must be held while under the protection of the l2tp lock; there
is no guarantee that sk remains valid after the read_unlock_bh() call.
Same issue for l2tp_ip and l2tp_ip6.
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c3483384ee511ee2af40b4076366cd82a6a47b86 ]
This patch should fix the issues seen with a recent fix to prevent
tunnel-in-tunnel frames from being generated with GRO. The fix itself is
correct for now as long as we do not add any devices that support
NETIF_F_GSO_GRE_CSUM. When such a device is added it could have the
potential to mess things up due to the fact that the outer transport header
points to the outer UDP header and not the GRE header as would be expected.
Fixes: fac8e0f579695 ("tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7f92083eb58f85ea114d97f65fcbe22be5b0468d ]
This is the same fix than commit a5d0dc810abf ("vti: flush x-netns xfrm
cache when vti interface is removed")
This patch fixes a refcnt problem when a x-netns vti6 interface is removed:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for vti6_test to become free. Usage count = 1
Here is a script to reproduce the problem:
ip link set dev ntfp2 up
ip addr add dev ntfp2 2001::1/64
ip link add vti6_test type vti6 local 2001::1 remote 2001::2 key 1
ip netns add secure
ip link set vti6_test netns secure
ip netns exec secure ip link set vti6_test up
ip netns exec secure ip link s lo up
ip netns exec secure ip addr add dev vti6_test 2003::1/64
ip -6 xfrm policy add dir out tmpl src 2001::1 dst 2001::2 proto esp \
mode tunnel mark 1
ip -6 xfrm policy add dir in tmpl src 2001::2 dst 2001::1 proto esp \
mode tunnel mark 1
ip xfrm state add src 2001::1 dst 2001::2 proto esp spi 1 mode tunnel \
enc des3_ede 0x112233445566778811223344556677881122334455667788 mark 1
ip xfrm state add src 2001::2 dst 2001::1 proto esp spi 1 mode tunnel \
enc des3_ede 0x112233445566778811223344556677881122334455667788 mark 1
ip netns exec secure ping6 -c 4 2003::2
ip netns del secure
CC: Lance Richardson <lrichard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Lance Richardson <lrichard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2b06cdf3e688b98fcc9945873b5d42792bd4eee0 ]
If a socket has a valid dst cache, then xfrm_lookup_route will get
skipped. However, the cache is not invalidated when applying policy to a
socket (i.e. IPV6_XFRM_POLICY). The result is that new policies are
sometimes ignored on those sockets. (Note: This was broken for IPv4 and
IPv6 at different times.)
This can be demonstrated like so,
1. Create UDP socket.
2. connect() the socket.
3. Apply an outbound XFRM policy to the socket. (setsockopt)
4. send() data on the socket.
Packets will continue to be sent in the clear instead of matching an
xfrm or returning a no-match error (EAGAIN). This affects calls to
send() and not sendto().
Invalidating the sk_dst_cache is necessary to correctly apply xfrm
policies. Since we do this in xfrm_user_policy(), the sk_lock was
already acquired in either do_ip_setsockopt() or do_ipv6_setsockopt(),
and we may call __sk_dst_reset().
Performance impact should be negligible, since this code is only called
when changing xfrm policy, and only affects the socket in question.
Fixes: 00bc0ef5880d ("ipv6: Skip XFRM lookup if dst_entry in socket cache is valid")
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/517555
Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/418659
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Basseri <misterikkit@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e3c42b61ff813921ba58cfc0019e3fd63f651190 ]
Verify that the caller-provided sockaddr structure is large enough to
contain the sa_family field, before accessing it in bind() and connect()
handlers of the AF_IUCV socket. Since neither syscall enforces a minimum
size of the corresponding memory region, very short sockaddrs (zero or
one byte long) result in operating on uninitialized memory while
referencing .sa_family.
Fixes: 52a82e23b9f2 ("af_iucv: Validate socket address length in iucv_sock_bind()")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com>
[jwi: removed unneeded null-check for addr]
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3575dbf2cbbc8e598f17ec441aed526dbea0e1bd ]
Remove a write-only stack variable from unix_attach_fds(). This is a
left-over from the security fix in:
commit 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593
Author: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sun Jan 10 07:54:56 2016 +0100
unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 24f33e64fcd0d50a4b1a8e5b41bd0257aa66b0e8 ]
Core regulatory hints didn't set wiphy_idx to WIPHY_IDX_INVALID. Since
the regulatory request is zeroed, wiphy_idx was always implicitly set to
0. This resulted in updating only phy #0.
Fix that.
Fixes: 806a9e3967 ("cfg80211: make regulatory_request use wiphy_idx instead of wiphy")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
[add fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8682250b3c1b75a45feb7452bc413d004cfe3778 ]
If a frame is dropped for any reason, mac80211 wouldn't report the TX
status back to user space.
As the user space may rely on the TX_STATUS to kick its state
machines, resends etc, it's better to just report this frame as not
acked instead.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 215ab0f021c9fea3c18b75e7d522400ee6a49990 ]
After commit d6990976af7c5d8f55903bfb4289b6fb030bf754 ("vti6: fix PMTU caching
and reporting on xmit"), some too big skbs might be potentially passed down to
__xfrm6_output, causing it to fail to transmit but not free the skb, causing a
leak of skb, and consequentially a leak of dst references.
After running pmtu.sh, that shows as failure to unregister devices in a namespace:
[ 311.397671] unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth_b to become free. Usage count = 1
The fix is to call kfree_skb in case of transmit failures.
Fixes: dd767856a3 ("xfrm6: Don't call icmpv6_send on local error")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 07bf7908950a8b14e81aa1807e3c667eab39287a ]
We don't validate the address prefix lengths in the xfrm
selector we got from userspace. This can lead to undefined
behaviour in the address matching functions if the prefix
is too big for the given address family. Fix this by checking
the prefixes and refuse SA/policy insertation when a prefix
is invalid.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Air Icy <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0e1d6eca5113858ed2caea61a5adc03c595f6096 ]
We have an impressive number of syzkaller bugs that are linked
to the fact that syzbot was able to create a networking device
with millions of TX (or RX) queues.
Let's limit the number of RX/TX queues to 4096, this really should
cover all known cases.
A separate patch will add various cond_resched() in the loops
handling sysfs entries at device creation and dismantle.
Tested:
lpaa6:~# ip link add gre-4097 numtxqueues 4097 numrxqueues 4097 type ip6gretap
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
lpaa6:~# time ip link add gre-4096 numtxqueues 4096 numrxqueues 4096 type ip6gretap
real 0m0.180s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.107s
Fixes: 76ff5cc919 ("rtnl: allow to specify number of rx and tx queues on device creation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f88b4c01b97e09535505cf3c327fdbce55c27f00 ]
netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() assumes that if it finds the
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR attribute, it must also have the
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK attribute as well. However, this is
not necessarily the case as the current checks in
netlbl_unlabel_staticadd() and friends are not sufficent to
enforce this.
If passed a netlink message with NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR, and NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK attributes,
these functions will all call netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() which
will then attempt dereference NULL when fetching the non-existent
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK attribute:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0
Process unlab (pid: 31762, stack limit = 0xffffff80502d8000)
Call trace:
netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get+0x44/0xd8
netlbl_unlabel_staticremovedef+0x98/0xe0
genl_rcv_msg+0x354/0x388
netlink_rcv_skb+0xac/0x118
genl_rcv+0x34/0x48
netlink_unicast+0x158/0x1f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x32c/0x338
sock_sendmsg+0x44/0x60
___sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x2a8
__sys_sendmsg+0x64/0xb4
SyS_sendmsg+0x34/0x4c
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
Code: 51001149 7100113f 540000a0 f9401508 (79400108)
---[ end trace f6438a488e737143 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 86f9bd1ff61c413a2a251fa736463295e4e24733 ]
The backend handling for /proc/net/if_inet6 in addrconf.c doesn't properly
handle starting/stopping the iteration. The problem is that at some point
during the iteration, an overflow is detected and the process is
subsequently stopped. The item being shown via seq_printf() when the
overflow occurs is not actually shown, though. When start() is
subsequently called to resume iterating, it returns the next item, and
thus the item that was being processed when the overflow occurred never
gets printed.
Alter the meaning of the private data member "offset". Currently, when it
is not 0 (which only happens at the very beginning), "offset" represents
the next hlist item to be printed. After this change, "offset" always
represents the current item.
This is also consistent with the private data member "bucket", which
represents the current bucket, and also the use of "pos" as defined in
seq_file.txt:
The pos passed to start() will always be either zero, or the most
recent pos used in the previous session.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Barnhill <0xeffeff@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit af7d6cce53694a88d6a1bb60c9a239a6a5144459 ]
Since commit 5aad1de5ea ("ipv4: use separate genid for next hop
exceptions"), exceptions get deprecated separately from cached
routes. In particular, administrative changes don't clear PMTU anymore.
As Stefano described in commit e9fa1495d738 ("ipv6: Reflect MTU changes
on PMTU of exceptions for MTU-less routes"), the PMTU discovered before
the local MTU change can become stale:
- if the local MTU is now lower than the PMTU, that PMTU is now
incorrect
- if the local MTU was the lowest value in the path, and is increased,
we might discover a higher PMTU
Similarly to what commit e9fa1495d738 did for IPv6, update PMTU in those
cases.
If the exception was locked, the discovered PMTU was smaller than the
minimal accepted PMTU. In that case, if the new local MTU is smaller
than the current PMTU, let PMTU discovery figure out if locking of the
exception is still needed.
To do this, we need to know the old link MTU in the NETDEV_CHANGEMTU
notifier. By the time the notifier is called, dev->mtu has been
changed. This patch adds the old MTU as additional information in the
notifier structure, and a new call_netdevice_notifiers_u32() function.
Fixes: 5aad1de5ea ("ipv4: use separate genid for next hop exceptions")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 64199fc0a46ba211362472f7f942f900af9492fd ]
Caching ip_hdr(skb) before a call to pskb_may_pull() is buggy,
do not do it.
Fixes: 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ccfec9e5cb2d48df5a955b7bf47f7782157d3bc2]
Cong noted that we need the same checks introduced by commit 76c0ddd8c3a6
("ip6_tunnel: be careful when accessing the inner header")
even for ipv4 tunnels.
Fixes: c544193214 ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.")
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c953d63548207a085abcb12a15fefc8a11ffdf0a upstream.
The info->target comes from userspace and it would be used directly.
So we need to add the sanity check to make sure it is a valid standard
target, although the ebtables tool has already checked it. Kernel needs
to validate anything coming from userspace.
If the target is set as an evil value, it would break the ebtables
and cause a panic. Because the non-standard target is treated as one
offset.
Now add one helper function ebt_invalid_target, and we would replace
the macro INVALID_TARGET later.
Signed-off-by: Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Loic <hackurx@opensec.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 58152ecbbcc6a0ce7fddd5bf5f6ee535834ece0c ]
In case skb in out_or_order_queue is the result of
multiple skbs coalescing, we would like to get a proper gso_segs
counter tracking, so that future tcp_drop() can report an accurate
number.
I chose to not implement this tracking for skbs in receive queue,
since they are not dropped, unless socket is disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
