When commit be6d3e56a6 "introduce new LSM hooks
where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(),
only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed.
But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor.
Thus, let's remove these arguments.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Allow mount options to be stored in the superblock. Also add default
mount option bits for nobarrier, block_validity, discard, and nodelalloc.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
The ->sync_fs() super op only needs to wait if wait is true. Otherwise,
just get some dirty cap writeback started.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Specify the supported/required feature bits in super.h client code instead
of using the definitions from the shared kernel/userspace headers (which
will go away shortly).
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
When we get a cap EXPORT message, make sure we are connected to all export
targets to ensure we can handle the matching IMPORT.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
If an MDS we are talking to may have failed, we need to open sessions to
its potential export targets to ensure that any in-progress migration that
may have involved some of our caps is properly handled.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Caps related accounting is now being done per mds client instead
of just being global. This prepares ground work for a later revision
of the caps preallocated reservation list.
Signed-off-by: Yehuda Sadeh <yehuda@hq.newdream.net>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
If we have a capsnap but no auth cap (e.g. because it is migrating to
another mds), bail out and do nothing for now. Do NOT remove the capsnap
from the flush list.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
The caps revocation should either initiate writeback, invalidateion, or
call check_caps to ack or do the dirty work. The primary question is
whether we can get away with only checking the auth cap or whether all
caps need to be checked.
The old code was doing...something else. At the very least, revocations
from non-auth MDSs could break by triggering the "check auth cap only"
case.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
If the file mode is marked as "lazy," perform cached/buffered reads when
the caps permit it. Adjust the rdcache_gen and invalidation logic
accordingly so that we manage our cache based on the FILE_CACHE -or-
FILE_LAZYIO cap bits.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
If we have marked a file as "lazy" (using the ceph ioctl), perform buffered
writes when the MDS caps allow it.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Allow an application to mark a file descriptor for lazy file consistency
semantics, allowing buffered reads and writes when multiple clients are
accessing the same file.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Also clean up the file flags -> file mode -> wanted caps functions while
we're at it. This resyncs this file with userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
nfs_commit_inode() needs to be defined irrespectively of whether or not
we are supporting NFSv3 and NFSv4.
Allow the compiler to optimise away code in the NFSv2-only case by
converting it into an inlined stub function.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Perform full sync procedure so that any delayed allocation blocks are
allocated so quota will be consistent.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Commit 6b0310fbf0 caused a regression resulting in deadlocks
when freezing a filesystem which had active IO; the vfs_check_frozen
level (SB_FREEZE_WRITE) did not let the freeze-related IO syncing
through. Duh.
Changing the test to FREEZE_TRANS should let the normal freeze
syncing get through the fs, but still block any transactions from
starting once the fs is completely frozen.
I tested this by running fsstress in the background while periodically
snapshotting the fs and running fsck on the result. I ran into
occasional deadlocks, but different ones. I think this is a
fine fix for the problem at hand, and the other deadlocky things
will need more investigation.
Reported-by: Phillip Susi <psusi@cfl.rr.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
* 'bugfixes' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/nfs-2.6:
NFS: Ensure that writepage respects the nonblock flag
NFS: kswapd must not block in nfs_release_page
nfs: include space for the NUL in root path
Remove the __exit mark from cifs_exit_dns_resolver() as it's called by the
module init routine in case of error, and so may have been discarded during
linkage.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16056
If other processes are blocked waiting for kswapd to free up some memory so
that they can make progress, then we cannot allow kswapd to block on those
processes.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
In root_nfs_name() it does the following:
if (strlen(buf) + strlen(cp) > NFS_MAXPATHLEN) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Root-NFS: Pathname for remote directory too long.\n");
return -1;
}
sprintf(nfs_export_path, buf, cp);
In the original code if (strlen(buf) + strlen(cp) == NFS_MAXPATHLEN)
then the sprintf() would lead to an overflow. Generally the rest of the
code assumes that the path can have NFS_MAXPATHLEN (1024) characters and
a NUL terminator so the fix is to add space to the nfs_export_path[]
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
flock locks want to be labelled using the process pid, while posix locks
want to be labelled using the fl_owner.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This is needed by NFSv4.0 servers in order to keep the number of locking
stateids at a manageable level.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Christoph points that the NFSv2/v3 callers know which case they want
here, so we may as well just call the file=NULL case directly instead of
making this conditional.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
trunc_start() in bmap.c incorrectly uses sizeof(struct gfs2_inode) instead of
sizeof(struct gfs2_dinode).
Signed-off-by: Abhi Das <adas@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Fixes at least one real minor bug: the nfs4 recovery dir sysctl
would not return its status properly.
Also I finished Al's 1e41568d73 ("Take ima_path_check() in nfsd
past dentry_open() in nfsd_open()") commit, it moved the IMA
code, but left the old path initializer in there.
The rest is just dead code removed I think, although I was not
fully sure about the "is_borc" stuff. Some more review
would be still good.
Found by gcc 4.6's new warnings.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
The vfs doesn't really allow us to "upgrade" a file descriptor from
read-only to read-write, and our attempt to do so in nfs4_upgrade_open
is ugly and incomplete.
Move to a different scheme where we keep multiple opens, shared between
open stateid's, in the nfs4_file struct. Each file will be opened at
most 3 times (for read, write, and read-write), and those opens will be
shared between all clients and openers. On upgrade we will do another
open if necessary instead of attempting to upgrade an existing open.
We keep count of the number of readers and writers so we know when to
close the shared files.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
It's possible for get_task_cred() as it currently stands to 'corrupt' a set of
credentials by incrementing their usage count after their replacement by the
task being accessed.
What happens is that get_task_cred() can race with commit_creds():
TASK_1 TASK_2 RCU_CLEANER
-->get_task_cred(TASK_2)
rcu_read_lock()
__cred = __task_cred(TASK_2)
-->commit_creds()
old_cred = TASK_2->real_cred
TASK_2->real_cred = ...
put_cred(old_cred)
call_rcu(old_cred)
[__cred->usage == 0]
get_cred(__cred)
[__cred->usage == 1]
rcu_read_unlock()
-->put_cred_rcu()
[__cred->usage == 1]
panic()
However, since a tasks credentials are generally not changed very often, we can
reasonably make use of a loop involving reading the creds pointer and using
atomic_inc_not_zero() to attempt to increment it if it hasn't already hit zero.
If successful, we can safely return the credentials in the knowledge that, even
if the task we're accessing has released them, they haven't gone to the RCU
cleanup code.
We then change task_state() in procfs to use get_task_cred() rather than
calling get_cred() on the result of __task_cred(), as that suffers from the
same problem.
Without this change, a BUG_ON in __put_cred() or in put_cred_rcu() can be
tripped when it is noticed that the usage count is not zero as it ought to be,
for example:
kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:168!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
CPU 0
Pid: 2436, comm: master Not tainted 2.6.33.3-85.fc13.x86_64 #1 0HR330/OptiPlex
745
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81069881>] [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP: 0018:ffff88019e7e9eb8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880161514480 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff880140c690c0 RDI: ffff880140c690c0
RBP: ffff88019e7e9eb8 R08: 00000000000000d0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff880140c690c0
R13: ffff88019e77aea0 R14: 00007fff336b0a5c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f12f50d97c0(0000) GS:ffff880007400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8f461bc000 CR3: 00000001b26ce000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process master (pid: 2436, threadinfo ffff88019e7e8000, task ffff88019e77aea0)
Stack:
ffff88019e7e9ec8 ffffffff810698cd ffff88019e7e9ef8 ffffffff81069b45
<0> ffff880161514180 ffff880161514480 ffff880161514180 0000000000000000
<0> ffff88019e7e9f28 ffffffff8106aace 0000000000000001 0000000000000246
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810698cd>] put_cred+0x13/0x15
[<ffffffff81069b45>] commit_creds+0x16b/0x175
[<ffffffff8106aace>] set_current_groups+0x47/0x4e
[<ffffffff8106ac89>] sys_setgroups+0xf6/0x105
[<ffffffff81009b02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 48 8d 71 ff e8 7e 4e 15 00 85 c0 78 0b 8b 75 ec 48 89 df e8 ef 4a 15 00
48 83 c4 18 5b c9 c3 55 8b 07 8b 07 48 89 e5 85 c0 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 65 48 8b
04 25 00 cc 00 00 48 3b b8 58 04 00 00 75
RIP [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP <ffff88019e7e9eb8>
---[ end trace df391256a100ebdd ]---
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It is legal to perform a write using the lock stateid that was
originally associated with a read lock, or with a file that was
originally opened for read, but has since been upgraded.
So, when checking the openmode, check the mode associated with the
open stateid from which the lock was derived.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
The delegation code mostly pretends to support either read or write
delegations. However, correct support for write delegations would
require, for example, breaking of delegations (and/or implementation of
cb_getattr) on stat. Currently all that stops us from handing out
delegations is a subtle reference-counting issue.
Avoid confusion by adding an earlier check that explicitly refuses write
delegations.
For now, though, I'm not going so far as to rip out existing
half-support for write delegations, in case we get around to using that
soon.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
There were some error paths in ext4_delete_inode() which was not
dropping the inode from the orphan list. This could lead to a BUG_ON
on umount when the orphan list is discovered to be non-empty.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
