android_kernel_oneplus_msm8998/security
Al Viro f412aeb916 missing barriers in some of unix_sock ->addr and ->path accesses
[ Upstream commit ae3b564179bfd06f32d051b9e5d72ce4b2a07c37 ]

Several u->addr and u->path users are not holding any locks in
common with unix_bind().  unix_state_lock() is useless for those
purposes.

u->addr is assign-once and *(u->addr) is fully set up by the time
we set u->addr (all under unix_table_lock).  u->path is also
set in the same critical area, also before setting u->addr, and
any unix_sock with ->path filled will have non-NULL ->addr.

So setting ->addr with smp_store_release() is all we need for those
"lockless" users - just have them fetch ->addr with smp_load_acquire()
and don't even bother looking at ->path if they see NULL ->addr.

Users of ->addr and ->path fall into several classes now:
    1) ones that do smp_load_acquire(u->addr) and access *(u->addr)
and u->path only if smp_load_acquire() has returned non-NULL.
    2) places holding unix_table_lock.  These are guaranteed that
*(u->addr) is seen fully initialized.  If unix_sock is in one of the
"bound" chains, so's ->path.
    3) unix_sock_destructor() using ->addr is safe.  All places
that set u->addr are guaranteed to have seen all stores *(u->addr)
while holding a reference to u and unix_sock_destructor() is called
when (atomic) refcount hits zero.
    4) unix_release_sock() using ->path is safe.  unix_bind()
is serialized wrt unix_release() (normally - by struct file
refcount), and for the instances that had ->path set by unix_bind()
unix_release_sock() comes from unix_release(), so they are fine.
Instances that had it set in unix_stream_connect() either end up
attached to a socket (in unix_accept()), in which case the call
chain to unix_release_sock() and serialization are the same as in
the previous case, or they never get accept'ed and unix_release_sock()
is called when the listener is shut down and its queue gets purged.
In that case the listener's queue lock provides the barriers needed -
unix_stream_connect() shoves our unix_sock into listener's queue
under that lock right after having set ->path and eventual
unix_release_sock() caller picks them from that queue under the
same lock right before calling unix_release_sock().
    5) unix_find_other() use of ->path is pointless, but safe -
it happens with successful lookup by (abstract) name, so ->path.dentry
is guaranteed to be NULL there.

earlier-variant-reviewed-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-03-23 08:44:31 +01:00
..
apparmor apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly 2018-03-22 09:23:24 +01:00
integrity ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count' 2018-11-21 09:27:35 +01:00
keys KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time 2019-03-23 08:44:29 +01:00
selinux selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy 2019-01-26 09:42:51 +01:00
smack smack: fix access permissions for keyring 2019-02-20 10:13:07 +01:00
tomoyo mm: replace get_user_pages() write/force parameters with gup_flags 2018-12-17 21:55:16 +01:00
yama Yama: Check for pid death before checking ancestry 2019-01-26 09:42:50 +01:00
commoncap.c ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks 2016-02-25 12:01:16 -08:00
device_cgroup.c security/device_cgroup: Fix RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() condition 2015-09-03 18:13:10 -07:00
inode.c Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2015-07-04 19:36:06 -07:00
Kconfig KPTI: Rename to PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION 2018-01-05 15:44:26 +01:00
lsm_audit.c missing barriers in some of unix_sock ->addr and ->path accesses 2019-03-23 08:44:31 +01:00
Makefile LSM: Switch to lists of hooks 2015-05-12 15:00:41 +10:00
min_addr.c
security.c LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on free 2019-01-26 09:42:50 +01:00