android_kernel_oneplus_msm8998/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
Greg Kroah-Hartman f057ff9377 This is the 4.4.148 stable release
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Merge 4.4.148 into android-4.4

Changes in 4.4.148
	ext4: fix check to prevent initializing reserved inodes
	tpm: fix race condition in tpm_common_write()
	ipv4+ipv6: Make INET*_ESP select CRYPTO_ECHAINIV
	fork: unconditionally clear stack on fork
	parisc: Enable CONFIG_MLONGCALLS by default
	parisc: Define mb() and add memory barriers to assembler unlock sequences
	xen/netfront: don't cache skb_shinfo()
	ACPI / LPSS: Add missing prv_offset setting for byt/cht PWM devices
	scsi: sr: Avoid that opening a CD-ROM hangs with runtime power management enabled
	root dentries need RCU-delayed freeing
	fix mntput/mntput race
	fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race
	IB/core: Make testing MR flags for writability a static inline function
	IB/mlx4: Mark user MR as writable if actual virtual memory is writable
	IB/ocrdma: fix out of bounds access to local buffer
	ARM: dts: imx6sx: fix irq for pcie bridge
	x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
	x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
	kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages
	x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT
	x86/mm: Move swap offset/type up in PTE to work around erratum
	x86/mm: Fix swap entry comment and macro
	mm: x86: move _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY from bit 7 to bit 1
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf
	mm: Add vm_insert_pfn_prot()
	mm: fix cache mode tracking in vm_insert_mixed()
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2
	x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit
	x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support.
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
	x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
	x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up CPU feature flags
	x86/init: fix build with CONFIG_SWAP=n
	x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures
	Linux 4.4.148

Change-Id: I83c857d9d9d74ee47e61d15eb411f276f057ba3d
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
2018-08-15 18:20:41 +02:00

144 lines
3.6 KiB
C

/*
* Flexible mmap layout support
*
* Based on code by Ingo Molnar and Andi Kleen, copyrighted
* as follows:
*
* Copyright 2003-2009 Red Hat Inc.
* All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Andi Kleen, SUSE Labs.
* Copyright 2007 Jiri Kosina, SUSE Labs.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
struct va_alignment __read_mostly va_align = {
.flags = -1,
};
static unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(void)
{
unsigned long max = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
max = ((-1UL) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return max;
}
/*
* Top of mmap area (just below the process stack).
*
* Leave an at least ~128 MB hole with possible stack randomization.
*/
#define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024UL + stack_maxrandom_size())
#define MAX_GAP (TASK_SIZE/6*5)
static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
{
if (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT)
return 1;
if (rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) == RLIM_INFINITY)
return 1;
return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
}
unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
{
unsigned long rnd;
if (mmap_is_ia32())
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1);
#else
rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
#endif
else
rnd = get_random_long() & ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1);
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
{
unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
if (gap < MIN_GAP)
gap = MIN_GAP;
else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
gap = MAX_GAP;
return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - rnd);
}
/*
* This function, called very early during the creation of a new
* process VM image, sets up which VM layout function to use:
*/
void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
random_factor = arch_mmap_rnd();
mm->mmap_legacy_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor;
if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
mm->mmap_base = mm->mmap_legacy_base;
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
} else {
mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor);
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
}
}
const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MPX)
return "[mpx]";
return NULL;
}
/*
* Only allow root to set high MMIO mappings to PROT_NONE.
* This prevents an unpriv. user to set them to PROT_NONE and invert
* them, then pointing to valid memory for L1TF speculation.
*
* Note: for locked down kernels may want to disable the root override.
*/
bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
return true;
if (!__pte_needs_invert(pgprot_val(prot)))
return true;
/* If it's real memory always allow */
if (pfn_valid(pfn))
return true;
if (pfn > l1tf_pfn_limit() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return false;
return true;
}