android_kernel_oneplus_msm8998/arch/x86/entry
Richard Fellner 8a43ddfb93 KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation
This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.

More information about the patch can be found on:

        https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER

From: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
From: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
X-Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=149390087310405&w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5

To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
To: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: <clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de>

After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).

With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.

If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!

Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)

[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

[patch based also on
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IAIK/KAISER/master/KAISER/0001-KAISER-Kernel-Address-Isolation.patch]

Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
Signed-off-by: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05 15:44:23 +01:00
..
syscalls x86/syscalls/64: Add compat_sys_keyctl for 32-bit userspace 2016-08-16 09:30:50 +02:00
vdso x86/vdso: Ensure vdso32_enabled gets set to valid values only 2017-04-21 09:30:05 +02:00
vsyscall x86/entry/vsyscall: Fix undefined symbol warning 2015-09-21 09:56:59 +02:00
calling.h x86/asm/entry/64: Save all regs on interrupt entry 2015-07-07 10:59:07 +02:00
common.c x86/entry/compat: Keep TS_COMPAT set during signal delivery 2016-04-12 09:08:32 -07:00
entry_32.S ftrace/x86_32: Set ftrace_stub to weak to prevent gcc from using short jumps to it 2017-01-09 08:07:50 +01:00
entry_64.S KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation 2018-01-05 15:44:23 +01:00
entry_64_compat.S KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation 2018-01-05 15:44:23 +01:00
Makefile x86/entry: Move C entry and exit code to arch/x86/entry/common.c 2015-07-07 10:59:05 +02:00
syscall_32.c x86/syscalls: Give sys_call_ptr_t a useful type 2015-10-09 09:41:08 +02:00
syscall_64.c x86/syscalls: Give sys_call_ptr_t a useful type 2015-10-09 09:41:08 +02:00
thunk_32.S Merge branch 'x86-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip 2015-06-22 17:59:09 -07:00
thunk_64.S Merge branch 'x86-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip 2015-06-22 17:59:09 -07:00