Jann Horn 1450803288 proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top ... This prevents stacking filesystems (ecryptfs and overlayfs) from using procfs as lower filesystem. There is too much magic going on inside procfs, and there is no good reason to stack stuff on top of procfs. (For example, procfs does access checks in VFS open handlers, and ecryptfs by design calls open handlers from a kernel thread that doesn't drop privileges or so.) Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dennis Cagle <d-cagle@codeaurora.org> Git-repo: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git Git-commit: e54ad7f1ee263ffa5a2de9c609d58dfa27b21cd9 (cherry picked from commit e54ad7f1ee263ffa5a2de9c609d58dfa27b21cd9) Change-Id: I1bf47b15e8201d3a049a04e1b054c664d9be9bea		2016-09-13 14:30:57 -07:00
..
array.c	ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks	2016-02-25 12:01:16 -08:00
base.c	Merge "Revert "Merge remote-tracking branch 'msm-4.4/tmp-510d0a3f' into msm-4.4""	2016-08-29 00:49:25 -07:00
cmdline.c
consoles.c
cpuinfo.c
devices.c
fd.c
fd.h
generic.c
inode.c
internal.h	mm: Per process reclaim	2016-06-22 14:43:06 -07:00
interrupts.c
Kconfig
kcore.c
kmsg.c
loadavg.c
Makefile
meminfo.c
namespaces.c	ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks	2016-02-25 12:01:16 -08:00
nommu.c
page.c
proc_net.c
proc_sysctl.c
proc_tty.c
root.c	proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top	2016-09-13 14:30:57 -07:00
self.c
softirqs.c
stat.c
task_mmu.c	Revert "Merge remote-tracking branch 'msm-4.4/tmp-510d0a3f' into msm-4.4"	2016-08-26 14:34:05 -07:00
task_nommu.c
thread_self.c
uptime.c
version.c
vmcore.c