Pull f2fs update from Jaegeuk Kim: "In this round, we've mainly focused on performance tuning and critical bug fixes occurred in low-end devices. Sheng Yong introduced lost_found feature to keep missing files during recovery instead of thrashing them. We're preparing coming fsverity implementation. And, we've got more features to communicate with users for better performance. In low-end devices, some memory-related issues were fixed, and subtle race condtions and corner cases were addressed as well. Enhancements: - large nat bitmaps for more free node ids - add three block allocation policies to pass down write hints given by user - expose extension list to user and introduce hot file extension - tune small devices seamlessly for low-end devices - set readdir_ra by default - give more resources under gc_urgent mode regarding to discard and cleaning - introduce fsync_mode to enforce posix or not - nowait aio support - add lost_found feature to keep dangling inodes - reserve bits for future fsverity feature - add test_dummy_encryption for FBE Bug fixes: - don't use highmem for dentry pages - align memory boundary for bitops - truncate preallocated blocks in write errors - guarantee i_times on fsync call - clear CP_TRIMMED_FLAG correctly - prevent node chain loop during recovery - avoid data race between atomic write and background cleaning - avoid unnecessary selinux violation warnings on resgid option - GFP_NOFS to avoid deadlock in quota and read paths - fix f2fs_skip_inode_update to allow i_size recovery In addition to the above, there are several minor bug fixes and clean-ups" Cherry-pick from origin/upstream-f2fs-stable-linux-4.4.y:42bf67fc54
f2fs: remain written times to update inode during fsync6cb5aa02bf
f2fs: make assignment of t->dentry_bitmap more readablea8d07f1f9c
f2fs: truncate preallocated blocks in error case86444d6006
f2fs: fix a wrong condition in f2fs_skip_inode_updatedb2188a687
f2fs: reserve bits for fs-verityee2e74b3f0
f2fs: Add a segment type check in inplace write0192e0a450
f2fs: no need to initialize zero value for GFP_F2FS_ZERO49338842e9
f2fs: don't track new nat entry in nat setd6a69d5e65
f2fs: clean up with F2FS_BLK_ALIGN2c8834a7a2
f2fs: check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a bio6ab573a9d9
f2fs: Set GF_NOFS in read_cache_page_gfp while doing f2fs_quota_read7419dcb8be
f2fs: introduce a new mount option test_dummy_encryption9321e22c03
f2fs: introduce F2FS_FEATURE_LOST_FOUND feature8a57196158
f2fs: release locks before return in f2fs_ioc_gc_range()739ace131c
f2fs: align memory boundary for bitops4c55abe4f8
f2fs: remove unneeded set_cold_node()30654507e0
f2fs: add nowait aio supportd909e94106
f2fs: wrap all options with f2fs_sb_info.mount_opt5738be52b3
f2fs: Don't overwrite all types of node to keep node chain0bdeb167c8
f2fs: introduce mount option for fsync mode6bc490f0ee
f2fs: fix to restore old mount option in ->remount_fs0c9c3e0344
f2fs: wrap sb_rdonly with f2fs_readonly6c6611223a
f2fs: avoid selinux denial on CAP_SYS_RESOURCE076a6f32fe
f2fs: support hot file extension58edcdbca6
f2fs: fix to avoid race in between atomic write and background GC1e0aeb0af9
f2fs: do gc in greedy mode for whole range if gc_urgent mode is set10b2d001d6
f2fs: issue discard aggressively in the gc_urgent modea5052f32b9
f2fs: set readdir_ra by default1aa536a624
f2fs: add auto tuning for small devices0ffdffc8f1
f2fs: add mount option for segment allocation policyb798298912
f2fs: don't stop GC if GC is contended766d232169
f2fs: expose extension_list sysfs entry98b329de50
f2fs: fix to set KEEP_SIZE bit in f2fs_zero_range4d409fa334
f2fs: introduce sb_lock to make encrypt pwsalt update exclusive1f6bac14c1
f2fs: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'p'946aefc754
f2fs: flush cp pack except cp pack 2 page at firste5081a52ac
f2fs: clean up f2fs_sb_has_xxx functionsa292477154
f2fs: remove redundant check of page type when submit bio190e64a819
f2fs: fix to handle looped node chain during recovery889d980876
f2fs: handle quota for orphan inodes92b12bb1a2
f2fs: support passing down write hints to block layer with F2FS policy22fa74c2b0
f2fs: support passing down write hints given by users to block layer180900373e
f2fs: fix to clear CP_TRIMMED_FLAG0671fae134
f2fs: support large nat bitmapeceb943d5d
f2fs: fix to check extent cache in f2fs_drop_extent_tree2e2a339c98
f2fs: restrict inline_xattr_size configuration41dda11641
f2fs: fix heap mode to reset it back39575737bb
f2fs: fix potential corruption in area before F2FS_SUPER_OFFSET7e0e7995ee
fscrypt: fix build with pre-4.6 gcc versions31d3279a4f
fscrypt: fix up fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() for internal use82bec88856
fscrypt: define fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer() to be for presented names168a907828
fscrypt: calculate NUL-padding length in one place only042ae9f4cf
fscrypt: move fscrypt_symlink_data to fscrypt_private.hf9550c24c2
fscrypt: remove fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk()7ac4756a24
f2fs: switch to fscrypt_get_symlink()6b76f58e24
f2fs: switch to fscrypt ->symlink() helper functionsfd457d2c4e
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_get_symlink()a1cdacb7ae
fscrypt: new helper functions for ->symlink()7f43602f4d
fscrypt: trim down fscrypt.h includesd9cadc11bd
fscrypt: move fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot() to fs/crypto/fname.ce6fe930580
fscrypt: move fscrypt_valid_enc_modes() to fscrypt_private.hefefa434f4
fscrypt: move fscrypt_operations declaration to fscrypt_supp.h7ed178bc8a
fscrypt: split fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled() into supp/notsupp versions3f16e09dad
fscrypt: move fscrypt_ctx declaration to fscrypt_supp.h8216a0b51a
fscrypt: move fscrypt_info_cachep declaration to fscrypt_private.hdfe0b3b1b6
fscrypt: move fscrypt_control_page() to supp/notsupp headers3a2c791778
fscrypt: move fscrypt_has_encryption_key() to supp/notsupp headers Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@google.com>
412 lines
11 KiB
C
412 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* This contains functions for filename crypto management
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility
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*
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* Written by Uday Savagaonkar, 2014.
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* Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
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*
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* This has not yet undergone a rigorous security audit.
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*/
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include "fscrypt_private.h"
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static inline bool fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(const struct qstr *str)
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{
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if (str->len == 1 && str->name[0] == '.')
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return true;
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if (str->len == 2 && str->name[0] == '.' && str->name[1] == '.')
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* fname_encrypt() - encrypt a filename
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*
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* The output buffer must be at least as large as the input buffer.
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* Any extra space is filled with NUL padding before encryption.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
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u8 *out, unsigned int olen)
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{
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struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
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DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
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struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = inode->i_crypt_info->ci_ctfm;
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int res = 0;
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char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
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struct scatterlist sg;
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/*
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* Copy the filename to the output buffer for encrypting in-place and
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* pad it with the needed number of NUL bytes.
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*/
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if (WARN_ON(olen < iname->len))
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return -ENOBUFS;
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memcpy(out, iname->name, iname->len);
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memset(out + iname->len, 0, olen - iname->len);
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/* Initialize the IV */
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memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* Set up the encryption request */
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req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
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if (!req) {
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printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
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"%s: skcipher_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
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CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
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crypto_req_done, &wait);
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sg_init_one(&sg, out, olen);
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skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, olen, iv);
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/* Do the encryption */
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res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
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skcipher_request_free(req);
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if (res < 0) {
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printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
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"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
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return res;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* fname_decrypt() - decrypt a filename
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*
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* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
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const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
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struct fscrypt_str *oname)
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{
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struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
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DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
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struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
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struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
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struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
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int res = 0;
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char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
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unsigned lim;
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lim = inode->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(inode);
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if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > lim)
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return -EIO;
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/* Allocate request */
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req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
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if (!req) {
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printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
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"%s: crypto_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
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CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
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crypto_req_done, &wait);
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/* Initialize IV */
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memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* Create decryption request */
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sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len);
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sg_init_one(&dst_sg, oname->name, oname->len);
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skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, iv);
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res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
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skcipher_request_free(req);
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if (res < 0) {
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printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
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"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
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return res;
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}
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oname->len = strnlen(oname->name, iname->len);
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return 0;
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}
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static const char *lookup_table =
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"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+,";
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#define BASE64_CHARS(nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3)
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/**
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* digest_encode() -
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*
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* Encodes the input digest using characters from the set [a-zA-Z0-9_+].
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* The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string.
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*/
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static int digest_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
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{
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int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
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char *cp = dst;
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while (i < len) {
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ac += (((unsigned char) src[i]) << bits);
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bits += 8;
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do {
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*cp++ = lookup_table[ac & 0x3f];
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ac >>= 6;
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bits -= 6;
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} while (bits >= 6);
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i++;
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}
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if (bits)
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*cp++ = lookup_table[ac & 0x3f];
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return cp - dst;
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}
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static int digest_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
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{
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int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
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const char *p;
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char *cp = dst;
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while (i < len) {
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p = strchr(lookup_table, src[i]);
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if (p == NULL || src[i] == 0)
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return -2;
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ac += (p - lookup_table) << bits;
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bits += 6;
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if (bits >= 8) {
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*cp++ = ac & 0xff;
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ac >>= 8;
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bits -= 8;
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}
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i++;
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}
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if (ac)
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return -1;
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return cp - dst;
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}
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bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 orig_len,
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u32 max_len, u32 *encrypted_len_ret)
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{
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int padding = 4 << (inode->i_crypt_info->ci_flags &
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FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
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u32 encrypted_len;
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if (orig_len > max_len)
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return false;
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encrypted_len = max(orig_len, (u32)FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
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encrypted_len = round_up(encrypted_len, padding);
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*encrypted_len_ret = min(encrypted_len, max_len);
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer - allocate a buffer for presented filenames
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*
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* Allocate a buffer that is large enough to hold any decrypted or encoded
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* filename (null-terminated), for the given maximum encrypted filename length.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *inode,
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u32 max_encrypted_len,
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struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
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{
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const u32 max_encoded_len =
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max_t(u32, BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE),
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1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)));
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u32 max_presented_len;
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max_presented_len = max(max_encoded_len, max_encrypted_len);
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crypto_str->name = kmalloc(max_presented_len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
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if (!crypto_str->name)
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return -ENOMEM;
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crypto_str->len = max_presented_len;
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer);
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/**
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* fscrypt_fname_free_buffer - free the buffer for presented filenames
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*
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* Free the buffer allocated by fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer().
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*/
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void fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
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{
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if (!crypto_str)
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return;
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kfree(crypto_str->name);
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crypto_str->name = NULL;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_free_buffer);
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/**
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* fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() - converts a filename from disk space to user
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* space
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*
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* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
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*
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* If the key is available, we'll decrypt the disk name; otherwise, we'll encode
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* it for presentation. Short names are directly base64-encoded, while long
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* names are encoded in fscrypt_digested_name format.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
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u32 hash, u32 minor_hash,
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const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
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struct fscrypt_str *oname)
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{
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const struct qstr qname = FSTR_TO_QSTR(iname);
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struct fscrypt_digested_name digested_name;
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if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(&qname)) {
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oname->name[0] = '.';
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oname->name[iname->len - 1] = '.';
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oname->len = iname->len;
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return 0;
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}
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if (iname->len < FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE)
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return -EUCLEAN;
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if (inode->i_crypt_info)
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return fname_decrypt(inode, iname, oname);
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if (iname->len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) {
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oname->len = digest_encode(iname->name, iname->len,
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oname->name);
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return 0;
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}
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if (hash) {
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digested_name.hash = hash;
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digested_name.minor_hash = minor_hash;
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} else {
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digested_name.hash = 0;
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digested_name.minor_hash = 0;
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}
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memcpy(digested_name.digest,
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FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(iname->name, iname->len),
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FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE);
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oname->name[0] = '_';
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oname->len = 1 + digest_encode((const char *)&digested_name,
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sizeof(digested_name), oname->name + 1);
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr);
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/**
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* fscrypt_setup_filename() - prepare to search a possibly encrypted directory
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* @dir: the directory that will be searched
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* @iname: the user-provided filename being searched for
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* @lookup: 1 if we're allowed to proceed without the key because it's
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* ->lookup() or we're finding the dir_entry for deletion; 0 if we cannot
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* proceed without the key because we're going to create the dir_entry.
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* @fname: the filename information to be filled in
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*
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* Given a user-provided filename @iname, this function sets @fname->disk_name
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* to the name that would be stored in the on-disk directory entry, if possible.
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* If the directory is unencrypted this is simply @iname. Else, if we have the
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* directory's encryption key, then @iname is the plaintext, so we encrypt it to
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* get the disk_name.
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*
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* Else, for keyless @lookup operations, @iname is the presented ciphertext, so
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* we decode it to get either the ciphertext disk_name (for short names) or the
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* fscrypt_digested_name (for long names). Non-@lookup operations will be
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* impossible in this case, so we fail them with ENOKEY.
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*
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* If successful, fscrypt_free_filename() must be called later to clean up.
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
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int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
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{
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int ret;
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int digested;
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memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
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fname->usr_fname = iname;
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if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
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fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
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fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
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return 0;
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}
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ret = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir);
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if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
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return ret;
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if (dir->i_crypt_info) {
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if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, iname->len,
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dir->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(dir),
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&fname->crypto_buf.len))
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return -ENAMETOOLONG;
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fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(fname->crypto_buf.len,
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GFP_NOFS);
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if (!fname->crypto_buf.name)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = fname_encrypt(dir, iname, fname->crypto_buf.name,
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fname->crypto_buf.len);
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if (ret)
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goto errout;
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fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
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fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
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return 0;
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}
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if (!lookup)
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return -ENOKEY;
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/*
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* We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
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* user-supplied name
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*/
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if (iname->name[0] == '_') {
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if (iname->len !=
|
|
1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)))
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
|
digested = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (iname->len >
|
|
BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE))
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
|
digested = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fname->crypto_buf.name =
|
|
kmalloc(max_t(size_t, FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE,
|
|
sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)),
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
ret = digest_decode(iname->name + digested, iname->len - digested,
|
|
fname->crypto_buf.name);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ret = -ENOENT;
|
|
goto errout;
|
|
}
|
|
fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
|
|
if (digested) {
|
|
const struct fscrypt_digested_name *n =
|
|
(const void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;
|
|
fname->hash = n->hash;
|
|
fname->minor_hash = n->minor_hash;
|
|
} else {
|
|
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
|
|
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
errout:
|
|
kfree(fname->crypto_buf.name);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_setup_filename);
|